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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines and evaluates the legal protection of privacy and personal data in 
South Africa and across Africa in the electronic health care industry, that is, where 
medical services are provided to individuals by way of networked technological 
platforms including mobile telephones. This thesis presents a critical understanding 
of, and pragmatic solution to, the questions that lie at the intersection of the following: 
an individual’s right to privacy and data protection, cultural disparities when defining 
privacy, the emergence of electronic health care, the sensitivity of health related data, 
the need for health care in areas, where lack of resources and lack of accessibility are 
often commonplace, and the introduction of networked technologies within the health 
care system as a solution. 
 Firstly, eHealth services and applications are described. Secondly, notions of 
privacy and data protection are considered. Thirdly, the prevailing legal determinants 
that form the basis of African and South African data protection regulatory measures 
are ascertained. Fourthly, selected illustrations are presented of the practical 
implementation of eHealth services and certain recent influencers within the digital 
environment, which may inform the future eHealth privacy regulatory framework. 
Finally, criticisms of the Malabo Convention are presented and recommendations 
advanced.  
 As there is limited guidance with regard to policymaking decisions concerning 
privacy and data protection in the implementation of eHealth in developing countries, 
possibilities for reform are suggested. These will allow a more careful balance 
between, on the one hand, the normative commitment to providing accessible health 
care using electronic means and, on the other, the rights to privacy and data protection 
of the user, which require safeguarding within an African context.  
 In proposing a solution, it is argued that adequate privacy regulation of 
electronic health must (1) be sensitive to societal and cultural differences in what is 
considered private, (2) be responsive to rapid technological transformation in 
healthcare industries, and (3) build user confidence in data protection in this context, 
to enable nascent electronic health initiatives to reach their potential in Africa. 
 It is proposed that the adoption of an accepted social imperative protected by a 
powerful triumvirate of ethical constraints, effective legal provisions and regulations, 
and operational necessities, is possible. Greater regulatory collaboration across the 
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continent is called for based on harmonised domestic and international laws, national 
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CHAPTER 1: STATING THE PROBLEM     
 
O my body, make of me always a man who questions!  





I  INTRODUCTION 
The provision of health care in Africa today faces many challenges, including a 
shortage of health care resources, an increased burden of disease, a large proportion of 
the population living in rural areas, and a lack of education and primary health care.1 
Illness and death in developing countries are often due to health conditions that are 
preventable and for which medical solutions are known and easily implemented.2 
Advances in information communication technology over the past few years have 
provided an alternative and attractive method of health care delivery in the form of 
electronic health (eHealth).  
Although increasing in popularity and of enormous benefit, eHealth has 
created potential ethical and legal challenges to regulators, both internationally and in 
Africa. Safeguarding privacy is an issue plaguing the successful implementation of 
eHealth.3  
As there is limited guidance to direct regulatory decisions with regard to 
privacy and data protection in the implementation of eHealth in developing countries4, 
the intention of this thesis is to arrive at a clearer understanding of the broader legal 
narrative, while suggesting possibilities for regulatory reform, which may allow 
greater inclusion and collaboration in adequately safeguarding privacy rights within 
the African region.  
 
                                               
1 WHO ‘World Health Statistics: 2012’ (2012); M Mars and C Seebregts ‘Country Case Study for 
eHealth: South Africa’ (2008) Rockefeller Foundation at 1. 
2 A Le Roux ‘Telemedicine: A South African legal perspective’ (2008) (1) TSAR at 99 and M Kekana, 
B Mkhize and P Noe ‘The practice of telemedicine and challenges to the regulatory authorities.’ (2010) 
3 (1) South African Journal of Bioethics and Law at 33. 
3 C Erwell ‘Telemedicine: overcoming obstacles on the road to global health care’ (2003) International 
Trade Law Journal 68 at 69; S Fox and L Rainie ‘The online health care revolution’ Pew Internet & 
American Life Project: Online Report (2000) at 1.  
4 N Leon et al. ‘Applying a framework for assessing the health system challenges to scaling up mhealth 
in South Africa’ (2013) 12 BMC Medical Informatics and decision making at 123. 
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II  THE PREDICAMENT: THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 
AND EHEALTH DATA PROTECTION 
This thesis commences by stating the predicament arising in privacy and data 
protection brought about by the recent emergence of health care applications in the 
digital order within Africa.  
The predicament is set out as follows. Firstly, strides in technological 
development and wider use of the electronic environment have advanced new threats 
to its users. The rights to privacy and data protection have been placed at risk by 
emerging technological processes. These emerging threats cannot be easily and 
suitably overcome by historical legal remedies and require additional and/or 
alternative resolution measures. The question is how are these potential violations to 
privacy rights to be safeguarded against in the provision of much-needed eHealth in 
developing countries, such as those found in Africa?  
In light of the borderless nature of the threat, the inference drawn is that any 
resolution cannot be achieved in isolation. The challenges lie in the disparity between 
the evolving norms both internationally and regionally, the significant and rapid 
acceleration of technological progress, and the practical incorporation of such norms 
at a national level.  
Within this context, the aim is to provide a pragmatic solution that is 
appropriate within an African context by the proposed engagement of legal, 
regulatory and policymaking measures. Insight is thus provided in this thesis, aimed at 
informing regulatory governance and ensuring that the delicate balance between the 
normative commitment to provide adequate and accessible health care, on the one 
hand, and the right to privacy and data protection of the user, on the other, is 
safeguarded within a uniquely African context.  
For illustrative purposes, the position of privacy and data protection within 
South Africa is considered. South Africa is a useful example of how data protection 
regulation may be implemented on a domestic level and is used as a case study as it 
mirrors many of the issues found within the African region as a whole. Consideration 
of the position found in South Africa is a worthwhile endeavour as privacy is 
protected by a multi-facetted approach, that is, by virtue of the law of delict, by means 
of a protected right of privacy enshrined in the Constitution, and by provisions in 
4 
general or specific privacy and data protection legislation. These means of protection 
run concurrently within the legal system and, rather than existing independently, their 
convergence and mutual interaction can serve to strengthen any consequential privacy 
protection. South Africa is, however, merely used to illustrate certain challenges 
experienced in the domestic implementation of data protection regulation within a 
health care environment and is not an attempt to provide a complete solution within 
the country itself or within the African continent as a whole.  
The argument postulated in this thesis is that contemporary digital and health 
care expansion precludes the adherence to suppositions of strict self-reliance and 
detachment. The proposition is that an exercise in slavish adherence to autonomous 
self-determination by sovereign nations may very well prove ineffectual. Rather, a 
multi-layered approach combining various regulatory measures is a more viable 
solution. It is suggested further that an overly simplistic generalisation about Africa 
may be averted by way of a layered approach to regulation. 
 
III  THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT  
Firstly, this thesis examines and defines eHealth services and applications and the 
essence of privacy and data protection in Chapters 2 and 3. The prevailing legal 
determinants forming the basis of African and South African data protection 
regulatory measures are ascertained in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 6 sets out selected 
illustrations of the practical implementation of eHealth services and identifies certain 
recent influencers, or drivers, within the digital environment, which may inform 
future eHealth privacy and data protection regulatory frameworks. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 
present criticisms of the Malabo Convention and possible solutions and 
recommendations.  
 
IV  SCOPE AND DESCRIPTION OF THE TERMS ‘AFRICA’ 
AND ‘AFRICAN’ 
The purpose of this thesis is not to analyse class structures across 55 African nation-
states as to do so is not feasible. Instead, the thesis assesses and proposes 
5 
improvements to the regional and national regulation of privacy and data protection in 
the context of eHealth provision within the African continent as a whole.5   
In this thesis, ‘Africa’ is used to describe the 55 sovereign states that have 
ratified or acceded to the Constitutive Act of the African Union. This is done 
primarily as I seek to understand the influence of certain regional and sub-regional 
data protection instruments, specifically those of the African Union and its most 
recently promulgated Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection 
(‘the Malabo Convention’). I acknowledge that it is problematic to treat Africa as a 
single homogeneous entity as it is a continent of great diversity. As stated by Ryszard 
Kapuściński when describing Africa: 'The continent is too large to describe. It is a 
veritable ocean, a separate planet, a varied, immensely rich cosmos. Only with the 
greatest simplification, for the sake of convenience, can we say "Africa". In reality, 
except as a geographical appellation, Africa does not exist’.6 However, this thesis 
addresses a shared problem in the region of Africa, and for reasons of necessity, 
generalisations where justified by the available facts are unavoidable. Importantly, the 
solution the thesis proposes is a regional effort to tackle the problem identified in the 
thesis, including harmonising regional laws which can then be adopted by states with 
appropriate modifications taking account of varying conditions in particular countries.  
 ‘African’ is used to denote people who originated on the African continent. 
Using the phrase an ‘African perspective’ is not meant to imply that it is the 
perspective of all indigenous people, but only to designate the normative thought 
common amongst those people in Africa. Likewise, using the term ‘Western’ denotes 
the normative thought of those in the West, that is, predominately in Europe and 
America. Using a geographical term to connote a certain idea does not suggest that all 
people in that geographical area accept the idea or perspective, nor that no one outside 
of that area does. It merely means that the idea or perspective is prevalent in that area 
to a noticeable extent, relative to other places in the world. The importance of privacy 
and protecting personal data is the foundation on which the thesis’s argument is 
                                               
5 Africa is a vast continent consisting of 55 sovereign states recognised by either the AU or the UN or 
both, 9 territories and 2 de facto independent states with limited recognition. The member states of the 
African Union are the 55 sovereign states that have ratified or acceded to the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union. 
6 Ryszard Kapuściński writes of Africa in his book The Cobra's Heart: extracted from the author's 
book The Shadow of the Sun (2007). 
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built.  The raison d’être of the thesis’s argument is to assess and make proposals 
regarding the protection of privacy and personal data in African societies. 
 
V ARGUMENT   
In this thesis, I shall argue that: 
 
(a)  with the emergence and increased accessibility of the Internet and, 
particularly, social media, the development of mobile (mHealth) and 
electronic health (eHealth) is an inevitability;7  
(b)  a health care crisis looms in many developing countries, including in South 
Africa, and eHealth as a potential platform for the distribution of health care 
services provides an attractive, alternative or complementary solution;8 
(c)  various legal barriers to the implementation of eHealth exist, including more 
specifically violations of one’s right to privacy and data protection; 
(d)  the right to privacy is an elusive concept worthy of debate; 
(e)  in exploring the notion of privacy, the cultural and contextual sensitivities that 
arise in certain countries and the great influence and importance of traditional 
indigenous laws should be considered;  
(f)  recent international developments in data protection regulatory frameworks 
make valuable contributions to the debate;  
(g)  the regulatory framework within the African region governing data protection 
is documented in this thesis; 
(h)  emerging trends in medical and technological development, although hugely 
beneficial to the service delivery of health care in developing countries, have 
created additional regulatory challenges, with regard to cross-jurisdictional 
data mobility and data protection;  
                                               
7 ‘eHealth’ is electronic health and ‘mHealth’ is mobile health; both are defined in greater detail in 
Chapter 2. 
8  See L Schoeman ‘Embracing e-government: In search of accountable and efficient governance 
objectives that improve service delivery in the South African health sector’ (2007) 42 (5) Journal of 
Public Administration 183 at 184. 
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(i)  it is therefore necessary to advance a range of approaches, which may wholly 
or partially transform the existing regulatory environment into one that is 
better suited to a technologically enabled health system;  
(j)  the law within South Africa can be used as an illustration of an effective 
African position regarding data protection developments. This is because 
South African law is an approach that can be duplicated or emulated in other 
African countries;  
(k)  the Malabo Convention, although positive in many respects, fails to address 
the rapid development of eHealth with regard to the protection of sensitive 
medical data and issues of consent in developing countries; 
(l)  a means of protecting an individual’s right to privacy and to control the use of 
their personal information is to adopt a multidisciplinary and multifaceted 
approach to data protection regulation;9 
(m)  while it is imperative, on the one hand, to remain part of the international 
information community and to ensure that data can be freely and easily 
exchanged, it is necessary, on the other hand, to appreciate the difficulty of 
implementing internationally adopted eHealth privacy regulations mindlessly 
within an African context;  
(n)  the determination is to provide a solution that is appropriate, equitable and 
beneficial to developing countries whilst upholding human rights;  
(o)  additionally, it is acknowledged that there exists a need for greater 
standardisation and harmonisation of data protection laws within the African 
region, which would require greater co-operation between African nations; 
(p)  and finally, on a practical and doctrinal level, it is proposed that there is a need 
for a more collaborative, inclusive, pragmatic regional approach to 
policymaking.  
 
VI METHODOLOGY  
This thesis relies on research conducted using published materials. These include 
international organisations treaties, declarations, resolutions, recommendations; 
policy documents, statements and guidelines; reports of investigations; submissions 
                                               
9 See A Roos ‘Core principles of data protection law’ (2006) 39 CILSA at 102. 
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and proposals to the organisations; minutes and reports of meetings; Special 
Rapporteur reports; General Comments; and reported cases. Domestic government 
materials including statutes, regulations, policy documents, and reported cases. Non-
governmental organisation reports; policy documents; public statements and press 
briefings were considered. The main secondary sources relied upon include books, 
journals, newspaper and online articles, research reports and theses.  
 
 
VII CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, I have set out the predicament and argument to be presented in this 
thesis. The structure of the argument to be followed has been outlined. In Chapter 2, I 





CHAPTER 2: DEFINITION AND BENEFIT OF E-HEALTH 
 
Science never solves a problem without creating ten more.1  
George Bernard Shaw 
  
                                               
1 ‘The doctor’s dilemma’ (2003) 32 (6) International Journal of Epidemiology 910–5. 
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I INTRODUCTION  
Chapter 2 begins by defining the concept of eHealth. The nature and scope of eHealth 
and its benefits are examined in greater detail. Thereafter, the health care position of 
developing countries and the challenges faced are discussed, specifically with regard 
to what has been described as a health care crisis.2 As equitable access to health care 
should be a highly desirable goal of most states, the merits of alternative, or 
supplementary, methods of addressing health care delivery are explored.  
By referring to the examples of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa and the use 
of mobile text messages, two potentially conflicting themes are explored: the right to 
privacy and data protection, on the one hand, and the right to access health care 
through the promising phenomenon of eHealth, on the other. Finally, a barrier to the 
development of eHealth is examined, that is, safeguarding user privacy and data 
protection. 
 
II EHEALTH DEFINED 
When Archbishop Tutu3 was asked whether eHealth could narrow the divide in social 
inequality across the world, he responded:  
‘[t]echnology is a major driving force of our civilisation …[w]hat we need is a 
paradigm shift from information and communications technologies for health to a 
greater emphasis on information and communications technologies for development, 
which benefit health but also have an effect on education, agriculture, commerce, 
governance and other social determinants of health. What the poor and the vulnerable 
people need is not only good lives but good health as well’.4  
In the following sections, eHealth, mHealth (i.e. mobile health), telemedicine 
and cyber-medicine will be described in turn. Although no universally accepted 
                                               
2 ‘Reforming healthcare in South Africa’ (2011) Report 18 Centre for Development and Enterprise at 
7.  
3 Archbishop Desmond Tutu speaking at the Global eHealth Ambassadors Program of the International 
Society for Telemedicine and eHealth. 
4 WHO ‘The bigger picture for e-health’ (2012) 90 (5) Bulletin of the World Health Organization 321–
400.  
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definition exists,5 eHealth (or electronic health) is a broad term encompassing the use 
of all information and communications technologies with the aim of delivering health 
care services and information from a distance.6 eHealth is thus an overarching concept 
incorporating mHealth, telemedicine, and cyber-medicine.  
The objective of eHealth is to optimise both efficiency and quality in the 
provision of health care and, generally, to improve patients’ quality of care.7 eHealth 
seeks to dismantle the barriers of traditional health care support and to facilitate 
access to health services for all people, regardless of their geographical location.8 It 
describes online applications and communication technologies, which traverse a range 
of activities and services within the health care sector.9 The WHO defines eHealth as: 
‘the cost-effective and secure use of information and communications technologies in 
support of health and health-related fields, including health care services, health 
surveillance, health literature, and health education, knowledge and research’.10 
eHealth exists at the intersection of ‘medical information, public health and 
business’11 and is a means of improving the quality of service delivery, especially in 
primary health care. 12  It comprises four interrelating categories: (a) clinical 
information systems, (b) telemedicine and homecare, (c) integrated regional/national 
health information, and (d) secondary usage non-clinical systems. 13 
                                               
5  BM Kalema and MR Kgasi ‘Leveraging E-health for Future-oriented Healthcare Systems in 
Developing Countries’ (2014) 65 (8) The Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing 
Countries at 3. 
6 WMA ‘Statement on Guiding Principles for the Use of Telehealth for the Provision of Health Care’ 
(2009). See also A Le Roux ‘Telemedicine: A South African legal perspective’ (2008) 1 TSAR 99 at 
100. 
7 Kalema and Kgasi (n 5) at 1. 
8 Ibid. 
9 S Callens and K Cierkens ‘Legal aspects of eHealth’ (2008) 141 Stud Health Technology Information 
47–56. 
10 WHO (n 4) at 321. 
11 WHO ‘WHA58.28 e-health’ (2005). 
12 Ibid. 
13 eHealth Taskforce Report ‘Accelerating the Development of the eHealth Market in Europe’ (2007) 
European Union eHealth Taskforce Report at 10. 
12 
In an attempt to provide a definitive description of eHealth, Hans et al. 
undertook a systematic review of published, suggested, or proposed definitions of 
eHealth.14 They conducted a qualitative analysis of these definitions of eHealth with 
regard to content and emerging themes, as gleaned from documents, articles, 
references and websites.15 They found that, of the 51 unique definitions retrieved, 
although a wide range of themes were found, ‘no clear consensus’ about the meaning 
of the term eHealth could be established. Nevertheless, two universal themes were 
consistent, that of, ‘health’ and ‘technology’. 16  The conclusion drawn was that, 
although the use of the term eHealth is ‘widespread’, there is a ‘tacit understanding’ 
of the meaning of the term. 17  As is the case with most neologisms, it is often 
problematic to establish the precise meaning of the term, with the meaning frequently 
transient and varying according to the context within which it is used. eHealth thus 
characterises ‘virtually everything related to computers and medicine’.18 Eysenbach 
defines eHealth as: 
‘… not only a technical development, but also a state-of-mind, a way of thinking, an 
attitude, and a commitment for networked, global thinking, to improve health care 
locally, regionally, and worldwide by using information and communication 
technology’.19 
eHealth thus involves the use of online, digital and related information 
systems and technology in all aspects of health care.20 Common themes included in 
                                               
14 OH Hans, C Rizo, M Enkin and A Jadad ‘What Is eHealth (3): A Systematic Review of Published 
Definitions’ (2005) 7 (1) Journal of Medical Internet Research at e1. 
15  A total of 1209 abstracts were scanned and 430 citations reviewed from various bibliographic 
databases. 
16 Hans et al. (n 14) at e1. 
17 Ibid. 
18 G Eysenbach ‘What is e-health?’ (2001) 3(2) Journal of Medical Internet Research at e20. 
19 Ibid. 
20 JE Orlikoff and MK Totten ‘Trustee workbook 3. E-health and the board: the brave new world of 
governance Part 1’ (2000) 53 (7) Trustee at 4. 
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the definition are health, health care 21  or health care delivery, 22  and the use of 
communications technology, either explicitly or implicitly.23 
mHealth (or mobile health) is a component of eHealth. 24  mHealth is a 
‘medical and public health practice supported by mobile devices, such as mobile 
phones, patient monitoring devices, personal digital assistants and other wireless 
devices’.25 It is the utilisation of mobile devices to improve ‘health outcomes, health 
care services, and health research’. 26  mHealth comprises health care practices 
supported by mobile devices.27 When linked to the Internet and other social network 
platforms, mobile telephone functionality extends beyond mere one-to-one voice 
communication and instant messaging. 28  Mobile technology has enabled instant 
wireless connectivity and enabled users to communicate in real time, and gain access 
to Internet-based software applications, in a way that was not previously possible.29 
Consequently, mHealth has emerged as a rapidly expanding technology platform for 
transforming electronic health care. 30  It uses wireless technologies, for instance, 
Bluetooth, GSM/GPRS/3G, WiFi, and WiMAX, to transmit health data and facilitate 
health care services. These applications are accessed through devices such as mobile 
telephones, voice recorders, patient monitoring devices, Smartphones, personal digital 
                                               
21 ‘Health care’ is defined in Medical-dictionary.com as ‘[t]he prevention, treatment, and management 
of illness and the presentation of mental and physical well being through the services offered by the 
medical and allied health professions’. 
22 Hans et al. (n 14) at e1.  
23 Ibid. 
24 CZ Qiang, M Yamamichi, V Hausman and R Miller ‘Mobile applications for the health sector’ 
(2012) at 21. See also WHO ‘mHealth: New horizons for health through mobile technologies’ in the 
second Global Observatory for eHealth Series vol 3 (2011) at 6. 
25 Ibid. 
26 K Congdon ‘The rise of mHealth’ (2013) Health IT Outcomes. 
27 WHO (n 24) at 6. 
28 E Edouard and L Edouard ‘Application of information and communication technology for scaling up 
youth sexual and reproductive health’ (2012) 16 (2) African Journal of Reproductive Health at 197. 
29 AO Adesina, KK Agbele, K Kehinde, R Februarie, AP Abidoye and HO Nyongesa ‘Ensuring the 
security and privacy of information in mobile health-care communication systems’ (2011) 107 (9–10) 
South African Journal of Science at 4. 
30 M Mars and C Jack ‘Why is telemedicine a challenge to the regulators? (2010) 3 (2) SAJBL 55 at 56. 
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assistants, sensor gadgets, laptops or tablet computers.31 Medical information is then 
uploaded and stored on various mHealth electronic storage devices.32  
The term ‘telemedicine’ has been applied in various forms since the early 
1960s and has continued to develop steadily in scope and application.33 The WHO 
defines telemedicine as: 
‘[t]he delivery of health services, where distance is a critical factor, by all health care 
professionals using information and communication technologies for the exchange of 
valid information for diagnosis, treatment and prevention of disease and injuries, 
research and evaluation, and for the continuing education of health providers, all in 
the interests of advancing the health of individuals and their communities’.34  
Telemedicine is the practice of health care delivery, consultation, diagnosis 
and treatment, education, and the transfer of medical data35 that is carried out ‘at a 
distance’.36 Telemedicine interactions are frequently between a host and a remote site 
and telemedicine describes a ‘technique’ for health care delivery rather than any one 
specific technology.37 Telemedicine is provided in real time, interactively between the 
participants, using data, voice or video, for instance, or by making use of ancillary 
technological diagnostic tools, such as electronic stethoscopes.38  
Telemedicine is categorised into either ‘store-and-forward’ telemedicine or 
‘face-to-face’ telemedicine. ‘Store-and-forward’, or asynchronous telemedicine, is 
used for non-emergency situations where the eHealth consultation is made within 24 – 
48 hours. The patient’s data and accompanying images or sound files (usually x-rays, 
CT scans or MRI) are transmitted by secure e-mail or website to a colleague health 
practitioner, who then reviews the data and provides a diagnosis, advice and/or a 
                                               
31 Adesina et al. (n 29) at 4. 
32 R Wootton, NG Patil, RE Scott and K Ho Telehealth in the Developing World (2009) at 43. 
33 L Rannefeld ‘The doctor will e-mail you now: Physicians’ use of telemedicine to treat patients over 
the Internet’ (2004) 19 (1) Journal of Law and Health 75 at 77. 
34 WHO ‘Telemedicine Opportunities and developments in Member States’ in Global Observatory for 
eHealth series (2010) 2 at 9. 
35 L Cilliers and SV Flowerday ‘Health information systems to improve health care: A telemedicine 
case study’ (2013) 15 (1) SA Journal of Information Management 1–5 at 1. 
36 Ibid and Rannefeld (n 33) at 77. 
37 Le Roux (n 6) at 101. 
38 M Mars ‘Telepsychiatry in Africa: A way forward?’ (2012) 15 African Journal of Psychiatry at 215. 
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health management plan. 39  In face-to-face or synchronous telemedicine, eHealth 
consultations are interactive and occur in real time, using, for example, video-
conferencing, a two-way telephone conversation or Skype applications.40 
Lastly, cyber-medicine is closely related to telemedicine41 and is described as 
‘the science of applying internet and global networking technologies to medicine and 
public health, of studying the impact and implications of the Internet, and of 
evaluating opportunities and the challenges for health care’.42  Although there are 
areas of overlap, telemedicine43 focuses primarily on a restricted exchange of clinical 
information between patient and doctor or between doctor and doctor, while cyber-
medicine dispenses health information and advice between a doctor and patient via 
the Internet, or other online platform, with or without an established or ongoing 
doctor-patient relationship.44 This usually involves an online platform, such as an 
Internet website, where a health care practitioner, or a group of practitioners, offers 
various medical services to users. Services would usually be restricted to the 
provision of primary health care,45 advice, information, and second opinions. The 
health practitioner and user communicate online via e-mail, instant messaging or a 
real-time chat service. The practice of this form of eHealth, although increasingly 
popular, is also the most controversial, with questions around the quality of the care, 
misdiagnosis, misrepresentation, breaches of privacy and confidentiality, and the 
potential abuse of online pharmaceutical drug prescriptions being of the most 
concern. 46  Whereas telemedicine is generally applied to ‘diagnostic and curative 
                                               
39 Ibid. 
40 P Malindi and MTE Kahn ‘Letter to the Editor: Rural Telemedicine in Africa’ (2005) 47 (8) South 
African Family Practice at 4. 
41 Rannefeld (n 33) at 77. 
42 G Eysenbach, E Ryoung Sa and TL Diepgen ‘Shopping around the Internet today and tomorrow: 
towards the millennium of cybermedicine’ (1999) 319 (7220) BMJ 1294 at 1294. 
43 Or ‘health care at a distance’. 
44 Le Roux (n 6) at 100. 
45 Primary health care is defined as ‘the provision of integrated, accessible, health care services by 
clinicians who are accountable for addressing a large majority of personal health care needs, 
developing a sustained partnership with patients, and practicing in the context of the family and the 
community’ in EE Westberg and RA Miller ‘The basis for using the Internet to support the information 
needs of primary care’ (1999) 6 JAMIA at 6.  
46  C Erwell ‘Telemedicine: Overcoming obstacles on the road to global health care’ (2003) 
International Trade Law Journal 68 at 69. 
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medicine’, cyber-medicine is applied to ‘preventive medicine and public health’.47 
While telemedicine is driven by a so-called ‘technological push’, cyber-medicine is 
characterised by a ‘consumer pull’.48  
The terms ‘telemedicine’, ‘tele-health’, ‘online health’, ‘eHealth’, ‘connected 
health’, and ‘cyber-medicine’ are used inconsistently and interchangeably in the 
literature and should be interpreted within the context within which they are used. 
What is constant, however, in the definitions of ‘telemedicine’, ‘eHealth’ and ‘cyber-
medicine’ is the use of electronic and communication technologies within health care 
practice that are then often linked to the technologies of the time. For ease of 
reference, I have used the more general term of ‘eHealth’, unless the terms 
‘telemedicine’, ‘mHealth’ or ‘cyber-medicine’ are more appropriate. 
 
III NATURE AND SCOPE OF EHEALTH  
Increasingly, the future of health care services is being defined by online social 
network tools like weblogs, instant messaging, video chat, online consultations and 
advice forums.49 eHealth offers a myriad of opportunities to benefit from, manage and 
provide access to medical data, which in turn can deliver higher quality patient care.50  
The South African National eHealth Strategy 51  includes the following 
activities and services that fall within the scope of eHealth: 
• electronic health and medication records; 
• health management information;  
• health information networks / consumer health informatics; 
• health knowledge management;  
                                               
47 G Eysenbach ‘Towards ethical guidelines for dealing with unsolicited patient emails and giving 
teleadvice in the absence of a pre-existing patient-physician relationship systematic review and expert 
survey’ (2000) 2 (1) J Med Internet Res at e1.  
48 ‘Technology push’ refers to the existence and availability of technology without defining the user’s 
demands and does not necessarily lead to a widespread use of telemedicine applications and/or 
services. Customer or ‘demand pull’, in contrast, is a response to users’ demands and needs, 
irrespective of existing or developing technology. 
49 C Hawn ‘Take two aspirin and tweet me in the morning: How Twitter, Facebook, and other Social 
Media are reshaping health care’ (2009) 28 (2) Health Affairs at 361.  
50 Kalema and Kgasi (n 5) at 1. 
51 ‘National eHealth Strategy South Africa 2012–2016’ Department of Health (2012) at 7. 
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• mHealth; 
• telemedicine and tele-care services; 
• virtual health care, diagnosis and treatment (health professionals’ co-operation 
via ICTs, online diagnosis and treatment of limited and specific medical 
conditions and provision of primary health care); and 
• health research.  
 
Additionally, eHealth includes: 
• the prevention of disease (including access to the latest news, articles and 
trends in health care and medically related matters as well as the promotion of 
health and well-being);  
• remote patient monitoring (includes home-centered care, supporting self-
management of chronic diseases and personal management tools, such as 
online disease management, for example, online health and tracking 
applications); 
• online discussion and support groups; 
• continuing education of health professionals and patients; and 
• ePrescribing.52  
 
Furthermore, eHealth extends to virtual reality, robotics, multimedia, digital 
imaging and computer assisted surgery.53 
One should, however, differentiate between those who use health resources on 
various online platforms and on technological platforms merely as ‘users’ who seek 
advice and support for general medical, wellness and health conditions, and those who 
seek specific diagnosis, treatment, care and second opinions, and who may thus be 
more accurately described as ‘patients’. eHealth, however, is steadily transforming 
‘patients’ into ‘users’ and, finally, into ‘consumers’. With innovative eHealth 
                                               
52 B Futter ‘The naked patient’ (2012) 79 (9) South African Pharmaceutical Journal at 64. 
53 N Ferraud-Ciandet ‘Privacy and data protection in eHealth: A comparative approach between South 
African and French legal systems’ (2010) IST-Africa at 1–10. 
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services, it is believed that health care systems can advance from a purely public 
service delivery towards transforming the patient into a consumer.54  
 
IV BENEFITS AND USES OF EHEALTH 
The benefits and uses of eHealth are considered hereunder. The following sub-
sections discussed are online health information seeking, emerging virtual health care 
patterns, and the socio-economic impact of eHealth. 
(1)  eHealth and online health information seeking 
The online environment provides instant data sharing, which includes applications, 
such as Myspace, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Wikipedia, as well as online websites 
developed for the purpose of information sharing and interconnectivity.55 Users are 
increasingly using search engines to obtain health related information. In 2004, 
Google reported that five percent of all searches were health related. 56  This 
percentage has grown considerably, with a 2012 survey indicating that obtaining 
health information is one of the most popular activities conducted online: 72 percent 
of Internet users surveyed had searched for a health-related topic online within the 
preceding year.57  
The extent of online personal diagnoses was explored in a health survey. Pew 
researchers asked participants whether they had used the Internet to search for at least 
one of 16 major health topics online, ranging from mental health and immunisations 
to sexual health information. The research found that users most frequently accessed 
the Internet to find information about a specific disease or medical condition (55 
percent) or a particular medical treatment or procedure (43 percent). Information was 
                                               
54 N Friederici, C Hullin & M Yamamichi ‘Chapter 3: mHealth’ in Information and Communications 
for Development 2012: Maximizing Mobile (2012) at 45.  
55 Social media is defined as ‘forms of electronic communication (as web sites for social networking 
and micro-blogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, 
personal messages, and other content (as videos)’. Available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
(accessed 12 February 2017). 
56 G Eysenbach and C Köhler ‘Health-related searches on the Internet’ (2004) 291 (24) J Am Med 
Assoc at 2946. 
57 Research conducted by the Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project ‘Health Fact 
Sheet’. 
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also sought about diet, nutrition and exercise or fitness (60 percent). Other popular 
health topics included prescription or over-the-counter drugs (34 percent); medical 
test results (15 percent); information on depression, anxiety or stress (21 percent) and 
information on a particular doctor or hospital (21 percent). Fifty-two percent of 
smartphone owners and 31 percent of cellular phone owners have searched for health 
information on their mobile phone, 58  while 19% of smartphone owners have 
downloaded an application to track or manage their health.59 
The Internet’s popularity as a health resource does not appear to be abating. A 
2010 survey revealed that an estimated 175 million people in the United States have 
used the Internet to search for health related information and that the number 
continues to increase. Frequency of use has also increased noticeably, with 32% of 
people who look for health information online doing so ‘often’. The poll found that 
the percentage of people who have gone online to search for health information had 
increased noticeably to 88%, with a staggering 81% having looked for health 
information online in the last month. Moreover, ‘very few’ people reported being 
dissatisfied with their ability to find what they were looking for online and over half 
reported discussing information they found on the Internet with their doctors.60 
As patients have wider access to medical resources, this has led to ‘higher 
quality standards and evidence-based medicine’.61 Fifty-three percent of online users 
said that they had used the information found online and discussed it with a medical 
professional.62 Patient to patient interchanges have also increased in popularity.63  
With the increased efficiency and acceleration of information transfer between 
information technology networks, the barriers to prompt and reliable exchanges of 
information, including health information and medical imagery, have been greatly 
eased. People can access information faster and more easily than was previously 
                                               
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 ‘Cyberchondriacs on the Rise?’ (2012) Harris Interactive. 
61 Eysenbach, Ryoung Sa and Diepgen (n 42) at 1295. 
62 S Fox and M Duggan ‘Information Triage’ (2013) Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life 
Project. 
63 Eysenbach Ryoung Sa and Diepgen (n 42) at 1295. 
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possible.64 The value of eHealth lies not in the communication technology per se but 
in the ability to share medical information and expertise with others.65 
(2)  eHealth and emerging virtual health care patterns  
eHealth has the advantage of affording users immediacy and anonymity. With 
immediate access at any time of the day or night, the continuous updating and 
revision of information and the extensive range of content available, online resources 
can be differentiated from other traditional forms of obtaining information.  
To illustrate how popular eHealth has become, an incredible 92% of users 
surveyed revealed that the health information they found during their last online 
search was ‘useful’, with 81% saying ‘they learned something new’.66 Of the 21 
million users who said they were influenced by what they read, 70% said ‘the web 
information influenced their decision about how to treat an illness or condition’, 50% 
said ‘the web information led them to ask a doctor new questions or get a second 
opinion from another doctor’, and 28% said ‘the web information affected their 
decision about whether or not to visit a doctor’.67 The significance of such widespread 
popularity seems to indicate that people are becoming more empowered to actively 
gain access to alternative accessible forms of health care services.68  
Of interest is that the anonymity offered by the Internet is viewed by users as 
advantageous, as it ‘allows users to ask awkward, sensitive, or detailed questions 
without the risk of facing judgment, scrutiny, or stigma, and to do so at their 
convenience’. 69  Additionally, users or patients are free to engage in a more 
participative health care model, which, in turn, alleviates the difficulties of physical 
                                               
64 C Jack and M Mars ‘Telemedicine a need for ethical and legal guidelines in South Africa’ (2008) 50 
(2) South African Family Practice 60a at 60c-d. 
65 GT Bosslet, AM Torke, SE Hickman, CL Terry and PR Helft ‘The patient-doctor relationship and 
online social networks: Results of a national survey’ (2011) 26 J Gen Intern Med 1168 at 1172. 
66 S Fox and L Rainie ‘The online health care revolution’ Pew Internet & American Life Project: 
Online Report (2000). 
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid.  
69 SR Cotten and SS Gupta ‘Characteristics of online and offline health information seekers and factors 
that discriminate between them’ (2004) 59 Social Science & Medicine at 1795. 
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access to health care practitioners experienced by those in isolated or remote areas. 
People have opted to perform previously face-to-face transactions online.70  
In addressing the challenge of increased health care sustainable delivery, the 
EU has increased its focus on a more patient-centric care methodology so that patients 
are better able to manage their own care, more particularly, by influencing patient 
behaviour to improve lifestyle choices, enable the treatment of chronic conditions 
remotely, and better equip health care providers in improved clinical decision 
making.71  
Data findings from a WHO survey noted that 91% of EU member states 
indicate that individuals and communities are using social media to learn about health 
issues. It reported that in 81% of EU member states, health care organisations use 
social media to promote health messages as part of their health campaigns, while 51% 
report that organisations use social media to make emergency announcements. 72 
Additionally, 14% of EU member states are reported to have a national policy or 
strategy in place, regulating the use of social media in health professions.73 eHealth 
data, when appropriately analysed, assists in establishing patterns of broader 
importance to various communities and societies. These patterns or trends may predict 
and avoid the escalation of potential health crises. 
(3)  eHealth and the socio-economic impact  
A 2013 report states that, in utilising eHealth, the EU could save 99 billion Euros in 
total annual health care expenditure in 2017. This translates to the treatment of an 
additional 24,5 million patients, while assisting 185 million users to benefit by leading 
healthier lifestyles. The PwC report estimates that 45 million chronic patients and 47 
million elderly people may require monitoring of their health conditions in the EU by 
2017.74 
                                               
70 Ibid.  
71 ‘Socio-economic impact of mHealth: An assessment report for the European Union’ June 2013 PwC. 
72 WHO ‘From innovation to implementation: eHealth in the WHO European Region’ (2016). See C 
Dario, A Dunbar, F Feliciani, M Garcia-barbero, S Giovannetti, G Graschew, P Mancini, MTJ Mohr, P 
Ortiz García, S Pedersen, JM Pérez-Sastre and A Rey ‘Opportunities and Challenges of Ehealth and 
Telemedicine via Satellite’ (2004) Eur J Med Res Supplement at 1. 
73 Ibid. 
74 PwC (n 71) at 15.  
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eHealth has a socio-economic impact by shifting the emphasis of health care 
to the prevention of disease and the enhancement of wellness.75 The proliferation of 
medical and health care websites, online databases, health care advice services and 
publications available on the Internet is testimony to the need for ongoing alternative 
sources of medical advice, support and treatment. An array of health information and 
advice is freely available online, with support groups and medical organisations, for 
example, the Heart and Stroke Foundation South Africa 76  and Diabetes South 
Africa77, providing information to online users on the causes, symptoms, treatments 
and preventative measures for various conditions.  
Websites that allow patients to gain online access to their medical reports and 
patient records, billing information, appointment bookings and clinical laboratory 
reports have also increased in popularity. 78 Social media provides the capacity for 
online users to make contact easily and effortlessly with other users with similar 
conditions. 79  With the number of medical websites currently well in excess of 
100 000, there is a global awareness, if not something of a fascination, with medically 
related online content.80  
eHealth is a worldwide phenomenon and growing steadily.81 The number of 
health-related applications in Apple’s online App Store increased from 4000 in 
February 2010 to more than 15 000 by September 2011, just 18 months later.82 A 
survey of asthma patients between the ages of 12 and 40 years old named text 
messaging, email and Facebook as being used at least weekly by the majority of 
respondents (82%, 77% and 65%, respectively). Interestingly, female and Black or 
Hispanic participants were found to be more likely to have an interest in the use of 
                                               
75 Ibid at 9. 
76 Heart Foundation SA. 
77 Diabetes SA.  
78 For example, ‘my health at Vanderbilt.com’. 
79 Adesina et al. (n 29) at 1. 
80 Harris Interactive (n 60).  
81 P Keckley and M Hoffmann ‘Social Networks in Health Care: Communication, collaboration and 
insights’ (2010) Deloitte Centre for Health Solutions. 
82 Friederici et al. (n 54) at 51. 
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electronic media for asthma care.83 This trend seems to mimic the increase in usage of 
mHealth in those sectors of the population who were previously considered separated 
by the 'digital divide'.84  
 
V EHEALTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
The purpose of eHealth is to reduce the cost of health care, enhance the quality of 
health service delivery, improve primary care interventions and public health 
initiatives, and address and improve the shortage of health professionals through 
partnership, collaboration and training.85 Clearly, when it is optimally integrated into 
a health care system, eHealth offers an extensive advantage.86 eHealth systems can 
transform existing health care systems. 87  When asked how eHealth can improve 
health system's performance, Godal responded:  
‘By incrementally improving existing health-care systems, and by opting for 
radically new ways of delivering and monitoring care. Entering patient data on a 
phone or a tablet in a rural clinic, transferring this electronically and extracting 
required information from this avoids the slow and labour-intensive steps of paper-
based systems. But more importantly, e-health technologies can totally change the 
way health care is delivered and monitored. Front-line workers can now have tools 
for making decisions available at their fingertips and telemedicine can provide them 
with expert help. Thus new roles can be defined and patients empowered with 
information and a voice in monitoring’.88 
                                               
83 AT Baptist, M Thompson, KS Grossman, L Mohammed, A Sy and GM Sanders ‘Social Media, Text 
Messaging and Email preferences of Asthma patients between 12 and 40 years old’ (2011) 48 (8) J 
Asthma 824–830.  
84 UNICEF ‘African Mobile Observatory 2011: Driving Economic and Social Development through 
Mobile Services’ (2011); the ‘digital divide’ refers to the ‘gap’ between ‘individual’s households, 
businesses and geographic areas at different socio-economic levels with regard to both their 
opportunities to access information and communication technologies (ICTs) and to their use of the 
Internet for a wide variety of activities’. 
85 S Avancha, A Baxi and D Kotz ‘Privacy in mobile technology for personal healthcare’ (2012) 45 (1) 
3 ACM Computing Surveys at 3.1. 
86 Rannefeld (n 33) at 78. 
87 WHO (n 4) at 321–400. 
88 Ibid at 321. 
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The digital environment provides an efficient, convenient, cost effective and 
private method of obtaining medical information and health care advice and 
delivery.89 Thus, eHealth offers substantial value for informed decision-making and 
greater participation by individuals in directing and managing their own health care. 
While eHealth in developed countries is largely driven by the incentive to cut health 
care costs, in developing countries it is fundamentally supported by the increased 
access to primary health care.90 
The successful integration of ICT (information communication technology) 
into health care systems is seen primarily in developed countries.91 However, the 
broad policy debate on the value of eHealth in developing countries is an issue 
deserving of attention.92 
As telecommunications technologies mature, what is emerging is the shift 
from using mobile phones merely as simple tools of communication to the creation of 
eHealth service delivery platforms, which can transform lives through innovative 
applications and services.93 eHealth offers a tremendous opportunity for developing 
countries and communities to obtain medical care, while saving scarce resources by 
improving the efficiency of health care systems and the delivery of health care.94 As 
stated by Sharmin et al., an enormous potential exists 'in using mHealth as one of the 
supportive systems within the health care sector to solve the inequalities in health care 
delivery between rural and urban hospitals'.95 
Although studies on telemedicine and eHealth in Africa in particular have 
centred on the ‘technological feasibility, specialist clinical interest, implementation 
costs and estimated cost savings’, 96  there are clear and obvious socio-economic 
                                               
89 Avancha et al. (n 85) at 3.1. 
90 WHO (n 34) at 6 and 21 
91 Kalema and Kgasi (n 5) at 1.  
92 WA Kaplan ‘Can the ubiquitous power of mobile phones be used to improve health outcomes in 
developing countries?’ (2006) 2 Globalization and Health. 
93 JC Aker and IM Mbiti ‘Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa’ (2010) 24 (3) Journal 
of Economic Perspectives at 212.  
94 Qiang et al. (n 24) at 15. 
95 J Sharmin, M Hoque Chowdhury ‘mHealth: A Sustainable Healthcare Model for Developing World’ 
(2014) 2 (3) American Journal of Modeling and Optimization at 73–76. 
96 PA Jennett et al. ‘The socio-economic impact of telehealth: A systematic review’ (2003) Journal of 
Telemedicine and Telecare at 311–312 and Le Roux (n 6) at 102. 
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benefits to users, namely, better quality care, greater participation, cost effectiveness 
and increased accessibility.97 While electronic health technologies cannot physically 
transfer medicine, medical practitioners, and/or equipment between locations, their 
inherent strength is their ability to convey and process large volumes of data (much of 
which is personal and sensitive health data) in a myriad of forms, for instance, coded 
data, text, images, audio, and video, and then to interface with other devices and 
networks that may be linked to or support them.98 
As is reported in Sarasohn-Kahn, users in ‘emerging economies’, such as 
Brazil, India, Mexico, and Russia, have ‘a greater reliance on online health 
information because of the higher costs associated with seeing a medical professional 
face to face’. 99 Additional challenges facing developing countries are the chronic 
shortage of health care facilities and medical practitioners, and general inaccessibility 
of health care services, especially in remote areas. Developing countries, both low- 
and middle-income, tend to experience general shortages in health information, access 
to health care, poor treatment quality and lack of affordability for even the most basic 
care.100 
Certain African health sectors face a considerable human resources crisis. For 
instance, a Lancet report found that failures in direction and weak management have 
resulted in inadequate implementation of otherwise good health policies in the South 
African public health system. 101  The HIV/AIDS epidemic has only exacerbated 
already challenged public health care systems.102 A key factor emphasised in the 
report was that ‘innovative approaches to health service delivery are needed in 
developing countries that are affected by both communicable and non-communicable 
diseases’.103  
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An illustration of the doctor to patient ratio within an African country is 
confirmed by the South African Department of Health. While Africa carries 24% of 
the global disease burden, it only has a low 3% of the world’s health practitioners.104 
With countries like France, America and the United Kingdom having 34, 24 and 27 
doctors per 10 000 population respectively, countries in the African region have a 
reported 2 doctors per 10 000 population.105  This is by far the lowest doctor to 
population ratio worldwide. 
Illness and death in developing countries are often due to health conditions 
that are largely preventable and for which medical solutions are known and often 
easily implemented.106 Despite this, the health of those living in developing countries 
remains at risk, where a disproportionately high burden of infectious diseases, 
escalating health care costs, unacceptably high levels of mother and child mortality 
and a continuing HIV/AIDS pandemic exist.107 This is exacerbated by the general 
lack of and poor quality of health care services and the chronic shortage of health care 
professionals.108  
Despite the need for sustainable and efficient health care services and the 
increased awareness that the Internet and various online technological platforms 
provide a beneficial solution, eHealth has not been fully integrated and remains on the 
fringe of most mainstream African health care systems.109 It is suggested that ‘[t]o 
achieve better health in a cost-effective and sustainable way, developing countries 
need to exploit ideas and technologies that leverage resources that are readily 
available and affordable’.110 
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VI THE ROLE OF EHEALTH IN PROVIDING AN 
ALTERNATIVE OR COMPLEMENTARY HEALTH CARE 
SOLUTION  
mHealth is a direct result of the rapid rise of mobile phone penetration. Sharmin et al. 
conclude that, in terms of ‘size, portability, low power consumption and ability to 
operate with limited infrastructure’, mobile phones are ‘better platforms to provide 
health services in the developing countries’.111 eHealth (and particularly mHealth) 
provides increased access to larger segments of the population and improves the 
ability of the health care systems in such populations to provide better health care.112 
Although mHealth is still in its infancy, there are indications that it is already 
transforming health care systems.113 The benefits of mHealth are: (a) increased access 
to health care delivery and information to particularly remote or isolated populations; 
(b) increased efficiency and decrease in the cost of service delivery; (c) improvement 
in the ability to diagnose, treat and track diseases; (d) the more timely dissemination 
of public health information; and (e) extended access to medical and health care 
education to users and health care practitioners.114  
With an estimated 6 billion people worldwide (which roughly translates to 
75% of the world’s population) having access to a mobile phone, mobile phones are 
the single most ubiquitous modern technology.115  In certain developing countries, 
more people have access to mobile phones than to electricity or clean water.116 Mobile 
phone applications are portals to an online world – a powerful tool in providing 
developing countries with more than just a voice but also empowering them to engage 
in more informed decision-making and exposing them to wider choice. 117  The 
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significance of the mobile phone is no longer in the phone itself, but in the way in 
which it is used and the content and applications to which users gain access.118 
In recent years, mobile communications have experienced faster growth rates 
in lower-income groups – more than twice as fast as those in the high-income 
countries, thus accounting for more than 20% of the world mobile market share.119 
The prevalence of mobile phones in much of sub-Saharan Africa surpasses that of 
fixed-line phones.120 Africa is the fastest growing mobile market in the world, with in 
excess of 500 million mobile users in sub-Saharan Africa in the first quarter of 
2013.121 In 2015, 46% of the African population subscribed to mobile services, with 
Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa being the most subscribed. While sub-Saharan Africa 
has 8% of the worldwide 6.5 billion mobile connections, it has the highest growth rate 
globally, with connections expected to increase by a further 50% over the next five 
years.122 It is estimated that, within the next three years, an additional 168 million 
people will subscribe to mobile services across Africa, reaching 725 million 
connections by 2020. 123 
With the rapid expansion of mobile technology, Africans living in urban and 
rural communities have been able to access digital information through mobile and 
computer internet connectivity, more than ever before. 124  Statistics South Africa 
found that among the population of approximately 50 million in South Africa, there is 
an account of 100.48% mobile penetration, that is, of people owning, renting and/or 
having access to a mobile cellular device.125 Regionally, South Africa has one of the 
highest mobile coverages in Africa, with 81% of the population having access to 
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mobile service coverage.126 As of September 2011, the African continent had the 
second largest mobile market in the world, with over 620 million mobile 
connections. 127  The developing world is described as ‘more mobile’ than the 
developed world.128  
This technology for eHealth and specifically mHealth holds enormous promise 
for the public and private health care sectors129 alike in improving the access and 
delivery of health care services within remote or vulnerable populations, but also to an 
increasingly technologically driven consumer.130 In addition to this, the entry level for 
mHealth services is often lower than that of other eHealth applications, making it that 
much more financially attractive to users.131 The youth with their familiarity with 
mobile phones, their adaptability, their high usage of such devices, and their ability to 
use social networking platforms can particularly benefit from mHealth applications, 
especially, for instance, in health promotion, disease prevention and sexual and 
reproductive health.132 The youth are skilled technological consumers and their ability 
to comment, blog or use the ‘share button’ in respect of eHealth initiatives improves 
outreach and impact. 133  The interactivity of mHealth applications and their 
participatory functionality is proving popular and highly desirable to the youth.134 In 
light of this, Edouard suggests that it is desirable then that health care professionals 
become familiar with using social networking platforms such as Facebook and 
Twitter in enhancing their service delivery.135  
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Clearly, developing countries have much to gain from leveraging off 
expanding 3G networks and mobile broadband, and mHealth applications are 
perfectly placed to provide a solution to the shortage of preventative and primary 
health care. 
 
VII EXAMPLES OF EHEALTH APPLICATIONS  
EHealth services and applications can be of enormous value to developing countries. 
The following sub-sections will highlight the use of mobile messages, and the role 
eHealth played in the Ebola outbreak, as illustrations of the tremendous benefit 
eHealth can provide.  
(1)  The use of mobile messages 
A study conducted in South African using mobile phone technologies to connect 
tuberculosis patients to their caregivers, using reminder text messages found that, 
after the system was implemented, adherence to treatment regimens improved.136 
South Africa is a fertile testing ground for treatment compliance technologies, with 
several disease control specialists looking at short message services (SMSs) as a cost 
effective and effectual method of communicating with and monitoring patients 
located in remote areas.137 The WHO reported a 71% treatment success rate in South 
Africa using its directly observed treatment short course (DOTS), while most patients 
who were not treated under DOTS defaulted on their treatment.138 This programme 
has dramatically improved tuberculosis control around the world and is of particular 
importance, as both TB and HIV/AIDS treatments require constant patient 
supervision and rigorous adherence to a daily treatment regimen.139 eHealth is being 
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successfully applied in maternal and child health care in South Africa 140  in 
programmes to reduce diseases associated with poverty, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria 
and tuberculosis. 
Similarly, in June 2012, the delivery of a basic health care service was 
launched by the Pan-African mHealth Initiative in conjunction with the GSMA. The 
purpose was, by using mHealth, to address certain challenges, such as reducing 
maternal and infant mortality rates, combating infectious diseases and creating 
awareness of HIV/AIDS remotely.141 
The South African Department of Health announced the launch of an eHealth 
initiative named the MomConnect service.142 This is a service whereby all pregnant 
women, of which there are approximately 1.5 million a year, are to be sent SMS 
messages, if registered with the service. These messages will be sent fortnightly 
during pregnancy, and will continue for a period of at least 1 year after the child has 
been born. The messages will be appropriate to their stage of pregnancy and will 
advise them of relevant issues applicable to the progression of their pregnancy. After 
birth, information on the care of their newborn is to be provided for a period of 1 year. 
Health messages on such topics as growth monitoring, oral rehydration, breastfeeding, 
immunisation, food supplementation and family planning are to be provided 
electronically.143  
(2)  The Ebola outbreak in Western Africa 
The 2014 Ebola virus disease outbreak in Western Africa is regarded as the severest 
outbreak since the disease was initially identified in 1976.144 By October 2014, nine 
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countries, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Nigeria, Mali, the USA, Senegal, Spain and 
the United Kingdom, had been affected.145 
To illustrate the expeditious and valuable application of eHealth service 
delivery, IBM launched three eHealth initiatives to curb the spread of the outbreak of 
the Ebola virus in West Africa.146 These included ‘a citizen engagement platform in 
Sierra Leone, the roll-out of coordination technology in Nigeria to strengthen their 
preparedness for future outbreaks and a global open data repository’.147 What was 
instrumental in these initiatives was the application of mobile technology, data 
analytics and cloud computing, which afforded governments and relief agencies the 
opportunity to make considerable advancements in containing the deadly disease. 
Using supercomputing power and analytics capabilities via cloud technology, systems 
were able to rapidly identify correlations and highlight emerging issues across the 
entire data set. As stated by Chief Scientist, IBM Research for Africa, Dr. Uyi 
Stewart148: ‘…we are uniquely positioned to use innovation to help tackle some of the 
continent’s biggest challenges’.  
Chowdhury stated that: ‘[m]obile technology is Africa’s most powerful 
communications platform providing an important channel for reaching large numbers 
of the population’. 149  Not only did the ability to monitor and track population 
movement enable scientists to map and predict the spread of disease, but the effective 
flow of important health information between patients, health workers and the general 
public was invaluable.  
This eHealth initiative provided health workers with a ‘reliable and secure 
digital platform to work together virtually and in person, enabling them to securely 
share documents, identify experts, exchange video, chat and audio messages, provide 
updates, tap into information via mobile devices and hold virtual meetings’.150 
Likewise, efforts have been made to assist identify, inventory and classify all 
open data sources related to the Ebola outbreak. The objective is to establish a cloud-
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based Ebola Open Data Repository. This will provide governments, aid agencies and 
researchers with open access to data related to Ebola. African countries such as Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, Ghana, South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania have joined the Open 
Government Partnership151 with the intention of obtaining published open data and 
consequently drive innovation and support better collaboration.152 
This is indeed a most promising and compelling argument in favour of the real 
and rapid responses that can be offered by eHealth initiatives. While highlighting the 
tremendous impact that eHealth can have on health care systems, especially in 
humanitarian crises, cognisance should be taken of the concomitant dangers in the 
random, free and uncontrolled exchange of personal, medical data, especially when 
diseases are highly contagious and there is a realistic opportunity for potential 
stigmatisation, and abandonment or ostracism by a largely fearful community.153  
Concerned about informational privacy and security, a 2010 report, 
conducting research on privacy and security in developing countries and humanitarian 
operations, concluded that policy change is insufficient in environments with 
‘minimalist legal frameworks, or where the rules are easily suspended in the case of 
emergency humanitarian and relief efforts’.154  
 
VIII A BARRIER TO EHEALTH ADOPTION – PRIVACY 
PROTECTION  
Despite the numerous advantages offered by eHealth systems, various challenges are 
present. A necessary consequence of eHealth is the creation of medical records, 
digital images and copious data, the subject of which is personal and highly 
sensitive.155 Primary concerns of eHealth implementation are the privacy and security 
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issues arising from electronic data storage and management. With the adoption of 
eHealth, new forms of data collection, storage, and the extensive sharing and 
transference of sensitive medical data, the implicit threat of misuse of such data 
becomes immediately apparent.156 Privacy and data protection are identified as vital to 
eHealth applications.157  
Data handling and good, secure record keeping should form the backbone of 
any eHealth practice for it to succeed in securing user confidence and gaining global 
momentum. This is particularly so, in light of advancements in medical testing, 
genetic profiling and medical imaging, together with the dramatic increase in the 
volume and detail of digitally available health information. 
Perhaps one of the greatest advantages offered by information technology in 
health care is that eHealth can create a platform and infrastructure for the sharing and 
exchanging of electronic health records. Personal medical information about a patient 
is recorded in a patient's medical record and may be kept in either paper or electronic 
form. Although these records may include extensive personal information regarding a 
patient, they usually include medical notes, historical reports, magnetic resonance 
images, clinical laboratory results, medical practitioners’ letters, referrals, medication 
prescriptions and treatment regimes. They may then be centrally recorded and located 
and be accessible to various medical health care practitioners.158 Interestingly, India’s 
Health Management and Research Institute, through the integration of an eHealth 
application, has created over 10 million unique electronic health records, which is 
reported to be one of the largest public eHealth record databases worldwide.159  
Electronic Patients Records (EPR) convert paper-based documents into a 
digital or electronic format.160 EPRs are advantageous in that they allow real-time 
access to medical records and can be easily accessed and updated.161 The corollary to 
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this, however, is that these benefits need to be balanced against the vulnerability of 
data to security breaches. 
The EU eHealth Taskforce Report 162  concludes that, although there is a 
significant lag (at last ten years according to the report) in the implementation of IT 
solutions in health care, information technology can ‘improve’ and ‘radically 
revolutionise’ the health care system within the EU. Great emphasis however is 
placed on the manner in which the following fundamental issues are to be addressed, 
namely, the treatment of data, privacy issues, the movement of data across 
jurisdictional borders, research and the physician-patient relationship.163 
Moreover, the European Commission’s 2014 green paper on mHealth cites 
‘[d]ata protection, including security of health data’ as an ‘issue at stake’ in mHealth 
advancement.164 The paper raises concerns about the appropriate processing of data 
collected through mHealth software applications or solutions by inter alia individuals, 
application developers or health professionals, as by their very nature, eHealth 
solutions and devices are capable of collecting and processing large volumes of data.  
It is fair to say that these issues are not unique to the EU but resonate across 
all regions (including Africa) wishing to promote the development and 
implementation of eHealth solutions.  
  
IX CONCLUSION 
In line with the major advances in ICT over the past few years, as well as changing 
consumer behaviour, new avenues for innovative approaches to medical and health 
care access and treatment have developed. As online platforms continue to grow in 
accessibility and popularity, a clearer understanding is required of the extent to which 
online health care is influencing people’s lives, along with the scope of such care and 
the implications this will have on people.   
This chapter sought to define the concept, nature and scope of eHealth. 
Aspects of eHealth that were considered include online health information seeking, 
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emerging virtual health care patterns and the socio-economic impact of eHealth. The 
eHealth position in developing countries was considered. The health care crisis and 
the merits of alternative, or supplementary, methods of addressing health care 
delivery were explored. As examples of the potential solution that eHealth offers, viz. 
the Ebola outbreak in West Africa and the use of mobile text messages in the South 
African context of tuberculosis treatment were discussed. Finally, the challenge of 
protecting user privacy and data in eHealth developments were examined. The 




CHAPTER 3: PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION  
 
Progress is impossible without change, and those who cannot change their minds 
cannot change anything.1 
George Bernard Shaw 
 
  
                                               
1 Available at http://www.quotes.net/quote/37025 (accessed 2 January 2017). 
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I INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents the notion of privacy and data protection. As privacy includes 
the privacy of information disclosed in an eHealth relationship, it is necessary to 
consider the concept of privacy and its influence on that relationship. This chapter 
thus seeks to explore and clarify the concepts of privacy and data protection more 
fully and to predict the implications thereof in eHealth development. Before the law 
around privacy and data protection can be affirmed and applied, it is essential to 
ascertain the interest, or subject, which is worthy of legal protection and which is 
being threatened. This chapter seeks to clarify the definitions of privacy and data 
protection and to explore the relationship between these concepts. The aim is thus to 
move beyond reducing privacy to a single value, by attempting to emphasise the 
multi-dimensional understanding of privacy, and that which it seeks to safeguard.  
 
II THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW DIGITAL ORDER AND ITS 
THREAT TO INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY  
RO Mason states that ‘information forms the intellectual capital from which human 
beings craft their lives’.2 Information is essential for the functioning of contemporary 
society. This information, or data,3 may be used for a variety of economic, political 
and social purposes and may be collected, handled, stored and distributed by 
frequently unknown and unidentifiable persons or organisations.4 
The unfortunate effect is that, with the increased prevalence in dealing with 
personal data, albeit on many levels that are beneficial and convenient, society has 
largely been turned into what is a ‘privacy-unfriendly environment’. The uneasy 
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juxtaposition of rapidly advancing information communication technology and 
conservative and underdeveloped informational privacy law has exacerbated 
sensitivities around potential privacy violations.5 Van der Merwe speaks of privacy 
law as now being ‘under considerable strain’ to adapt to the rapidly changing digital 
environment.6  
Technology is enhancing the collection, exchange, storage, use and 
dissemination of high volumes of, previously unwieldy, data both rapidly and easily, 
thereby leveraging potential incentives and financial benefits to companies, 
organisations and governments. Threats to the personal privacy of individuals and 
their personal data have become alarming.7 The free market and technology have 
further exacerbated the threat to a person’s privacy, and they have in effect become an 
‘invisible enemy’. 8  With data mining, user profiling, electronic monitoring and 
surveillance, and the global transference of data being increasingly pervasive, often 
without the user’s knowledge or consent, the proclivity to use data for self-gain 
becomes axiomatic.9  Accordingly, the tensions and challenges around information 
privacy require attention; they are touted ‘as one of the most serious ethical debates of 
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the information age’.10 The concern over violations to privacy is now a veritable 
threat, more so than at any previous time in history.11 
Although the idea of data collection is not new, 12  the introduction of 
computers in the 1950s and the concomitant development of new information 
communications technologies, principally networks linking computers to the Internet, 
enabled information to be collected, stored, processed and disseminated more quickly 
and efficiently. 13  The enormity and scale of data usage and the consequential 
opportunity for its misuse are a danger, both perceived and real.14 
As individuals’ control over their data is lost and therefore not regularly 
checked or corrected, information may easily become ‘misinformation’, or the subject 
of incompleteness or distortion. 15  Moreover, personal data, although factually or 
contextually accurate, may be of such a sensitive and/or personal nature that it is not 
acceptable for use, as it may cause potential harm and embarrassment if disclosed 
without the individual’s knowledge and consent.16  
The management of personal data, especially in large volumes, has created 
newfound risks for the privacy of individual information and, by the end of the 1980s, 
the protection of personal data in e-transactions, including e-commerce and by 
                                               
10 See MD Birnhack ‘The EU Data Protection Directive: An engine of a global regime’ (2008) 24 
Computer Law and Security Report at 508. Birnhack considers privacy under ‘attack’ by, firstly, the 
‘theoretical challenge posed by different understandings of privacy’, secondly, by the ‘technological 
challenge posed by the digital environment’ and thirdly, by a ‘legal challenge’. See Mason (n 2) at 5. 
Privacy along with ‘accuracy’, ‘property’ and ‘access’ are considered by Mason as the four most 
pressing ethical issues around information technology development. 
11  Davies (n 5) at 143 and D Banisar and SG Davies ‘Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An 
International Survey of Privacy, Data Protection, and Surveillance Laws and Developments’ (2012) 18 
(1) John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law at 4. 
12 For instance, acquiring and recording of information by conducting a census, issuing and monitoring 
passports, recording data in paper files or books, to name but a few, see Edwards (n 9) at 448.  
13 See A Roos ‘Data protection: Explaining the international backdrop and evaluating the current South 
African position’ (2007) 124 South African Law Journal at 401 and A Roos ‘Privacy in the Facebook 
era: A South African legal perspective’ (2012) 129 South African Law Journal at 377. 
14 Banisar and Davies (n 11) at 4. 
15 Where increased growth and sharing of data over the Internet have resulted in misinformation on the 
Internet being described as ‘rife’, see WHO ‘Safety and security on the Internet: Challenges and 
advances in Member States’ in Global Global Observatory for eHealth Series vol 4 (2011) at 10. 
16 Chilapowski (n 7) at 133. See also S Snail and S Papadopoulos ‘Privacy and data protection’ in 
S Papadopoulos & S Snail (eds) Cyberlaw@SA 3 ed (2012) at 275, 6 describing some of the dangers to 
privacy brought about by the Internet. 
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extension eHealth transactions, was identified as a distinct and important issue of 
public policy.17  
Cyberspace has begun invading our private space. 18  Because of this, the 
subsequent emergence and development of data protection mechanisms has gained 
momentum, with several countries recognising and implementing measures to protect 
the privacy and, more narrowly, the personal data of their people.19 In technologically 
advanced societies, privacy is, with varying degrees of success, high on political and 
technological agendas.20  
The problem is exacerbated by the very nature of the Internet itself. Data can 
be accessed ubiquitously and conveyed seamlessly across borders and jurisdictions, 
creating difficulty in data management and control.21 Hence, the transference of data 
between different jurisdictions with varying or no data protection laws further 
complicates matters.  
Edward describes the impact of trans-global data flows on data protection 
rights as ‘an opaque and politically thorny issue’.22 Nevertheless, these issues in times 
of legal uncertainty and disintegration create a valuable catalyst for legal 
transformation and the opportunity to establish global legal cohesion. The unease 
experienced by those engaging in electronic transactions, caused principally by a 
                                               
17 CJ Bennett Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States 
(1992) at 30; Pavlou (n 5) at 977 and Banisar and Davies (n 11) at 4. 
18  See R Clarke ‘Internet privacy concerns confirm the case for intervention’ (1999) 42 (2) 
Communication of the ACM at 60. 
19 In 1970, the German state of Hesse enacted the first data protection legislation. This was followed by 
Sweden enacting data protection legislation, namely, the Swedish Data Act in 1973. This has been 
replaced by the Personal Data Act (Sw. personuppgiftslagen, SFS 1998:204) when Sweden became a 
member of the European Union and when the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘EU Directive’) was implemented in 1998. More recently, it was followed by the EU 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of person data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection 
Regulation) of 2012 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘EU Regulation’. Numerous countries have adopted 
data protection regulations and enforcement laws, albeit to differing and various degrees. See FH Cate 
‘The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public Interest’ (1994–95) 80 Iowa 
Law Review at 431.  
20 Policy Engagement Network for the International Development Research Centre ‘Electronic Health 
Privacy and Security in Developing Countries and Humanitarian Operations’ (2010) LSE at 6.  
21 Edwards (n 9) at 449. 
22 Ibid. 
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largely unregulated, even lacking, approach to personal information protection, has 
advanced the growing advocacy of increased uniform and harmonised privacy 
regulations.23  Although this form of privacy regulation resonates favourably with 
certain theorists’ opinions, it cannot and should not be seen to be the only or the 
definitive source of privacy protection.24 
 
III A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF PRIVACY  
Privacy is a nebulous, ambiguous and controversial term.25 The distinction between 
what a person exposes to public view and what is concealed, or exposed only to 
chosen intimates, is essential to permit human interaction without social 
disintegration.26 The formation of a functioning adult in society necessitates a learned 
capacity to limit expression to what is acceptable within a public forum, while 
developing an inner and distinctly private life that is more uninhibited within a 
personal or private realm.27  
The concept of privacy has well documented historical roots in religious and 
philosophical discourse.28 Although deeply rooted in history and valued in various 
cultures, privacy and data protection as an established issue of public policy is a 
comparatively modern development.29 Notably, Aristotle differentiated between the 
                                               
23 Burchell (n 7) at 2. 
24 Ibid.  
25 See H Gross ‘The Concept of Privacy’ (1967) 42 NYULR at 35, who describes the concept of privacy 
as ‘inflicted with pernicious ambiguities’. Moreover, Julie Inness describes the legal and philosophical 
discourse of privacy as a state of ‘chaos’, in JC Inness Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation (1992). See the 
dispute in terminology, as illustrated in G Collste ‘Global ICT-ethics: The case of privacy’ (2008) 6 (1) 
Journal of Information, Communication & Ethics in Society at 79 and AB Makulilo ‘Privacy and data 
protection in Africa: A state of the art’ (2012) 2 (3) International Data Privacy Law at 164. 
26 T Nagel Concealment and Exposure and other essays (2002) at 28. 
27 Ibid. 
28  The Qur’an, the Bible and Jewish law contain references to individual privacy, while classical 
Greece and ancient China support references to the concept with substantive protection of privacy. See 
B Moore ‘Privacy Studies in social and Cultural History’ (1984) M.E. Sharpe Inc at 3–80. Also Banisar 
and Davies (n 11) at 6 on the right to solitude. 
29 See Perinan (n 8) at 183 and 189 where the right to privacy, although in a different guise and without 
specific legal definition or content, was nevertheless recognised as a legal construction in ancient 
Rome. Protection of one’s privacitas or personalitas in the form of the actio iniuriarum was available 
to protect individual personality and specifically ‘non-physical’ aspects of the personality, such as 
43 
public sphere of political activity (‘the polis’) and the private sphere of family and 
domestic life (‘the oikos’), where the idea of privacy as a function of individual 
freedom was an attempt to distinguish home life from that of society.30 Historical use 
of the term provides little clarity as to the meaning, value and scope of the concept of 
privacy.31 Privacy law can be observed in 14th century England, when the English 
Justices of the Peace Act provided for the arrest of peeping toms and eavesdroppers.32 
John Stuart Mill in his treatise On Liberty asks:  
‘[w]hat, then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself? 
Where does the authority of society begin? How much of human life should be 
assigned to individuality, and how much to society? ... To individuality should 
belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to 
society, the part which chiefly interests society.’33 
The distinction between the private and public spheres arose again in 1689 in 
John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government34 where he argued that in the ‘state of 
nature all the world's bounty is held in common, and is in that sense public’, but ‘one 
possesses oneself and one’s own body, and one can also acquire property by mixing 
one’s labor with it, and in these cases it is one’s private property’. British Lord 
Camden CJ, in Entick v Carrington remarked:  
‘[o]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot 
upon his  neighbour’s close without his leave; if he does, he is a trespasser, 
though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his neighbour’s ground, he 
must justify it by law …we can safely say there is no law in this country to justify the 
                                                                                                                                      
dignitas and fama (honour). See too Aristotle’s distinction between public and private spheres in J 
DeCew ‘Privacy’ in EN Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013). 
30  See BM Carson ‘Legally speaking: Warren, Brandeis and the creation of the legal concept of 
privacy’ (2008) 20 (2) Against the Grain at 55 and ibid. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Banisar and Davies (n 11) at 8.  
33 JS Mill On Liberty (1869). 
34 J Locke Two Treatise on Government (1689). 
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defendants in what they have done; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts of 
society, for papers are often the dearest property any man can have.’35 
In 1776, the Swedish Parliament enacted the first law on freedom of 
information and data protection legislation, the Access to Public Records Act, which 
allowed the people access to public records and documents in order to examine their 
accuracy, and ensured that all government-held information be used for legitimate 
purposes. 36  Shortly thereafter, in 1789, France’s National Constituent Assembly 
adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen,37 which defined a 
collection of individual rights and rights for all men and declared that private property 
was inviolable and sacred. France prohibited the publication of private facts and set 
harsh fines for violators in 1858.38  
In 1890, American authors Warren and Brandeis, in their essay entitled ‘The 
Right to Privacy’, cautioned that ‘modern enterprise and invention have, through 
invasions upon his privacy, subjected an individual to mental pain and distress, far 
greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury’.39 Citing ‘political, social, and 
economic changes’ and ‘the right to be let alone’ as key issues, they argued that a 
general right to privacy afforded a way to protect the privacy of the individual, and 
they sought to explain the nature and extent of such protection. They believed that, 
although privacy was well established in US common law, the development of new 
technological inventions necessitated explicit and separate privacy recognition and 
protection.40 In doing so, they established the foundation for informational privacy, or 
the ‘right to have control over information about oneself’.41 
                                               
35 The Court held that the common law does not recognise the interests of state as a justification for 
allowing what would otherwise be an unlawful search. 
36 RJ Rodrigues, P Wilson and SJ Schanz ‘The Regulation of Privacy and Data Protection in the Use of 
Electronic Health Information: An International Perspective and Reference Source on Regulatory and 
Legal Issues Related to Person-identifiable Health Databases’ (2001) at 89. 
37 The declaration inspired the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
38 Banisar and Davies (n 11) at 8. 
39 See SD Warren and LD Brandeis ‘The right to privacy’ (1890) 4 (5) Harvard Law Review at 193 and 
Carson (n 30) at 55.  
40 Roos (n 13) at 375 and 376, ‘the right to be let alone’ was an early recognition of the right to privacy. 
41 DeCew (n 29); early US cases introducing the right to privacy include Manola v Stevens; Mackenzie 
v Soden Mineral Springs Co; Marks v Jaffa; Schuyler v Curtis; and Roberson v Rochester Folding Cox 
Co.  
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As a consequence of Warren and Brandeis, and regardless of it initially not 
receiving widespread recognition as a fundamental right, US courts and the public 
began endorsing the newly developed right to privacy in the law of tort.42 In the 1928 
US case of Olmstead v United States, Brandeis AJ, in his dissenting judgment 
described privacy as ‘the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men’. 43  
Over time the right to privacy, in one form or another, was declared to exist by 
the majority of US Courts. In 1960, William Prosser, in an attempt to clarify the 
position, carefully systematised what the US courts had protected over the 70 years 
following the publication of the Warren and Brandeis paper. He distinguished among 
four distinct infringements, namely:  
 
‘1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs. 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness'’44 
 
Thus began a more formal recognition and expansion of the right to privacy in 
the US to include the control of information about individuals. This journey has been 
and still is being expanded to include unwarranted searches, eavesdropping, 
surveillance and misuse of one’s communications.45 A conversation about privacy has 
been the topic of continuing discourse. This conversation must now be broadened in 
light of the impact of the entire global communications infrastructure.46  
 
IV PRIVACY AS A MORAL VALUE OR A FUNDAMENTAL 
HUMAN RIGHT?  
The newly formed political ideas and social principles and structures arising out of the 
French Revolution and the development of the urban bourgeoisie with private 
                                               
42 Ibid. 
43 At 475. 
44 WL Prosser ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 (3) California Law Review at 389. 
45 Nagel (n 26) at 28. 
46 J Kang ‘Informational Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions’ (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review at 1197. 
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property and personal individuality paved the way for a modern day construction of 
privacy rights. The advent of privacy as a legal value emerged more vigorously in 
Europe after World War II, and the rise of Nazism and Stalinism.47 As a reaction to 
the atrocities of the war, freedom, like privacy, became recognised as fundamental to 
every human being.48 The ‘Big Bother’ concern of state surveillance prevalent in 
Germany during the war years and subsequently in the Soviet bloc was a fear of 
western countries as the world was in the process of being rebuilt in the 1940s and 
1950s.49  
Despite, or perhaps because of, various critical philosophical debates around, 
and responses to, its definition and content, many theorists are of the view that 
privacy is a meaningful and valuable concept, worthy of protection.50 In effect, the 
right to privacy has become increasingly more widely accepted as one of the more 
significant rights of the modern information age.51  
                                               
47 See B Perinan (n 8) at 184 and Edwards (n 9) at 447. 
48 See M Tugendhat & I Christie The Law of Privacy and the Media (2002) at 9. 
49 Edwards (n 9) at 447. 
50 See Moore (n 28) for an anthropological perspective on the development of privacy. Ibid at 443 
questions whether privacy is an objective concept ‘important in the same way to all people’ or whether 
it has ‘inherently subjective value’, which should be balanced against other values.  
51 Privacy is not only protected by constitutional guarantee in South Africa, but also in other countries, 
namely, the Netherlands in the 1989 Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of 
the Philippines in article III of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, of 1987 and the 
Russian Federation (article 23, Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993) also offer constitutionally 
recognised privacy protection. Although the right to privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution of the United States of America, courts in the US have held that the right to personal 
privacy is a fundamental liberty deserving of protection. Privacy is implied in the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th 
Amendments, and specifically in the ‘due process’ clause contained in the 14th Amendment to the US 
Constitution. The landmark decision in Roe v Wade implied a constitutional right to privacy, which 
rested on the judicial concept of ‘substantive due process’, as contained in the 14th Amendment. See 
Chilapowski (n 7) at 135 who argues that a new level of scrutiny for substantive due process analysis 
should be recognised in the US. Likewise, in 1961 the House of Lords in the United Kingdom 
approved the first Right of Privacy Bill. Since then, there has been a long evolution in UK Law from 
this 1961 enactment and the beginning of privacy, as a specific legal value. Since then, the UK has 
enacted general human rights legislation in the form of the Human Rights Act of 1998, which 
incorporates the European Convention of Human Rights into UK law. It has been observed that the 
influence and guarantee of the right to privacy contained in Article 8 of the European Convention has 
influenced the UK judiciary to broaden the scope of the cause of action for breach of confidence – now 
referred to as ‘misuse of private information’. Edwards (n 9) at 444 states that the two most important 
legal regimes governing data protection in the UK are the Data Protection Act of 1998 (informed by the 
EU Directive) and the law of confidence (a creature of common law). Both legal regimes have been 
greatly shaped by the guarantee of the right to a private life contained in Article 8 of the European 
47 
‘Privacy’, ‘dignity’, ‘identity’, and ‘reputation’ are aspects of an individual’s 
personality.52 Burchell submits that all people have a right to privacy and that this, 
together with one’s inherent right to dignity, contributes to that which makes us 
human.53 Thus, he states that: ‘[w]e are fully human not only through engagement 
with other human beings, but also because others show respect for our private 
domain’. Dignity and privacy underscore one’s individuality and dictate the ‘limits of 
humanity and of human interaction’.54 
Edmundson asserts that privacy and the right to privacy are ‘closely 
intertwined’ and that stating that something is ‘private’ serves to affirm that the matter 
or activity in question is ‘protected by the right to privacy’.55 He contends that privacy 
is a moral right and worthy of protection as a ‘positive right or constitutional right’.56 
Clarke also views privacy as a ‘moral or legal right’.57 
However, the nature and scope of the moral right expressed as the ‘right to 
privacy’ requires clarification, as any subjective notion of privacy is legally shaped 
and given definition by legislation and judicial decisions into a general and objective 
model of privacy. This model is not always stable but is dependent on the social 
values in force in society, at any given time. This suggests that the standard of privacy 
reflected in social values can be legally modified by changes in substantive law. 58 
Moreover, how effectively these legal rules, be they mere social values or 
fundamental rights, operate and are enforced within the information age and within 
the realm of the Internet, should be questioned.59  
                                                                                                                                      
Convention of Human Rights. See further B Markesinis, C O’Cinneide, J Fedtke and M Hunter-Henin 
‘Concerns and Ideas about the Developing English Law of Privacy (and How Knowledge of Foreign 
Law Might be of Help)’ (2004) 52 (1) American Journal of Comparative Law 133 at 157. 
52 Burchell (n 7) at 2. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 WA Edmundson ‘Privacy’ in Golding & Edmundson (eds) The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of 
Law and Legal Theory (2005) at 271. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Clarke (n 18) at 60. 
58 See B Perinan (n 8) at 187. 
59 See Edwards (n 9) at 444 and Ibid at 190. 
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Unfortunately, there is a failure to provide an authoritative definition of 
informational privacy protection, thus safeguarding the right to privacy by a process 
of ethical constraints, a legal system, and operational and procedural necessities. The 
lack of a comprehensive construct of privacy together with the inconsistencies in 
terminology, a flawed rationale, and discrepancies in principles leads to the unpacking 
of a legal notion of privacy that is both incoherent and incomplete.60  
 
V CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS  
The concept of privacy lacks a single, precise, analytically workable or generally 
accepted meaning or exhaustive definition.61 Most theorists agree that it is both a 
meaningful and a valuable concept.62 There is also agreement that the essence and 
scope of privacy spans an array of situations encompassing inter alia the 
exclusiveness of the physical space around a person, freedom of thought, control over 
one’s body and information about oneself, and the right to make private decisions 
without interference. Generally described in Gross, privacy is the limitation of the 
acquaintance with a person, or with the affairs of his life, which are personal to him.63  
Despite various definitions being posited in philosophical, political and legal 
discourse, privacy, though valued as a sphere within which individuals’ freedom from 
interference by others is to be protected, can function negatively, that is, as the cloak 
under which individuals may hide. Consequently, the multidimensionality and 
complexity of privacy renders its value open to debate with little consensus amongst 
theorists. 64  This difficulty in articulating what privacy is has had the regrettable 
consequence of making privacy law ‘ineffective and blind to the larger purposes for 
which it must serve’.65  
Certainly, one might expect that privacy exists when, and to the extent, that 
protection and preservation of an individual’s privacy interest is sought and when 
                                               
60 NP Terry ‘What’s wrong with health privacy’ (2009) 5 (1) Journal of Health & Biomedical Law at 2. 
61 See DeCew (n 29) and Banisar and Davies (n 11) at 6. 
62 See ibid for a more detailed discussion and critique of privacy.  
63 See Gross (n 25) at 36. 
64 See MS Olivier ‘Database Privacy Balancing Confidentiality, integrity and availability’ (2002) 4 (2) 
SIGKDD Explorations Newsletter 20 at 21. 
65 DJ Solove ‘Conceptualizing privacy’ (2002) 90 (4) California Law Review at 1090. 
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there is legal recognition of that interest. Yet, privacy seems not always to exist 
because of such legal recognition. It exists much like the concepts of secrecy, 
security, or tranquillity, ‘by virtue of habits of life appropriate to its existence’.66 
Perhaps because of this, privacy is considered a much broader concept than that 
galvanised merely by law. Thus, the law does not determine privacy merely as a 
concept per se, but informs the circumstances or situations under which privacy is to 
be safeguarded and therefore afforded legal protection.  
Unfortunately, this persistent lack of clarity and the failure to provide a 
compelling definition of the term create unease. This is because privacy is widely 
applauded as an integral tenet of freedom and democracy in modern society and 
worthy of protection.67 The lack of a precise definition of privacy does not render it 
any less important, however, and the need for legal certainty and for an understanding 
of the range of legal protection offered is clear.68 
 
VI CLASSIFICATIONS OF PRIVACY  
Despite being the subject of widespread debate amongst theorists, the concept of 
privacy consists of a commonality of certain fundamental or core elements.69 These 
are ‘secrecy’, that is, ‘the extent to which we are known to others’ or ‘our 
concealment of information’; ‘solitude’ or ‘the extent to which others have physical 
access to us’; and lastly, ‘anonymity’ or ‘the extent to which we are the subject of 
others’ attention’.70 The writings of Warren and Brandeis add two further elements, 
that of ‘personhood’, that is, ‘the protection of one’s personality, individuality, and 
dignity’ and ‘intimacy’ or ‘control over, or limited access to, one’s intimate 
                                               
66 See Gross (n 25) at 36. 
67 See C Ncube ‘A Comparative Analysis of Zimbabwean and South African Data Protection Systems’, 
2004 (2) The Journal of Information, Law and Technology (JILT). See Banisar and Davies (n 11) at 6.  
68 Gross (n 25) at 34, ‘[o]ur our ability to articulate and apply principles of legal protection diminishes, 
for we become uncertain about precisely what it is that compels us toward protective measures and 
wherein it differs from what has already been recognized or refused recognition under established legal 
theory.’  
69 Solove regards privacy not as containing a ‘single common characteristic’ but rather believes that it 
‘draw(s) from a common pool of similar elements’. See Solove (n 65) at 1091. 
70 See LA Bygrave ‘The place of privacy in data protection law’ (2001) 24 (1) UNSW Law Journal at 
280.  
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relationships or aspects of life’. 71  There is considerable overlap between the 
constructions and although the conceptions may fall within different categories, they 
are by no means independent of each other.  
In essence, the privacy boundary seeks, firstly, to avert intrusions into a 
person’s personal or private sphere and, secondly, to circumvent unwarranted 
publication of what one holds dear or what is worthy of concealment. The scope and 
meaning of privacy is better clarified according to the interest it seeks to protect. 72 
Thus privacy is classified within three different dimensions: as physical (spatial or 
locational) privacy, decisional privacy and informational privacy. 73  It is from 
informational privacy that the concept of data protection emerges.74  
(1) Physical (spatial) privacy 
Edmundson describes physical privacy as a person’s enjoyment of spaces ‘from 
which others may be excluded’ and within which a person’s activities are not 
monitored with their knowledge or consent.75 Spatial privacy conveys the extent to 
which a person’s territorial solitude may be shielded from unwanted invasion.76 An 
example of physical privacy is one’s right to be left alone in one’s own home. There 
is a space between what is open to the public and that which people wish to keep to 
themselves.77 Although this veil may be partially lifted at times, the management of 
one’s inner life and one’s exposure or concealment thereof should be largely, albeit 
not without qualification, a matter of personal choice.78  
                                               
71 Warren and Brandeis (n 39) at 193. This document, considered to be the foundation of privacy law in 
the US, gives unique insight into the thinking at the time and was instrumental in informing future 
thinking on the topic. On the recognition that the meaning of values is ever-changeable, it is stated that 
‘[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in 
its eternal youth, grows to meet the new demands of society’. 
72 DeCew (n 29).  
73 Edmundson (n 55) at 271 and 272. See also Kang (n 46) at 1202. 
74 Edwards (n 9) at 445, ‘loosely, the right to control what is known about you’. 
75 Edmundson (n 55) at 272. 
76 Kang (n 46) at 1202. 
77 Banisar and Davies (n 11) at 6. 
78 Where there is criminal activity, for example.  
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While Edwards describes physical or bodily privacy as ‘the right not to be 
touched or in some way acted on against your will’,79 Perinan describes the content of 
spatial privacy as that which has ‘control over the extent, timing, and circumstances 
of sharing oneself (physically, behaviourally, or intellectually) with others’.80 
(2) Decisional privacy 
At issue in decisional privacy is the right to ‘do something’, as opposed to the right to 
do it in seclusion.81 This sense of privacy concerns choice and a person’s ability to 
make significant and self-defining decisions regarding his or her life without 
interference.82 An example of this is the landmark US case of Roe v Wade83, where 
the United States Supreme Court ruled that a woman’s right to privacy extended to a 
woman’s decision to have an abortion. 
(3) Informational privacy 
This notion of privacy concerns the control of a person over the processing of their 
personal information. The processing may include the acquisition, disclosure and use 
of such information.84 Informational privacy is considered by Collste a ‘subspecies’ of 
the right to autonomy, and includes the right of an individual to control their own 
affairs and the circulation and dissemination of their information. 85  There is 
uncertainty as to what the nature and extent of such ‘control’ is and to what type of 
‘information’ it relates. The type of information protected is defined differently in 
various countries but typically includes ‘personal data’, such as ‘name, address, date 
of birth, contact details, financial, medical and social work details, identifiable photos, 
relationship status’, amongst others.86  
                                               
79 Edwards (n 9) at 446. 
80 ‘It could be said that beyond privacy there is nothing left or, that privacy represents the most intimate 
and inner sphere of any individual.’ See Perinan (n 8) at 187.  
81 Edmundson (n 55) at 272. 
82 Kang (n 46) at 1202. 
83 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
84 Banisar and Davies (n 11) at 6. 
85 Collste (n 25) at 80. 
86 Edwards (n 9) at 445. 
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Although the three privacy ‘types’ are differentiated, they are functionally 
interconnected and their constructions often coincide.87 Precise definitions and narrow 
categorisations are not readily possible. This being said, the lack of a strict definition 
of privacy is equally advantageous, in that there is greater scope for flexibility and for 
carving out a meaning and interpretation that best suits the situation to which it 
applies.88 This ability to be adapted into a dynamic informational environment, for 
instance, makes it a particularly interesting area of ongoing research.  
 
VII THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE: DATA 
PROTECTION 
Privacy is much more complex and difficult to define in an online environment.89 The 
ramifications and implications of privacy in a digital context are numerous and 
widespread. Questions of its influence, regulation and protection are not easily 
resolved, and necessitate a consolidated, multidisciplinary approach between the law 
and technology. 
While the preferred terminology used in Europe is ‘data protection’90, in the 
US the language tends towards the protection of ‘privacy’, ‘data privacy’ or 
‘information privacy’. 91  Regardless of differences in nomenclature, the focus of 
protection remains the same, that of ‘regulating the processing of data’ of persons ‘to 
safeguard, at least partly, the privacy and related interests of those persons’.92  
Nonetheless, data protection or data privacy, as it is increasingly being called, 
as an attempt to bridge the North American and European terminologies, has recently 
acquired a more precise and simplistic definition than that which embraces the 
complexities and vagueness encountered in defining the right to privacy. 93  Data 
                                               
87 Kang (n 46) at 1203. 
88 Bygrave (n 70) at 278. 
89 Edwards (n 9) at 443.  
90 This originated and derived from the German term ‘Datenschutz’. 
91 Bygrave (n 70) at 165. 
92 Ibid at 166. 
93 Ibid at 168 and also Roos (n 13) at 402 and Pavlou (n 5) at 977 where, for an alternative view, 
Pavlou states that, as with the concept of privacy, the definition of data protection is the subject of 
‘much ambiguity and disagreement’. This is because information privacy is a ‘complex concept that 
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protection refers to the concept of allowing individuals to determine when, how and to 
what extent their personal information is acquired, shared with and used by others.94 
The central objective of data protection legislation is to safeguard personal 
privacy by regulating the processing of personal data.95 This empowers individuals to 
participate in, and influence, the processing of information about themselves, and 
introduces the idea of self-determination or, at the very least, places them in a position 
of co-determination.96  
While Bélanger and Crossler offer a rich discourse on the definition and nature 
of information privacy, 97  a concise definition of data protection is provided by 
Bygrave who defines data protection as ‘a set of measures (legal and/or non-legal) 
aimed at safeguarding persons from detriment resulting from the processing 
(computerised and/or manual) of information on them, and embodying a group of 
principles on the processing of personal information’.98 
It should be borne in mind that concepts, especially those under discussion, are 
prone to ‘definitional instability’. Various definitions abound and are the subject of 
lengthy and vociferous debate. No sooner is some degree of consensus reached than 
new issues emerge, once again galvanising the need for further discourse. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
can be studied from many perspectives, including law, economics, psychology, management, 
marketing, and Information Systems’.  
94  A Westin Privacy and Freedom New (1967) at 7 states ‘[t]he claim of individuals, groups or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent, information about them is 
communicated to others.’ Also quoted by CJ Bennett Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public 
Policy in Europe and the United States (1992) at 14, Bygrave (n 70) at 279 and Perinan (n 8) at 185.  
95 See A Roos ‘Core principles of data protection law’ (2006) 39 CILSA at 104. 
96 See Bygrave (n 70) at 279, where ‘data protection laws rarely give persons an absolute right to 
dispense with data about themselves as they see fit. Thus, the laws are better viewed as manifestations 
of an interest in informational co-determination as opposed to self-determination’. See Banisar and 
Davies (n 11) at 8, where ‘[p]rivacy can be defined as a fundamental, though not absolute, human 
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97 F Bélanger and RE Crossler ‘Privacy in the Digital Age: A Review of Information Privacy Research 
in Information Systems’ (2011) 35 (4) MIS Quarterly at 1017–1041. 
98 LA Bygrave Data protection law: Approaching its rationale, logic and limit (2002) at 2 and Bygrave 
(n 70) at 279. 
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VIII DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY RIGHTS  
The relationship and interaction between the right to privacy and data protection 
requires clarification. The question to be asked is whether the law should differentiate 
between these the rights to privacy and data protection.  
(1) The relationship between data protection and privacy rights 
The relationship between the right to privacy and the right to data protection is not as 
straightforward as one might expect. 99 While certain theorists view the concepts of 
privacy and data protection as synonymous and interchangeable, others maintain a 
contrary view.100  
While closely related, the terms are not identical. Data protection is typically 
reserved for ‘a set of norms that serve a broader range of interests than simply privacy 
protection’.101 While there may be convergence between the concepts, data protection 
relates specifically to the ‘informational’ rather than the ‘spatial or physical 
dimensions’ of privacy. Although the scope and subject matter of data protection and 
privacy rights are disparate, albeit often intersecting, adequate justification merits 
them being treated differently.102 What the rights do share is that they seek to serve 
frequently similar objectives.103 The suggestion is that the rights to data protection 
and privacy are summarised as ‘significantly overlapping yet distinct’.104 
Although the CJEU (Court of Justice of the European Union) in the Bavarian 
Lager case considered that data protection was a subset of the concept of privacy, the 
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100 See C Cuijpers ‘A Private Law Approach to Privacy: Mandatory Law Obliged?’ (2007) 4 (4) 
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subsequent Volker case treated data protection rights as a ‘hybrid species’ where, in 
the opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, a clear distinction between the rights to 
privacy and data protection could be established.105  
Data protection law is not solely concerned with privacy. Both concepts of 
privacy and data protection, although they intersect on common ground, such as 
information control, non-interference and limited accessibility, are at the same time 
each broader and more comprehensive than the other.106 Lynsley suggests that the 
right to privacy cannot be applied to the extensive range of data to which data 
protection policies apply more appropriately.107 The risk of conflating these two rights 
lies in inadvertently subjecting the right to data protection to the restrictions imposed 
on the right to privacy, thereby impeding its development.108 Whereas the concept of 
privacy extends beyond the narrow definition of data protection, data protection 
likewise includes a multitude of interests, such as data validity and integrity, and the 
reliance and completeness of data, which may not have a direct bearing on privacy-
related values.109 The right to data protection is thus wider in scope than the right to 
privacy.110  
The focus of data protection laws is the processing and managing of data that 
conforms to an acceptable, legitimate standard. Significantly, data protection 
legislation aims at safeguarding the privacy and related interests of individuals, while 
simultaneously securing and balancing the legitimate interests of those processing 
personal data. Thus, the privacy interests of the individual and the counter-interests of 
those processing and managing the data are considered and secured. This promotes 
the belief that conflict between these respective sets of interests can be significantly 
                                               
105 See Bavarian Lager v Commission and Volker und Markus Schecke and Hartmut Eifert. 
106 See C Kuner ‘Data Protection law and International jurisdiction on the Internet (part 1)’ (2010) 18 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology at 176 and C Kuner ‘An International Legal 
Framework for Data Protection: Issues and Prospects’ (2009) 25 Computer Law & Security Review 
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107 Lynskey (n 100) at 569. 
108 Ibid. 
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concerning data protection to the constitutional level, the fact remains that the processing of personal 
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touch upon the individual’s right to privacy’. 
110 Lynskey (n 100). 
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reduced through appropriate data protection legislative means.111 Although principles 
of data protection legislation are similar across regions and legal systems, there is 
often considerable and substantial difference in the details of the laws.112  
A further difficulty in the nature of the relationship between data protection 
and privacy is that data has the potential to acquire a commercial value, thereby 
becoming a tradable commodity.113 As an illustration of this, on 23 July 2014, the 
Brazilian Consumer Protection and Defence Department fined the 
telecommunications company ‘Oi’ an amount of €1.2 million for violating user 
privacy by not notifying its Internet users that their browsing activities had been 
tracked and on-sold to a third-party.114 The browsing data had been collected and 
stored in a database of user profiles, for the stated purpose of improving the users’ 
browsing experience. According to the Justice Ministry, Oi’s failure to inform 
Internet users constituted violations of their rights to information, the principles of 
good faith and transparency, and the right to privacy and intimacy.115  
The potential of data to provide certain economic advantage is described as 
‘propertised’. 116 By vesting a property right in personal data, personal data becomes 
an economically viable asset and therefore the object of commodification. Personal 
information is a currency in the digital age.117  Gunasekara states that ‘[p]ersonal 
information has become a valuable commodity, one which provides the raw material 
for and underpins the success of corporations such as Google and Facebook’. 
                                               
111 Bygrave (n 98) at 282 
112 Kuner (n 106) at 177. 
113 See the press release: European Commission Memo ‘Progress on EU data protection reform now 
irreversible following European Parliament vote’ Strasbourg (2014), where it is estimated ‘that the 
value of European citizens’ personal data has the potential to grow to nearly €1 trillion annually by 
2020’. 
114  C O’Donoghue and K Brimsted ‘Brazilian Data Protection Authority fines Internet Provider 
$1.59m’. 
115 Although the case was based on Brazil’s Consumer Law of 1990, a new Internet law (Marco Civil 
da Internet) has been introduced, in terms of which it is suggested that this case serves as a warning 
that strong action will be taken, should the new Brazilian Internet law be contravened.  
116 Prins (n 5) at 272.  
117  See G Gunasekara ‘Paddling in unison or just paddling? International trends in reforming 
information privacy law’ (2014) 22 (2) International Journal of Law and Information Technology at 
141. 
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Individuals can be controlled and their identities stolen or ‘mined’ to extract value.118 
Consequently, the debate around the term ‘big data’ has gained momentum in recent 
years.119 This is galvanised in the view that digital data represents the latest key asset 
that organisations can acquire for achieving a competitive financial advantage.120  
Finally, the ECHR (European Court of Human Rights) attempted to demarcate 
the realm of privacy from that of data protection.121 Karanja in his analyses of ECHR 
case law summarised the case law position with regard to data processing as follows: 
‘[i]t is no longer doubtful that data protection is a human right although the 
Convention does not state this. ‘… the Court has boldly manifested data protection 
principles in its decisions by adopting the language of data protection law’. He goes 
on to say that what is still lacking ‘is a positive statement in the general human rights 
legislation that human rights protect personal data’. He believes that a statement to 
that effect would give data protection ‘the universal status enjoyed by human rights 
principles’. Karinga suggests that the EU has addressed this by providing data 
protection in its Charter of Fundamental Rights and the EU Constitution.122 Since 
2009 data protection has been protected as a fundamental right, next to the right of 
privacy, in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
(2) Should the law differentiate between the right to privacy and the right to 
data protection?  
The relationship and interaction between the rights to data protection and privacy, 
based on a comparison between the scope of the two rights and the protection they 
afford, requires clarification.123 Two questions arise: What is the difference between 
the right to privacy and the right to data protection? Is there a convincing rationale to 
include the right to data protection as an independent right? While these two rights do 
                                               
118 Ibid. 
119 Big Data is discussed in Chapter 6. 
120 See Esposti (n 7) at 209. 
121 Makulilo (n 25) at 165. 
122 SK Karanja ‘Schengen Information System and Border Control Co-Operation: A Transparency and 
Proportionality Evaluation’ PhD Thesis Faculty of Law University of Oslo (2006) at 123. 
123 A more detailed discussion regarding the rights to privacy and data protection is contained above. 
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intersect, largely because of a commonality in their objectives, simply conflating the 
two rights appears problematic.  
Despite this assertion, analysis of CJEU jurisprudence reveals that that court 
‘consistently conflates the two rights’. The indication is that the CJEU views the right 
to data protection as little more than ‘a facet of the right to privacy'’124 Lynskey 
observes that on systematic analysis of the two rights, while extensive overlap exists, 
the rights to data protection and privacy are in fact distinct.125 Lynskey argues that the 
right to data protection provides individuals with more extensive protection rights 
over numerous data types than those offered by the more general right to privacy.126 
The proposition is that, as significant differences are noticeable in the two rights, a 
detached right to data processing protection merits justification. 
Moreover, closer examination reveals that an independent right to data 
protection enhances control of an individual over their data by, firstly, promoting their 
individual personality rights, which are placed under threat by the nature of personal 
data processing and, secondly, by attempting to reduce and address the imbalances in 
power, which exist between individuals and data processors.127 The conclusion is that, 
while ‘the content of the right to data protection overlaps significantly with that of the 
right to privacy, data protection nevertheless merits recognition as an independent 
right’.128 
 
IX MODELS FOR THE REGULATION OF DATA 
PROTECTION  
The models of data and privacy protection are identified in the literature as the 
comprehensive, sectoral, self-regulatory and technological models, which are all 
discussed below.129 In certain countries, more than one model is used concurrently.130 
                                               





129 Ncube (n 67) at 1.  
130 Banisar and Davies (n 11) at 13 and 14.  
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(1) Comprehensive Laws Model  
The comprehensive laws model comprises a general law, which regulates and controls 
the collection, use and dissemination of personal information in both the public and 
private sectors.131 A regulatory body is mandated to ensure compliance and oversee 
the application of this general law. An official within the regulatory body, who is 
sometimes referred to as a Commissioner, Ombudsman or Registrar, monitors 
compliance with the data protection laws and directs enquiries into alleged breaches 
and violations.132  
The reasons for the advancement of comprehensive data protection laws are 
threefold: Firstly, they are intended to remedy past injustices. Countries in Central 
Europe, South America and South Africa, for example, have adopted laws to remedy 
past privacy violations that occurred under previously repressive regimes. 133 
Secondly, comprehensive data protection measures encourage electronic commerce.  
Countries, especially in Asia, have thus developed data protection laws in an 
effort to promote the use of electronic commerce and facilitate electronic transactions. 
In an attempt to appease users who are uncomfortable with their personal information 
being used and freely disseminated, data protection laws are being initiated to 
safeguard their privacy. Lastly, the comprehensive laws set out to ensure that 
regulations are consistent with Pan-European laws on data protection.134 Countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe are thus adopting data protection legislation based on the 
Council of Europe Convention and the EU Data Protection Regulation. Countries in 
other regions, such as Canada,135 for example, have adopted new legislation to ensure 
that trade will not be adversely affected by non-compliance with the stringent 
requirements set out in the EU Regulation.136 
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This approach found support and was adopted by the European Union to 
ensure compliance with its data protection regime, and appears to be the preferred 
model for most countries adopting data protecting laws.137 The EU Data Protection 
Regulation is an example of strict compliance with this model.138 The approach relies 
on industry to develop the rules for information and privacy protection, which are 
then enforced by a private agency.139 The essential factor underling this model is 
enforceability so the comprehensive approach works particularly well where there is 
strict adherence to a general law and governmental oversight.140 However, the powers 
of the commissions vary greatly between countries and inadequate resources to 
enforce the laws are noticed.141  
A variation of the comprehensive model is the co-regulatory model, which 
involves cooperation between industry and government, with industry playing an 
active role in the development and enforcement of the regulation of data protection.142 
(2) Sectoral Laws Model  
This legal model provides governance of a particular sector.143 The sectoral approach 
involves no general data protection law but targets specific industries that are 
perceived to be a threat to data privacy.144 Despite it being effective when used in 
conjunction with and complementary to comprehensive data protection laws, on its 
own it lacks effective enforcement and is weakened by legislative delay, as legislation 
is tailored to govern only targeted industries.145 Although a variant of this model has 
                                               
137 The comprehensive regulatory model has been adopted in Europe, Australia, Hong Kong, New 
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been adopted in the United States,146 it has been the subject of criticism. This model 
requires legislation to be enacted with each new technology. For this reason, 
protections are frequently inadequate and out of sync with technological advances and 
practices. The absence of legal protections for genetic information in the US is an 
illustration of its limitations.147 
The sectoral model is a viable approach to data protection regulation when 
used as a means to aid comprehensive legislation rather than to replace it. Moreover, 
sectoral laws are of benefit where they provide the necessary detailed protection 
required to safeguard certain categories of information, such as for instance, within 
the telecommunications, health care or financial sectors. 
(3) Self-Regulation Model 
This model provides governance through the establishment, by industry bodies, of 
various forms of self-regulation and self-policing. Industry self-regulation necessitates 
that each industry establish their own codes of practice.148 By industry developing its 
own standards of regulation, however, a conflict of interests may arise.149 Moreover, 
voluntary compliance and self-policing are required, which is not likely when there is, 
for instance, a conflict of interest or when financial benefit could be gained from non-
compliance. Consequently, these codes are often inadequate and not efficiently 
enforced. This approach is promoted by the US, Singaporean, Japanese and Australian 
governments.150  
(4) Technology Model 
This model employs private technology based systems to provide protection. 151 
Rather than being a model of governance, this approach is more a tool empowering 
government and individuals to control the use and distribution of their personal data. 
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Internet users, for instance, can employ a range of technical programs and systems, 
which can ensure varying degrees of privacy and data security.152 The use of various 
programs and technological systems provide communication protection, for example, 
encryption, anonymous remailers, proxy servers and digital cash. 153  At issue, 
however, are the reliability and trustworthiness of these systems.  
The European Commission evaluated various technologies in an online 
environment and stated that technological tools and technical platforms should not act 
as sufficient replacements to protect privacy. These technological tools must be 
applied within the context of a legal framework of enforceable data protection rules, 
providing a minimum and non-negotiable level of privacy protection. 154  In the 
absence of such a framework, the onus to protect the user shifts primarily onto the 
user himself. This undermines the internationally established principle (as endorsed 
by the OECD Guidelines of 1980, the Council of Europe Convention No. 108 of 
1981, the UN Guidelines of 1990 and the EU Directives of 95/46/EC and 97/66/EC) 
that the ‘data controller’ is responsible for complying with data protection 
principles.155  
On a practical note, most Internet users are unlikely to alter pre-configured 
privacy settings on their online technological platforms and the ‘default’ position set 
by the software developers regarding the user’s preferences will in all likelihood 
reflect the overall level of online privacy protection. These default setting may or may 
not reflect the user’s interest in enjoying a high level of privacy protection. Granted, 
these setting may be subject to user modification, however it is hoped that Internet 
software developers will implement technological tools that enhance rather than 
reduce levels of privacy protection.156  
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X CORE CONCEPTS OF DATA PROTECTION  
The concept of privacy has evolved at an international level, necessitating the 
adoption of regulatory principles at a global level. Much of the western world, with 
Europe at the helm, has progressively instigated broad data protection legislation. Fair 
data practices regulating the exchange of data across international boundaries were 
codified in 1980 in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
(OECD) Guidelines. Consequently, the European Union recognised the need to 
tightening data protection provisions. The privacy benchmark at an international level 
can be found in Article 12 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This 
article specifically protects territorial and communications privacy. Numerous other 
international human rights treaties also recognise privacy.157  
Data protection laws protecting, in particular, the principles of data 
minimisation, or using data only for a set, lawful purpose and not allowing further 
processing, and the need for express, informed consent before data is gathered or 
processed, as found in the 1995 Directive (updated in the EU Regulation) provided 
much needed protection. Unfortunately, in reality they appear ‘to fail to live up to 
their promise, whether through weakness of implementation or through poorly 
resourced enforcement’.158 
It has been over forty years since the first comprehensive national data privacy 
legislation was enacted, establishing a basic set of core data protection 
principles. 159 Core concepts of data processing are primarily predicated on the 
following international documents. These serve as influential or persuasive models of 
national and international initiatives on data protection. They are the Council of 
Europe’s 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
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Automatic Processing of Personal Data; the OECD Guidelines Governing the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data; the EU 
Directive; the EU Regulation and the UN Guidelines Concerning Computerised 
Personal Data Files. 
Expressions of data protection vary and considerable overlap exists, 
nevertheless minimum standards of personal information can be seen as common to 
the abovementioned declarations. These key concepts are described by Bygrave and 
include: that data processing should be fair and lawful; that data should be used only 
for the specified purpose for which it was originally collected; that data collection 
should be adequate, relevant and not excessive to the purpose of its collection; that 
data should be kept accurate and up-to-date; that data should be accessible to the 
subject to allow subject participation and control; that data should be kept securely 
and destroyed after its purpose has been completed; and lastly, that certain types of 
data, which may be described as sensitive, should be subject to more stringent 
controls than other personal data.160 Crucially, the application of these concepts is of 
particular significance in health care, and data collected for medical purposes; for 
instance, an individual's HIV status may theoretically be used when assessing their 
risk for life or health insurance or employment. However, the use of data for an 
ulterior purpose, or what Edwards terms ‘scope creep’, is in practice ‘almost 
impossible to control’.161 
The above constitute elements that are present in various forms in data 
protection instruments and that serve to guide their more formal manifestations and 
abstractions in specific data protection legislation. This being said, however, certain 
core concepts do have a normative force of their own, having been incorporated into 
data protection legislation as fully developed legal rules in their own right. 162 
Nonetheless, the core principles embody and shape the thinking around data 
protection law development and regulation. This is seen most obviously and 
profoundly in the adoption of the principles contained in the COE Convention and 
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OECD Guidelines on many recent data protection legislation enactments. These 
guidelines have influenced and been used widely even by non-OECD member 
countries. 163  Greenleaf, in his most recently updated report on data protection 
legislation, consolidates the core concepts as:  
 
1. Data quality – relevant, accurate, and up-to-date; 
2. Collection – limited, lawful and fair, with consent or knowledge; 
3. Purpose specification at time of collection; 
4. Notice of purpose and rights at the time of collection;  
5. Uses and disclosures limited to purposes specified;  
6. Security through reasonable safeguards; 
7. Openness – regarding personal data practices; 
8. Access – individual right of access; 
9. Correction – individual right of correction; and 
10. Accountable – data controller with task of compliance.164 
 
XI SENSITIVE AND PERSONAL DATA  
Can certain data be ‘personal’ or ‘sensitive’ and therefore more worthy of protection 
against disclosure? Privacy encompasses an intrusion into one’s private sphere and 
includes a wide range of personal interests, inter alia, personal autonomy, bodily 
integrity, family life, sanctity of the home. By bringing data protection into this 
definition, one may seek to understand privacy as ‘secrecy, or a right against 
disclosure of concealed information, or a right to limit access to the self, or control of 
information pertaining to oneself’.165 In this regard, only secret, personal information 
is protected, that is, only such information that forms part of one’s private sphere.166 
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This suggests that not all aspects of data protection are covered by the scope of 
privacy protection and that that part, which falls outside the private sphere, does not 
enjoy data protection and is thus not protected as a fundamental human right.  
It is critical in defending privacy against violations to refine and explain the 
concept of ‘sensitive information’ and the reason why such information is believed to 
be so.167 The intimacy-orientated notion of privacy in data protection discourse relates 
only to individuals’ information that is ‘intimate’ or ‘sensitive’. Accordingly, not 
every disclosure of an individuals’ information will necessarily amount in a loss of 
privacy, only where there is a loss of information that is considered ‘sensitive’ or 
‘intimate’ is privacy infringed. 168  Julie Inness describes privacy as ‘the state of 
possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions, which includes decisions about 
intimate access, intimate information, and intimate actions’.169  
The distinction between personal information that is privacy-sensitive (or what 
Inness calls ‘intimate information’170) and that which is not, is culturally dependent as 
what is considered ‘sensitive’ or ‘intimate’ varies between individuals, societies and 
cultures.171 While societies are isolated from one other, they develop different moral 
standards. However, when there is exchange and interaction between individuals 
belonging to different societies, one can expect an interchange and transference of 
moral norms, standards and values. Interestingly though, according to Kukathas, with 
constant and increased interactions and exchanges between differing societies and 
cultures, one can anticipate a convergence of moral standards and a concurrent 
adaption of prevailing practices and attitudes. This in the direction towards more 
universally accepted and standardised values.172 According to this trend, globalisation 
should then increase mutual understanding and sharing of moral norms and values, or 
at the very least, a standardisation of the meaning and value of certain terms such as 
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privacy is anticipated. This global convergence on ethics is of particular significance 
in the world of ICT.  
This view of privacy as being only intimacy-orientated is problematic, 
primarily because intimacy-oriented definitions of privacy ‘are unable to anticipate 
and capture the process by which detailed personal profiles of individuals are created 
through combining disparate pieces of ostensibly innocuous information’. 
‘Innocuous’ information is information that, on its own, is neither sensitive nor 
intimate. However, when seemingly innocuous information is aggregated or 
combined, such as in the creation of detailed personal profiles, an insidious side of 
data management and manipulation is introduced, with an opportunity for privacy 
infringement.173  
Information technology has the ability not only to collate existing data but also 
to create new data types. An example of this is known as ‘clickstream’ monitoring, 
that is, a page-by-page tracking of people’s access (or digital footprint), as they 
navigate through the Internet. Detailed databases of pooled data can in turn reveal 
one’s interests and tastes with unnerving precision. This collection of personal 
information is referred to as ‘intelligence’, and such ‘intelligence’ has the unfortunate 
effect of shifting the balance of power in favour of the party controlling it. This 
control equates to power that translates to financial advantage, which promotes the 
controlling party’s interests and has become endemic, with the countervailing power 
of the individual data subject being limited or non-existent.174 Thus the concept of 
online privacy is at odds with the most appealing and advantageous aspects of e-
commerce, that is, the ability to infer a set of characteristics on an individual or 
collective entity based on their online behaviour, also known as profiling, and then for 
advertisers and interested parties to target them directly.175  
As stated by Google, their network offers unparalleled reach through text, 
image, YouTube, and millions of web, domain, video, gaming, and mobile partner 
sites. In 2013, Google averaged around 6 billion searches a day and reached over 90% 
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of Internet users worldwide.176 Online users who do not access websites owned by 
Google are also being tracked.177 The ability of modern technology to identify and 
track purchasing tendencies by means of, for instance, cookies, web bugs and sniffers, 
has raised significant privacy issues for individuals. 178  Any use of information, 
however anonymous and innocuous it may be, nevertheless may be seen to be a form 
of intrusion into an individual’s privacy. The prevalence and power of technology and 
the Internet creates concern for individual users and presents a clear and real danger to 
their privacy. Users are of the opinion that invasion of their privacy can cause harm to 
them (such as identity theft) and that there is a need to safeguard their interests.179 It is 
suggested that any conception of privacy that reflects only an intimacy-orientated 
approach is of relatively little real assistance or appreciation of data protection issues. 
Although intimacy-orientated conceptions of privacy provisions may place ‘extra 
restrictions on the processing of certain categories of especially sensitive, personal 
data’, data protection laws should not be limited to only sensitive or intimate 
information of a particular individual.180 
 
XII CONCLUSION 
The notions of privacy and data protection were addressed in this chapter. The 
concepts of privacy and data protection were described, as were the implications 
thereof in eHealth development. The relationship between the rights of privacy and 
data protection were explored and distinguished. Models for the protection of data and 
the core concepts in data protection were established. This chapter sought to move 
beyond the reduction of privacy to a single value, by attempting to emphasise the 
                                               
176 A Kreitman ‘Reach 90% of Internet Users Worldwide (And 10 more reasons to buy traffic from 
Google AdWords)’ (2014) at 1. 
177 See also B van der Sloot & F J Zuiderveen Borgesius ‘Google and Personal Data Protection’ in A 
Lopez-Tarruella (ed) Google and the Law: Empirical Approaches to Legal Aspects of Knowledge-
Economy Business Models Information Technology and Law Series vol 22 VIII (2012) at 75–111. 
178 Clarke (n 18) at 60.  
179 IM Azmi ‘E-Commerce and Privacy Issues: An Analysis of the Personal Data Protection Bill’ 
(2002) 16 (3) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology at 317 and see E Clark and G 
Cho ‘Privacy in an e-business world: A question of balance’ (2001) 11 (1) Journal of law, information 
and science at 7. 
180 Bygrave (n 70) at 281. 
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multi-dimensional understanding of privacy, and that which it seeks to safeguard. 
Sensitive data as a subject of data protection was described. 
The following chapter shall consider data protection and privacy measures 




CHAPTER 4: PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION MEASURES 
WITHIN AFRICA  
 
The continent is too large to describe. It is a veritable ocean, a separate planet, a 
varied, immensely rich cosmos. Only with the greatest simplification, for the sake of 
convenience, can we say "Africa". In reality, except as a geographical appellation, 
Africa does not exist.1 
Ryszard Kapuściński 
  
                                               
1 Ryszard Kapuściński writes of Africa in his book The Cobra’s Heart: extracted from the author’s 
book The Shadow of the Sun (2007).  
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I INTRODUCTION  
In the context of the emerging eHealth sector in Africa, and in light of the importance 
of privacy and the protection of health care data, this chapter seeks to determine the 
extent to which privacy and personal data are indeed being protected on the African 
continent, and within the African regions and sub-regions. I seek to understand the 
influence of certain regional and sub-regional data protection instruments, specifically 
those of the African Union and its most recently promulgated Convention on Cyber 
Security and Personal Data Protection (‘the Malabo Convention’).  
Finally, I consider whether there is a place for interpreting privacy, and the 
protection thereof, in a traditional African sense. I question whether a westernised 
notion of privacy is congruent with the African worldview and how this may be 
influenced by the African concept of ubuntu. I review the approach of the South 
African courts in adopting an inclusive attitude to customary law. Moreover, I 
question whether the dictates of the West are necessarily the only, or the only correct, 
approach to adopt when establishing solutions that are contextually relevant to 
primarily non-western problems. 
 
II THE AFRICAN POSITION: PRE-DIGITAL AGE 
Africa2 is the second-largest and second-most-populous continent in the world. It 
comprises six percent of the earth’s total surface area and 20.4 percent of the earth’s 
total land mass. To view so vast and diverse a region and such a heterogeneous 
population as one comparable entity is flawed. As Kapuściński writes of Africa: 
‘[o]nly with the greatest simplification, for the sake of convenience, can we say 
“Africa”’.3  
                                               
2 Africa is a vast continent consisting of 54 sovereign states recognised by either the AU or the UN or 
both, 9 territories and 2 de facto independent states with limited recognition. I have restricted my 
exploratory analysis to the WHO African Region, which consists of 46 member countries, of which 21 
are Francophone, 20 are Anglophone, and five are Portuguese-speaking.  
3 Kapuściński (n 1). 
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Few, if any, data protection policies had been developed within Africa up until 
the 1960s and 1970s.4 Prior to this time, there had been limited technological and 
informational development on the African continent, hence large-scale privacy 
awareness and regulatory responses were irrelevant. In subsequent years, however, 
the widespread introduction of the digital era along with the popularity and impact of 
digital technologies gained momentum. New found privacy concerns arose, driven by 
the urgency to strengthen protection in this rapidly changing global digital 
environment. As the impact of digital advancement reached the Africa continent, so 
too did the acknowledgement that informational privacy measures, critical to the 
digital revolution, required consideration. 
 
III PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION WITHIN AFRICA 
Although once lagging behind in the development of data protection laws, Africa has 
of late transformed its data privacy regimes.5 The African region is ‘catching up with 
the evolving international standards and norms on internet governance’. 6  Many 
African countries have included the right to privacy in their constitutions, or human 
rights instruments, with most countries regarding their constitutions as superior 
sources of law.7 The South African Constitution, for instance, has a supremacy clause 
in Section 2.  
Privacy underpins human dignity and is a central tenet of most democratic 
societies. Despite being well established in certain African constitutions, the right to 
privacy is not, however, always comprehensively or comparably defined between 
                                               
4 AB Makulilo ‘Myth and reality of harmonisation of data privacy policies in Africa’ (2015) 31 
Computer Law & Security Review at 81. 
5 C Rich ‘Privacy Laws in Africa and the Middle East’ (2014) 13 Privacy and Security Law Report 
at 1. 
6 A Gwagwa ‘To what extent are Africa’s regional and national cybersecurity regulatory frameworks 
keeping up with the emerging international norms on the protection of privacy and civil liberties in the 
cyberspace?’ 
7 This may not be entirely correct in jurisdictions where Islamic religion and practice prevail, for 
instance, in Somali where Sharia law may be considered a primary source of law and superior law to 
that of constitution. See S Mancuso ‘Legal transplants and the economic development: Civil Law vs 
Common Law?’ (2009) Springer at 75. See MM Carauna and JA Cannataci ‘European Union Privacy 
and Data Protection Principles: Compatibility with Culture and Legal Frameworks in Islamic States’ 
(2007) 16 (2) Information & Communications Technology Law at 99–124.  
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African countries. Kenya and Malawi, for example, have included the right to privacy 
in their constitutions. Likewise, the Rwandan Constitution provides for the right to 
privacy in Article 22, as does the Tanzanian Constitution,8 and the Constitution of the 
Republic of Ghana. 
Privacy rights encompass not only physical or bodily privacy, but also 
information, communication or data privacy. An example of this is to be found in the 
Zambian Constitution, which includes the right not to have information relating to a 
person’s family, health status or private affairs unlawfully revealed. General 
protection is afforded to persons, which is then extended to violations of their private 
communications and correspondence. The Constitution of Mozambique frames the 
right to privacy in a broader sense than elsewhere in the region with Article 71 
providing specifically for the ‘'[u]se of computerised data’. 
Nevertheless, most African constitutions call for the national legislature to 
align itself with, and uphold privacy rights, with the substance and scope of the right 
more carefully demarcated and detailed in generic or specific privacy protection 
legislation.  
To this end, Burkina Faso, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritius (all Francophone 
countries) have adopted comprehensive data protection legislation. 9  According to 
Greenleaf and Georges, Africa is now leading the expansion of global data protection 
legislation.10 Encouragingly, to date 21 African countries are noted as having privacy 
laws that regulate the collection and use of personal data.11 These laws have either 
been recently enacted or amended, including Cape Verde,12 Burkina Faso,13 Gabon,14 
                                               
8 Article 16 (1) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977. 
9 LA Bygrave ‘Privacy and Data Protection in an International Perspective’ (2010) 56 Scandinavian 
Studies in Law 165–200 at 193. See ES Nwauche An Overview of Data Protection and Privacy 
Legislation in Africa (2013).  
10 G Greenleaf and M Georges ‘The African Union’s data privacy Convention: A major step toward 
global consistency?’ (2014) 131 Privacy Laws and Business International Report at 18–21. 
11 See Rich (n 5) at B3. See G Greenleaf ‘120 national data privacy laws now include Indonesia and 
Turkey’ (2017) Privacy Laws and Business International Report No. 145 10-26.  
12 The Law on Protection of Personal Data (Cape Verde Law) amended in 2013. See JL Traça and B 
Embry ‘An overview of the legal regime for data protection in Cape Verde’ (2011) 1 (4) International 
Data Privacy Law at 249.  
13 Law on Protection of Personal Information providing protection and Law No. 010–2004 on the 
Protection of Personal Data (Burkina Faso Law) of 2004.  
14 Law No. 001/2011 on the Protection of Personal Data (Gabon Law) of 2011. 
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Mauritius, 15  Tunisia, 16  Morocco, 17  Seychelles, 18  Cote D’Ivoire, 19  South Africa, 
Lesotho, Mali20 and Ghana.21 The most recent of these is the protection of personal 
data law adopted by Madagascar on 9 January 2015.22  
Significant regional disparity in the adoption of privacy laws is noticed 
between the enactment of data protection laws in countries in the economic 
communities of East and West Africa.23 African countries, for instance, Kenya24, 
Tanzania25, Uganda26 and Nigeria27, are expecting data protection laws to be enacted 
in the near future. The Government of Uganda, for instance, on 15 November 2014, 
opened a public consultation process regarding the country’s Data Protection and 
                                               
15 The Data Protection Act No. XV of 2004 and Data Protection Regulations of 2009. 
16 Organic Law No. 2004–63 on Personal Data Protection (Tunisian Law) of 2004 (3 PVLR 1030, 
9/6/04).  
17  Law No. 09–08 on the Protection of Individuals in relation to the processing of personal data 
(Moroccan Law) of 2009 (8 PVLR 563, 4/13/09).  
18 The Data Protection Act No. 9 of 2003 (Seychelles Law).  
19 Law No. 2013–450 on Protection of Personal Data (Cote D’Ivoire Law) of 2013.  
20 Law No. 2013/015 on the Protection of Personal Data (Mali Law) of 2013.  
21 The Data Protection Act 843 of 2012 passed by Ghana’s Parliament in March 2012 and article 18 (2) 
of the 1992 Constitution. 
22 Article 28 of the Madagascan legislation creates an independent Data Protection Authority. 
23 DataGuidance Africa Advisory ‘Africa: Regional disparity in the adoption of privacy laws revealed’ 
April 2015.  
24 The Data Protection Bill of 2013 (expected to be tabled at the end of May 2014). The Bill was still 
being debated as of February 2016 and is yet to be passed. Also Article 31 (c) and (d) of the 
Constitution of Kenya of 2010 and The Cyber Security and Protection Bill of 2016. 
25 See ABP Magalla and GE Kabuje ‘The Law of Privacy in Tanzania: A discussion on the challenges 
affecting privacy in digital environment’ (2015) at 1. Article 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Tanzania and the Tanzanian Data Protection and Privacy Bill of 2013. 
26 Article 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 and the Uganda Communications Act 
of 2000. The Data Protection and Privacy Bill of 2015 is an attempt to rectify this position. See D van 
der Merwe ‘A comparative overview of the (sometimes uneasy) relationship between digital 
information and certain legal fields in South Africa and Uganda (2014) 17 (1) PER at 310 for the 
domestic legislative position in Uganda.  
27 In Nigeria, a right to privacy is provided for in section 37 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria of 1999. The Personal Information and Data Protection Bill is an attempt to rectify this 
position. See in this regard AS Adeniyi ‘The need for data protection law in Nigeria’ (2012) 
Communications and IT Law at 1 and also A Kusamotu ‘Privacy law and technology in Nigeria: The 
legal framework will not meet the test of adequacy as mandated by article 25 of European union 
directive 95/46’ (2007) 16 (2) Information and Communications Technology Law at 149 and 152. 
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Privacy Bill, 2015. If passed by the Ugandan Parliament, the Bill would become 
Uganda’s first piece of legislation that focuses exclusively on privacy and data 
protection. 
Yet, despite modest progress being made thus far, the expectation is that the 
pace of legislative enactment will continue to accelerate in Africa. This is largely due 
to the requirements stipulated in the EU Regulation, which provides that the 
international transfer of personal data to third countries, that is, to non-European 
Union member states (which would include African countries) can only occur where 
such country can guarantee an ‘adequate’ level of data protection.28 Thus far the EU 
Commission has recognised only a few countries outside of the EU as providing 
‘adequate’ protection.29 Noticeably and disturbingly, there is a complete absence of 
any African countries.  
The repercussions for African countries are clear, and it serves to accelerate 
the emergence of EU compliant data protection legislative measures in Africa. 30 
Additionally, the enormous increase in the volume and usage of information 
communication technology in Africa, and the realisation of the significant threats to 
data safety, are acting as a catalyst for the advancement of a solid body of privacy 
legislation in Africa.31 
 
IV AFRICAN REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL PRIVACY 
AND DATA PROTECTION MEASURES  
Various regional and sub-regional instruments exist in an attempt to safeguard data 
within the African continent. 
                                               
28  Articles 40 through 45 of the EU Regulation set out the principle for transfers, the adequacy 
decision, appropriate safeguards and international co-operation for the protection of personal data. See 
Makulilo (n 4) at 163.  
29  Andorra, Argentina, Canada, Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Iceland, Isle of Man, Israel, Jersey, 
Switzerland, Lichtenstein, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and Uruguay. 
30 See Kusamotu (n 27) at 149. 
31 See AB Makulilo ‘“One size fits all’”: Does Europe impose its data protection regime on Africa?’ 
(2013) 7 Datenschutz und Datensicherheit-DuD at 447.  
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(1)  African regional measures 
Certain African regional instruments considered are the African Charter, the Arab 
Charter, the Malabo Convention, and the African Declaration on Internet Rights and 
Freedoms. These measures seek to advance the right to privacy and data protection 
within the region.   
 
(i)  The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the Arab Charter on 
Human Rights  
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights of 1981 32  was inspired by 
African legal philosophy, while taking cognisance of African needs. A fundamental 
difference between the Charter and its European and US counterparts is that it places 
reliance on principles ‘primarily African in nature’. 33 Despite its intention to promote 
human rights in Africa, however, the Charter fails to display any willingness to 
embrace a culture of privacy. The deliberate disregard and omission of any reference 
with regard to the importance of the right to privacy and data protection on the 
continent is notable and disturbing.34  
For the sake of completeness, a discourse on regional initiatives in the 
protection of human rights in Africa should mention the Arab Charter on Human 
Rights.35 This charter is an important instrument, as it affects in excess of 395 million 
people, though not all African.36 It has been signed by a number of predominately 
northern African states, including Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria. The Arab Charter 
serves as a valuable regional instrument in encouraging progress by Arab states in the 
area of human rights, including the right to privacy.   
                                               
32  African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People’s Rights adopted June 27 1981 OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) entered into force October 1986.  
33 R Gittleman ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A legal Analysis’ (1982) 22 (4) 
Virginia Journal of International Law at 667, 674 and 675. 
34 LA Bygrave ‘Data Protection pursuant to the right to privacy in human rights treaties’ (1998) 6 (3) 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology at 251. See also D Banisar ‘Linking ICTs, 
the right to privacy, freedom of expression and access to information’ (2010) 16 (1) East African 
Journal of peace and human rights 124–154 at 132 for legal protections. 
35 League of Arab States Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004).   
36 M Rishmawi ‘The Arab charter on Human Rights and the League of Arab States: An update’ (2010) 
10 (1) Human Rights Law Review at 169–178.  
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(ii)  African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection: 
‘The Malabo Convention’ 
Previously known as the Organization of African Unity,37 the African Union is a 
union of 54 African countries.38 The Malabo Convention, adopted in June 2014, is an 
attempt to address certain cyber law uncertainties.39 It is the first treaty outside of 
Europe to regulate personal data protection comprehensively.  
 
a.  Intention of the Convention 
The Malabo Convention seeks to harmonise African cyber legislations and to elevate 
the rhetoric of ‘protection of personal privacy’ to an international level. Moreover, it 
intends to establish an appropriate normative framework consistent with the African 
legal, cultural, economic and social environment, for cyber security and personal data 
protection within the context of e-commerce and e-transactions. 40  The Malabo 
Convention represents a shared coordinated African position and seeks to reflect 
current legal thinking on the processing of personal information and its impact on the 
human rights of privacy, dignity, integrity, personality and autonomy. In recognising 
the increasing interdependence of African states, it calls for concerted action to be 
taken to protect the rights of individuals in ‘the establishment of an appropriate 
normative framework’.41  
                                               
37 See AB Makulilo (n 4) at 81. 
38 Created in terms of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.  
39 See the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection adopted during 
the 23rd Ordinary Session of the Summit of the African Union (2014) (‘the Malabo Convention’ or 
‘the Convention’) and its predecessor, the Draft African Union Convention on the Establishment of a 
Legal Framework conducive to Cyber Security in Africa (2012), African Union Commission. The 
Malabo Convention replaces the provisions of the Abidjan Declaration adopted on 22 February 2012 
and the Addis Ababa Declaration adopted on 22 June 2012 on the Harmonisation of Cyber Legislation 
in Africa.  
40 See for content on the draft convention of 2012, UJ Orji Cybersecurity Law and Regulation (2012) at 
135.  
41 Preamble Malabo Convention at 1. 
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The preamble to the Malabo Convention identifies certain major obstacles to 
the development of electronic commerce in Africa related to security issues. 42 
Whereas the Draft Convention43 was criticised for not adequately addressing privacy 
protection, the adopted version enjoins member states to enact legal and institutional 
frameworks for data protection and cyber security based on the stipulated provisions 
within the convention, thereby aligning themselves with the predetermined minimum 
standard of protection required.  
The overall intention of the Malabo Convention is to define the objectives for 
an African information society and to strengthen existing legislation in member states 
and within the Regional Economic Communities. Its adoption seeks to maximise 
African and international experiences and expertise in cyber legislation and to 
accelerate relevant reforms in African member states. This is to be accomplished by 
providing a normative framework consistent with an African legal, cultural, economic 
and social environment. Its purpose is to balance the use of information and 
communication technologies with the protection of the privacy of individuals, while 
guaranteeing the free flow of information across borders. 
 
b.  Scope of the Convention 
The Malabo Convention encompasses three central issues: electronic transactions, 
personal data protection and cyber-crimes. Chapter II of the Malabo Convention is of 
particularly relevance herein, as it focuses on the protection of personal data. The 
scope of application of the Convention is set out in Article 9. Its scope extends to both 
the public and private sectors generally, and to automated and non-automated 
processing. 44  Processing relating to ‘public security, defence, research, criminal 
prosecution or State security’ is subject to certain exceptions, as circumscribed in 
specific provisions in existing legislation. Exemptions include processing exclusively 
for an individual’s ‘personal or household activities’, unless such processing is ‘for 
systematic communication to third parties or for dissemination’. 45  Article 14 (3) 
                                               
42 Preamble at 2. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Articles 9 (1)(a) and (b). 
45 Article 9 (2)(a). 
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provides that processing for journalistic or research purposes is exempt in certain 
circumstances.  
 
c.  Principles in the Convention 
Section III outlines the basic principles governing the processing of personal data. 
Articles 13 to 23 set out the basic principles governing the processing of personal 
data.46 Pursuant to the need for tighter regulation, the Malabo Convention outlines the 
substantive principles that ought to be adhered to in processing personal data. With 
regard to privacy, Chapter II of the Malabo Convention contains specific personal 
data protection principles.47 Principles include consent and legitimacy, 48 lawfulness 
and fairness, 49  purpose, relevance and storage of processed personal data, 50 
accuracy,51 transparency52 and confidentiality and security of personal data.53 
 
d.  Rights of data subjects and obligations of data controllers 
The Malabo Convention sets out the data subjects’ rights and the obligations of 
personal data controllers.54 Data subjects’ rights include the right to information, or 
notification,55 the right of access,56 the right to object57 and the right of rectification 
and erasure.58 The obligations of data controllers include confidentiality obligations,59 
security obligations,60 storage obligations61 and sustainability obligations.62 
                                               
46 Section III Articles 13 (Principles 1–6) to 23.  
47 The basic principles of data processing in the Convention are contained in Articles 13 (1) through (6) 
and Article 14.  
48 Article 13 Principle 1. 
49 Principle 2. 
50 Principle 3. 
51 Principle 4. 
52 Principle 5. 
53 Principle 6. 
54 Section IV Articles 16 to 29 and Section V Articles 20 to 23. 
55 Article 16. 
56 Article 17. 
57 Article 18. 
58 Article 19. 
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e.  Sensitive data  
Article 14 stipulates specific principles for the processing of sensitive data. ‘Sensitive 
data’ is defined in Article 1 as all personal data ‘relating to religious, philosophical, 
political and trade-union opinions and activities, as well as to sex life or race, health, 
social measures, legal proceedings and penal or administrative sanctions’. Moreover, 
Article 14 (1) prohibits any data collection and processing ‘revealing racial, ethnic, 
and regional origin, parental affiliations, political opinions, religious or philosophical 
beliefs, trade union membership, sex life and genetic information or, more generally, 
data on the state of health of the data subject’. Exceptions to this prohibition are 
contained in Article 14 (2). The categories of sensitive data appear to be limited to 
only those stipulated within the section.  
 
f.  Data transference  
Article 14 (6)(a) stipulates that a data controller ‘shall not transfer personal data’ to 
countries outside the AU unless the recipient country can ensure ‘an adequate level of 
protection’. In certain instances, prior ‘authorisation’ by the Data Protection Authority 
is necessary to transfer data in terms of Article 14 (6)(b). Unfortunately, the term 
‘adequate level’ is not defined in the Convention, neither is it determined how 
findings of ‘adequacy’ are to be made.63 The ‘adequacy’ requirement does not apply 
to AU member states, irrespective of whether or not they have ratified the 
Convention, but only to non-AU member countries. Thus, AU member states are free 
to adopt any data export provisions they choose in relation to each other.64  
In terms of Article 9 (1)(c), the Malabo Convention only applies to the 
‘processing of data undertaken within the territory’ of a member state of the AU. 
                                                                                                                                      
59 Article 20. 
60 Article 21. 
61 Article 22. 
62 Article 23. 
63 Greenleaf and Georges (n 10) at 18–21. 
64 Ibid. 
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Thus, extra-territorial application is not required, but neither is it forbidden. 65 
Concerning the international movement of personal data, the Convention is therefore 
consistent in only requiring minimum standards of protection, while allowing 
protections that are more extensive.66 
 
g.  Enforcement and formalities 
Chapter II Section II establishes an institutional framework for the protection of 
personal data by providing for a ‘national protection authority’.67 This authority is 
responsible for the protection of personal data in each member state of the AU and is 
tasked in Article 12 (1) with ensuring that the processing of personal data is consistent 
with the provisions of the Malabo Convention. Additionally, in Article 12 (2), the 
independent national protection authority is to ensure that information communication 
technologies do no constitute a threat to public freedoms and to the private lives of 
citizens.68  
 
(iii)  African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms 
The African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms was launched in September 
2014 in South Africa.69 In its preamble, the Declaration affirms that the Internet is ‘a 
vital tool for the realisation of the right of all people to participate freely in the 
governance of their country, and to enjoy equal access to public services’ and that it is 
‘the responsibility of states to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of all 
people’ including ‘…individual rights to privacy’. Moreover, the Declaration 
emphasised ‘that the Internet is particularly relevant to social, economic and human 
development in Africa’ and that ‘…the Internet is an enabling space and resource for 
the realisation of all human rights’. To this end, the Declaration sets out various key 
                                               
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Section II Articles 11 and 12. 
68 Article 12 (2)(a)–(o) sets out the protection authorities responsibilities.  
69  At the 18th annual Highway Africa Conference South Africa (‘the Declaration’). Available at 
http://africaninternetrights.org/articles/ (accessed 27 November 2016).  
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principles to inform policy and legislative processes on Internet rights, freedoms and 
governance in Africa. 
Article 6 sets out the principle of privacy and data protection. In realising the 
right to privacy, the Declaration calls for ‘compliance with well-established data 
protection principles’. Although not specifically mentioned in the Declaration, this is 
most likely a reference to the provisions contained in the Malabo Convention.70  
(2)  African sub-regional measures 
African sub-regional measures considered are those emanating from ECOWAS, EAC, 
SADC and ECCAS.   
 
(i)  ECOWAS 
There was increased activity among francophone African data protection authorities, 
with the Association of Francophone Data Protection Authorities (AFAPDP), which 
unites 27 data protection authorities from the 24 countries that are members of the 
Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF)71 tasked with promoting co-
operation and harmonisation between French-speaking countries in the field of data 
protection and providing expertise for countries that do not have legislation 
concerning data protection.72 Key support came from UNCTAD’s e-Commerce and 
Law Reform Programme and from the AFAPDP for Franco-phone Africa.  
In 2010, in an attempt to standardise and harmonise the emerging national data 
protection legislation in their respective countries, and to prevent the disruption of the 
flow of personal data, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
a group of fifteen West African member states, adopted a sub-regional framework for 
its member states.73 The Act provides that the content of the data protection laws in 
                                               
70 Greenleaf and Georges (n 10) at 18–21. 
71  Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada (federal, New Brunswick, 
(Quebec), Cape Verde, Cyprus, Croatia, France, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, Monaco, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland and Tunisia. 
72 ECOWAS Treaty 1975 as revised in 1991, Art.3. A supplementary Act ECOWAS. Supplementary 
Act A/SA.1/01/07 on the Harmonisation of Policies and the Regulatory Framework for the Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT) Sector 2007.  
73 The ECOWAS Supplementary Act on Personal Data Protection of 2010.  
83 
the individual states should be influenced very strongly by the EU Directive and that a 
data protection authority should be established.74 However, the legal vacuum created 
by online transactions is not satisfactory dealt with by the Supplementary Act.75 
Generally, West Africa has a developed legal framework of privacy protection 
at a sub-regional level with the strongest developments in Africa emanating from 
ECOWAS. 76  When compared to other sub-regions within Africa, ECOWAS is 
described as the most vibrant and dynamic sub-regionals in Africa. 77  Of the 15 
member states of ECOWAS, as at 2013, five had enacted laws, namely, Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Senegal and Ghana, with Nigeria, Niger, Ivory Coast and 
Mali having data protection legislations, which are fully in force and have established 
data protection regulators.78 Only six ECOWAS countries have yet to make legislative 
progress in this regard.79 Three other member states of ECOWAS have passed data 
protection legislation but are yet to establish a data protection regulator. Data 
protection laws have also been drafted, although not yet enacted, in two other 
ECOWAS member countries.80  
 
(ii)  EAC 
The East African Community (EAC) comprises five countries: Kenya, Uganda, the 
United Republic of Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi.81 The EAC has the objective of 
widening the process of integration between its members, thereby creating conditions 
favourable for regional economic development. A focused privacy protection policy is 
found in the EAC Legal Framework for Cyber Laws 2008/2011. The cyber law 
                                               
74 Greenleaf (n 11) and again in G Greenleaf ‘Sheherezade and the 101 data privacy laws: Origins, 
significance and global trajectories’ (2013) Journal of Law, Information & Science at 19.  
75 The principles of data processing are covered in Chapter V of the Supplementary Act. 
76 Makulilo (n 4) at 163 and Greenleaf (n 74) at 18. 
77 See A Banjo ‘The ECOWAS Court and the Politics of Access to Justice in West Africa’ (2007) 32 
(1) CODESRIA Africa Development at 70 and Makulilo (n 4) at 82. 
78 DataGuidance Africa Advisory (n 23) at 1. 
79 In certain ECOWAS member states, Niger being one, treaties can have direct effect and be legally 
binding without requiring local enactment.  
80 DataGuidance Africa Advisory (n 23) at 1. 
81 Established in terms of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community and later 
amended in December 2006 and August 2007.  
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reform was developed in two phases, namely, the EAC Legal Framework for Cyber 
Laws (Phase I and II).82  
The aim of these frameworks is to develop standardised guidelines to assist in 
the enactment and implementation of national cyber legislation within the EAC 
region. The primary purpose for the framework is the harmonisation and 
standardisation of the establishment of policies and regulations in the sub-region.83 
The reformation of regulatory principles is based primarily on transparency, 
flexibility, regional harmonisation, proportionality and legal certainty, these being the 
core concepts underpinning regulatory frameworks in other similarly integrated 
regional communities and the European Union legislation. 84  Although the 
recommendations lack substantive data protection principles, they encourage their 
member states to reflect international best practices by adopting data protection 
legislation.85  
In contrast to the ECOWAS, limited data protection has been enacted in the 
EAC.86 A factor contributing to the rather slow process of harmonising law in the East 
African region is due, at least to some extent, to the two very different underlying 
legal regimes, which apply within the region itself. While Kenya, the United Republic 
of Tanzania and Uganda follow a common law system, both Burundi and Rwanda 
subscribe to a predominantly civil law system, which is resulting in divergent legal 
practices and procedures between these countries.87  
Although East African Community member countries have to ensure that their 
domestic legislation complies with the Community’s Cyber Laws Framework, they 
are, and have been, at various stages in the development of their national privacy and 
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cyber legislation and have been making progress, albeit slowly and steadily, at their 
own pace. Subsequently, harmonisation has become a more pressing policy issue, 
with support coming from UNCTAD’s e-Commerce and the Law Reform Programme 
focused on the East Africa Community. 
Despite a number of hurdles, progress has been made in the East African 
region.88 Kenya drafted data protection legislation in 2009, which was subsequently 
revised in 2013.89 This was followed by the Tanzanian Data Protection and Privacy 
Bill of 2013. In November 2014, Uganda engaged in public consultation regarding the 
Data Protection and Privacy Bill of 2014. The Bill was still being debated as of 
February 2016 and is yet to be passed. If enacted by the Ugandan Parliament, the Bill 
would become Uganda’s first piece of legislation that focuses exclusively on privacy 
and data protection. Development in this regard has required a participatory and 
consultative approach to be a meaningful form of synergy and regulatory convergence 
in legal development between the countries and within the sub-regions.90 
(iii)  SADC 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC), established in 1980, 
comprises various member states, namely, Angola, Botswana, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 91  The 
objective of SADC is to promote the harmonisation and standardisation of legal 
instruments within the region and to improve cooperation between member states, 
including the development of electronic technology. With regard to privacy and data 
protection legislation, however, only five SADC member states, namely, Seychelles 
(2003), Mauritius (2004), Angola (2011), Lesotho (2012) and South Africa (2013), 
have adopted comprehensive data privacy legislation.92  
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At a sub-regional level, SADC is still considering drafts of data protection 
model law, most notably the SADC Data Protection Model Law of 2012.93  The 
intention of such model law is to ensure that the widespread use of ICT does not result 
in the concurrent weakening of personal data protection. It seeks to give effect to the 
principles of data protection by placing limitations on the processing of personal data. 
Moreover, its purpose is to combat violations of privacy arising from the unlawful 
and/or unfair collection, processing, transmission, storage and use of data activities.  
As South Africa plays an influential role in regional economic development, 
the enactment of the Protection of Personal Information Act No. 4 of 2013 (POPI Act) 
is expected to affect and expedite the promulgation of other SADC member states’ 
data protection legislation significantly.  
 
(iv)  ECCAS 
The purpose of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is to 
achieve collective autonomy, raise the standard of living of its peoples and maintain 
economic stability through harmonious regional cooperation. Its ultimate goal is to 
establish a Central African Common Market.94 Central Africa has the least developed 
data privacy policy, when compared to other African sub-regions.95 Sub-regional data 
protection measures are being undertaken by the ECCAS, with the support of 
partners, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Economic 
Commission of Africa (ECA). 96  The model law on the protection of personal 
information is undergoing internal national review and stakeholder consultations. 
Cameroon, for instance, holds huge potential capacity of growing into a major ICT 
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development hub within the Central African region.97 ICT development is facilitated 
by extensive multilateral, regional and bilateral cooperation.98  
Although the sub-region is supportive of developing a bold ICT approach to 
the deployment of policy, coherent strategies in advancing the processing and 
protection of information and the harmonisation of privacy policies within the region 
are sorely limited, lacking direction or any hope of a quick solution.99 
 
V PRIVACY IN TRADITIONAL AFRICAN LAW 
Whether the notion of privacy is embraced within a traditional African context will 
now be considered. Are human rights to be found embedded within broader African 
values and what has been the approach of the South African courts to safeguard 
privacy protection as manifest within traditional African law? Lastly, the concept of 
ubuntu as a social construct will be considered as a means of furthering privacy rights. 
 
(1) Human Rights and African Values? 
The relevance of African values with regard to privacy and its role in health care is 
not easily determined. Whether it is prudent to apply certain values to the vastness 
that is Africa, and to such heterogeneous populations, where a complex blend of 
cultural values and divergent traditions exist, is questionable. 100 At issue is whether 
there is a point at which the regional multiplicity of African value systems becomes 
contextually positioned to transcend regional diversity? It must also be considered 
whether privacy laws are a cultural construct, and to what extent this informs decision 
making with regard to health care privacy policies. 101  Gutwirth articulates the 
situation as follows: ‘[s]hed privacy of its institutional, social, cultural, religious, 
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historical, and epistemological context, and it becomes a useless, naked notion, bare 
to the bone’.102 
Although the effect of culture as a demographic indicator has been used in 
various information privacy studies,103 few studies have explored the influence that 
cultural diversity has had on domestic privacy regulation.104 Cockcroft et al. propose 
the existence of a cultural component to patients’ rights of privacy and the impact 
such cultural dimensions have on the adoption of health information privacy 
regulation. They provide empirical evidence of the effect and role of national culture 
as informing, for instance, the inclusion and content of informed consent provisions, 
in the governance of privacy in health care.105 Based on their findings, they conclude 
that: ‘… in a true democracy, information privacy and consent concerns (driven in 
part by culture) should match policy’.106  
A significant driver of cultural bias may be religious beliefs, creating a ‘new 
composite cultural sensitivity and ethical tradition’. 107  While Biggar argues that 
religion ought to be included in any discourse on medical ethics,108 other authors 
respond in broadly utilitarian terms, and adopt a strictly secular approach to ethical 
considerations in medicine. 109  The importance of values and traditions, whether 
derivations of religious, social or cultural philosophies, is echoed by Andoh who 
writes:  
‘[i]n order that African traditional ethical values are not seen as irrelevant for 
contemporary society and researchers, there is a serious need for bioethics in Africa 
to reclaim and return to the roots of African thinking so as to reconsolidate a true 
African authenticity. For bioethics to be authentically African, Africans must 
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endeavour to root it, ground and fashion it according to their cultural norms as well 
as practical realities.’ 110 
The benefit of reflecting indigenous thought is that it can ‘deeply enrich our 
ethical discourse’.111 Issues faced by medical ethics within an African context are 
numerous.112 Despite this, what is troubling is that little synergy is being forged 
between those advocating African values versus global modernity. This lack of 
debate, rather than allowing the much-desired evolution of African values, has 
resulted in the abolishment and outright replacement of African values with imported 
secular ones. The needed conversation should inspire ‘an African concept of 
modernity and a modern concept of “Africanness”’.113  
The generalisation that African values are less supportive of privacy and 
individualism and more concerned with the interests of the collective good, 
communalism and interdependence is the view held by various writers. 114  The 
perception persists that privacy is less relevant in African societies than in the west. 
Such a difference between values is examined by Sihlongonyane. Whereas western 
values are observed as ‘atomic, individualistic, modernised and compatible with 
capitalist objectivised ideals’, African values are established on communalistic and 
traditional ideals.115 Western values are associated with ‘complexity, heterogeneity, 
differentiation, secularisation and technological advancement’, while traditional 
African values are equated with ‘underdevelopment, the primitive, simple, 
homogeneous, undifferentiated and supernatural influence’.116 The western family has 
‘materialistic, scientific and secular values’, while African values are described as 
being ‘communal, socialistic, sacred and magical’.117 Oosthuizen believes that ‘Africa 
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still cherishes the “humanity” of the African’ unlike western cultures. Africa teeters 
on the perimeter of the modern world, ‘with his roots still firmly embedded in all that 
is essentially human’.118 
To establish whether an African-style belief in privacy existed in African 
culture as a ‘genuine’ concept of value, Bygrave argued that the absence of 
comprehensive data privacy in Africa was indicative of Africa’s lack of a privacy 
culture. 119  In subsequent work, however, he modified his stance. 120  His revised 
thinking asserts that privacy in Africa does in fact exist, although essentially as an 
imported western construct of an individualistic, liberal paradigm. Although the 
concept is still underdeveloped, Bygrave senses that a change in the value of privacy 
is now likely in Africa. He suggests that this change is reflected in the emergence of 
recent data protection laws.121 Moreover, he cautions that ‘care must be taken not to 
paint countries and cultures into static categories’. 122  Baniser cautions against 
overstating the differences in cultural understanding of privacy between Africa and 
the west, as globalisation will inevitably compel privacy protection differences to be 
resolved and understandings to shift in the same direction as dictated by information 
technology.123  
It must be determined whether a person in an African society stands on an 
equal footing as his or her western counterpart vis-à-vis their privacy entitlements. If 
such entitlements are the very essence of the belief in human rights and the 
construction of a shared humanity,124 and not derived by virtue merely of a person’s 
citizenship of any particular country, or from association with or membership of any 
nation, but rather as an intrinsic universal entitlement inherent in all human beings, 
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then no disparity in the position between Africa and the west should exist.125 Yet, 
despite these ideals, it seems that privacy is not a universally cherished value.126 The 
aspiration of equality begs the question whether non-western societies should be 
persuaded, even intimidated, into conforming to a set of standards aligned with, and 
better suited to, the western values of liberty and freedom.127  
The concept of human rights suggests an entitlement ingrained in all human 
beings, simply by virtue of them being human beings. However, differing contextual 
cultural identities and discrepancies of privacy values within regions are noted. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that privacy by its very nature is a particularly slippery 
concept to define. 128 Adding to this is the fact that universal human rights as a 
fundamental entitlement are a relatively recent historical development, with the 
existence of traditional laws well predating these developments both in Africa and in 
the East. 129  
This dichotomy of belief structures effectively gives rise to a ‘clash of 
civilizations’ or a ‘battle between cultures’ that divides the western world from Asian 
countries, the salient points of which also apply to contemporary African society.130 
Sen highlights the differences between the Asian values of order and discipline (and 
their alternative views on political and civil rights) and their antithesis, the western 
approach that is based largely on individual rights, autonomy and freedom. 131 
Although Sen’s arguments are based on the position found in Asia and the ostensible 
divide between east and west, it is worth considering an extrapolation of this in an 
African context.132  
How does one integrate privacy rights in non-western societies and, in so 
doing, does such coercion not amount to yet another variant of ‘cultural 
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imperialism’?133 Yankuzo argues that the globalisation of African culture is ‘cultural 
imperialism manifesting through the domination of the indigenous culture both in the 
material and non-material modes by the foreign cultures’.134 The acceptance by non-
western countries of western-based privacy rights and the adoption thereof, when 
done merely as a necessary compliance measure to satisfy the west by virtue of its 
position as an economic stronghold and power, with scant regard to the ideological 
views of the communities within which such rights are to operate, is troubling. 
Notions ‘alien’ to African cultures ought to be sensitively and critically evaluated in a 
contemporary, African-focused manner before they are integrated into African 
society, thus avoiding cultural alienation and exploitation by an emerging 
imperialistic force.  
Muzaffar cautions that ‘new forms of colonial domination and control are 
institutionalised and legitimised in the name of globalisation’.135  As globalisation 
celebrates the ‘rootless and ruthless profiteering that eschews civic connectedness and 
national sacrifices’, the so-called ‘outdated’ virtues of African family customary 
values risk being progressively eroded.136 The western world, in exercising economic 
control, may steadily enforce its dominating values. Thus, traditional African society 
has undergone a transformation from communal humane values through the 
imposition of the ideologies of colonial and neo-colonial forces, and now 
subsequently to the adoption of Eurocentric values, which dominate the globalisation 
process and which are promoted by global organisations.137 
What is gaining momentum is thus a new wave of modern cultural domination 
that is being mounted by the west. Western values informed the development 
paradigm and planning models in African societies, and African independence 
constitutions referred to the rights of privacy and individualism in an attempt to 
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appease the departing colonialist regimes.138  By conforming in this way, African 
society has slowly deprived itself of self-determinism, thus ensuring further cultural 
deprivation, under-development and marginalisation of African values.139 
It is not surprising then that the so-called ‘propulsion’ and ‘enforcement’ by 
the west, compelling non-western countries to adopt privacy standards and laws 
historically foreign to them, may result in an outright rejection of western-based 
privacy rules. 140  Enforcing and imposing compliance, especially by the previous 
colonial regimes could result in various ‘rebellious’ rationales for non-performance of 
the implementation of privacy rules being assumed by non-Western countries. 141 
Granted, transformations of truth and value, complicated by the jagged testimony of 
colonial dislocation, its transposition of time and person, its damage to culture and 
domain, exhaust any ambition of creating an all-inclusive and complete theory of 
colonial oppression consistent throughout Africa.142 The heterogeneous identification 
of colonised subjects, based on the traditional sociological alignment of self, society, 
history and psyche, is rendered questionable by Fanon. 143  Fanon writes that the 
colonial condition most profoundly evoked is one of ‘over-determined from 
without’.144  
Arguments against the implementation of western privacy laws are not the 
preserve of only African countries. These arguments may be extended to other 
previously colonised countries in the rest of the world too. An example of this is 
presented in the strongly disputed opinion against the adoption of the 1995 EU 
Directive in India by Basu, based primarily on cultural differences.145 In discussing 
the position found in India, Basu proposes that ‘all judgments about adequate 
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protection must remain sensitive to important cultural differences’.146 Basu further 
proposes that the notion of privacy is a component of the ‘collective good’, thereby at 
least recognising the possibility of adopting a more extensive concept of privacy.147 
The implication of this approach is significant.148 In embracing human diversity, as 
Locke puts it, ‘men may choose different things, and yet all choose right’.149  In 
conclusion by Sen: 
‘[t]he recognition of diversity within different cultures is extremely important in the 
contemporary world, since we are constantly bombarded by oversimple [sic] 
generalizations about “western civilizations”, “Asian values”, “African cultures”, and 
so on. These unfounded readings of history and civilization are not only intellectually 
shallow, they also add to the divisiveness of the world in which we live’.150 
(2)  The approach of the South African courts to traditional African law 
Numerous intellectual traditions and philosophies informing African law attest to the 
importance of freedom and tolerance within African society. This augments the belief 
in universal human rights. Such rights have been upheld, for instance, in the South 
African Constitution, which has instigated a transition in the relative value judgments 
underlying the courts’ reasoning and decisions, and has argued in favour of adopting a 
more inclusive approach to traditional African law in developing constitutional 
jurisprudence. 
For instance, evidence of a sensitive approach to contextualised judicial 
decision-making is found in South African case law. In Bernstein v Bester151, the 
minority judgment of Kriegler, J advocated the need for a more nuanced use of 
comparative law.152 Such thinking also found favour in S v Mamabolo, where the 
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Court cautioned against slavishly adopting North American jurisprudence. 153  The 
reasoning behind this is simply that the two legal systems were found to be inherently 
incompatible, as they not only originate from different common laws, but also apply 
to materially different constitutional regimes.154  
In comparing the US Constitution to the South African Constitution, the Court 
held: ‘[o]ur Constitution is a wholly different kind of instrument. … it is infinitely 
more explicit, more detailed, more balanced, more carefully phrased and 
counterpoised, representing a multi-disciplinary effort...’. These discrepancies were 
raised by the court, despite the South African Constitution being modelled on, and 
influenced by, a myriad of international instruments and decisions,155 and specific 
provision contained in Section 35(1) of the Constitution156 compelling the courts, 
where applicable, to have regard to, and engage in, comparative enquiries with public 
international law sources in interpreting and developing South African constitutional 
jurisprudence.157 
In creating a uniquely South African constitutional jurisprudence, the 
Constitutional Court has endeavoured not to use direct comparative law in 
ascertaining the meaning and scope of the rights contained in the Constitution. As 
stated by Davis, interpretation of the rights indicates ‘a determination to have the use 
of comparative law mediated by indigenous history’.158  
In light of the historical position with regard to human rights abuses 
perpetrated in South Africa, and within the context of a newly transformed South 
African legal regime, it appears that a uniquely African interpretation and an inclusive 
approach to the content and definition of the rights contained in Chapter 2 of the 
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Constitution is reasonable. Section 39 (2) of the Constitution provides that, when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights (or any legislation), courts have a specific instruction to 
develop common and customary law, taking into account the spirit, purport and object 
of the Bill of Rights. Responding to the challenge of transformation requires the 
exhausting task of engaging critically with the values promoted by the Constitution.  
The adoption of principles of African traditional law, to the extent that they 
are congruent with the core normative framework contained in the Constitution, will 
more readily enable Africans to apply their own culture, moral traditions and ethical 
values when considering ethical dilemmas, thereby reclaiming their dignity and re-
affirming their identity.159  
Likewise, this idea of incorporating traditional legal principles into a 
transformed form of legal adjudication is not dismissed in S v Makwanyane, where 
Mokgoro J made extensive reference in her judgment to the concept of ubuntu160, 
while Madala J acknowledged ‘... the need to bring in the traditional African 
jurisprudence to these matters, to the extent that such is applicable, and would not 
confine such research to South Africa only, but to Africa in general’.161 Additionally, 
Sachs J at paragraph 373 held : ‘[i]n my view, s 35(1) requires this court not only to 
have regard to public international law and foreign case law, but also to all the 
dimensions of the evolution of South African law, which may help us in our task of 
promoting freedom and equality. This would require reference not only to what in 
legal discourse is referred to as “our common law” but also to traditional African 
jurisprudence’.  
Moreover, in paragraph 39 of his judgment, Chaskalson JP stated: ‘[i]n 
dealing with comparative law, we must bear in mind that we are required to construe 
the South African Constitution, and not an international instrument or the Constitution 
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of some foreign country, and that this has to be done with due regard to our legal 
system, our history and circumstances, and the structure and language of our own 
Constitution’.  
In the words of the Constitutional Court in Mayelane v Ngwenyama and 
another162, ‘[t]here is an untapped richness in customary law, which may show that 
the values of the Constitution are recognised, or capable of being recognised, in a 
manner different to a common-law understanding’.163 However, the Court in Bhe and 
others v Khayelitsha Magistrates and others rejected evidence, as the Court held that 
certain practices did not represent widespread developments in living customary law. 
Of significance though is the observation inherent in the Court’s findings.164  The 
Court describes customary law as a ‘parallel system’ and stated ‘[q]uite clearly the 
Constitution itself envisages a place for customary law in our legal system’.165  
Moreover, paragraph 41 states that ‘[c]ertain provisions of the Constitution put 
it beyond doubt that our basic law specifically requires that customary law should be 
accommodated, not merely tolerated, as part of South African law, provided the 
particular rules or provisions are not in conflict with the Constitution’.166 The Court 
held that, ‘[i]t is for this reason that an approach that condemns rules or provisions of 
customary law merely on the basis that they are different to those of the common law 
or legislation, … would be incorrect’.167  
The decision in Bhe raised an important issue of how universal human rights 
are to be translated and applied in a culturally diverse society.168 Pertaining to the 
nature and underlying values of living customary law, the Court tended to adopt at 
pragmatic approach, as its norms in practice adapt to ‘circumstantial changes, human 
frailty and the vagaries of people’s behaviour’.  
In Pillay, Justice Langa quotes the words of Martin Chanock:  
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‘[t]he idea of culture derived from anthropology, a discipline which studied the 
encapsulated exotic, is no longer appropriate. There are no longer (if there ever were) 
single cultures in any country, polity or legal system, but many. Cultures are complex 
conversations within any social formation. These conversations have many 
voices.’169  
Determinations and decisions are thus influenced by and made within a 
veritable value laden historical, traditional and cultural context. This resonates 
particularly in a society with the diverse range of peoples and cultures, as is evident in 
South Africa. 
(3)  Ubuntu: An African worldview that influences social conduct 
It is worth noting that, in both western and African traditions, societies and values 
have much diversity and variation within themselves. They are constantly in a state of 
growth and continued transition. It would be overly simplistic to claim that a single 
African worldview exists or to attempt to articulate what that is. As already stated at 
the beginning of this chapter, Africa is diverse and complex. A crude notion of what 
is ‘African’ is meaningless and unhelpful. It must be recognised that within various 
cultures there is both a contradictory dichotomy and a harmony of values that are 
constantly evolving in the contemporary world. Being bombarded by generalisations 
of what is considered ‘western civilisation’, ‘African values’ or ‘Asian values’ is 
essentially unconstructive.170 
That being said, certain noticeable and distinctively African beliefs and 
ideologies are nonetheless prevalent and practiced by a predominant number of sub-
Saharan Africans. One such prevailing African perspective is the significance of and 
reliance placed on the community.171 This is confirmed by Biko: ‘[t]he oneness of 
community ... is at the heart of our culture.’172  
                                               
169 MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal and Others v Pillay at para 54. The reference is to M Chanock 
‘Human Rights and Cultural Branding: Who Speaks and How?’ in A An-Naim Cultural 
Transformation and Human Rights in Africa (2002) at 41.  
170 Sen (n 124) at 9–31. 
171 Behrens (n 111) at 33. 
172 S Biko I Write What I Like (2004). 
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The view that traditional values play a role in the creation of South African 
law is echoed in Mokgoro, where she calls it a ‘patriotic obligation’ that is placed on 
all South Africans to not allow the Constitution and the principles of respect for 
human rights and dignity ‘to slide into disrepute’. 173  She explains that the very 
concept of ubuntu underlies and, in fact, demands the respect for human rights upon 
which the Constitution has been so carefully constructed. Moreover, her observation 
is that it is against the background of the call for an ‘African renaissance’, that the 
inspiration for, and development of, the traditional African concept of ubuntu, and the 
social values it represents, should motivate the expansion of a ‘new South African law 
and jurisprudence’. This assertion too is made by the court in Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers174, viz. that ubuntu is the ‘underlying motif of the 
Bill of Rights’.  
Although caution is expressed against a superficial interpretation of the 
concept, 175  ubuntu can be described as ‘a philosophy of life, which in its most 
fundamental sense represents personhood, humanity, humaneness and morality; a 
metaphor that describes group solidarity where such group solidarity is central to the 
survival of communities with a scarcity of resources, where the fundamental belief is 
that motho ke motho ba batho babangwe/umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (which 
translated means: a person can only be a person through others).’176 Ubuntu ‘can be 
grasped only on a “I know it when I see it” basis, its essence not admitting of any 
precise definition.’177 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu expressed it as follows: ‘[a] person is a person 
because he recognises others as persons’.178 The maxim is inclusive and may be 
                                               
173 Y Mokgoro ‘Ubuntu and the law in South Africa’ (1998) 1 (1) Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal at 1, and again at 6, where ‘[t]he values of ubuntu are therefore an integral part of that value 
system which had been established by the Interim Constitution’. Moreover, section 211 provides: ‘[t]he 
courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any 
legislation that specifically deals with customary law’. 
174 (CCT 53/03) [2004] ZACC 7; 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC); 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
175 See M Kunene ‘The Essence of being Human: An African Perspective’ Inaugural lecture 16 August 
1996 Durban at 10.  
176 Mokgoro (n 173) at 2. 
177 Ibid. See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers at para 308. 
178 The Desmond Tutu Peace Foundation. Available at http://www.tutufoundation-
usa.org/exhibitions.html (accessed 28 January 2017).  
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interpreted in the following ways: ‘[o]ne becomes a moral person insofar as one 
honours communal relationships’, and ‘[a] human being lives a genuinely human way 
of life to the extent that she prizes identity and solidarity with other human beings’, 
and ‘[a]n individual realises her true self by respecting the value of friendship’.179 
Desmond Tutu explains: 
 ‘[w]hen we want to give high praise to someone, we say Yu u nobuntu; Hey, so-and-
so has  ubuntu.’ The claim that one can obtain ubuntu “through other persons” 
means, to be more explicit, by way of communal relationships with others.’180  
Ubuntu is not merely a social ideology but is ‘the very quality that guarantees 
not only a separation between men, women and the beast, but the very fluctuating 
gradations that determined the relative quality of that essence’. He calls it the 
‘potential of being human’.181 The implication is that ‘one is constantly challenged by 
others, practically, to achieve self-fulfilment through a set of collective social ideals’, 
and the term is used in a more philosophical sense to describe ‘the belief in a 
universal bond of sharing that connects all humanity’.182 
Despite no reference being made specifically to privacy, Mokgoro states that 
‘[g]roup solidarity, conformity, compassion, respect, human dignity, humanistic 
orientation and collective unity have, among others, been defined as key social values 
of ubuntu’. She asserts that, by virtue of its expansive nature, the concept of ubuntu 
and its social value will depend on the approach and purpose for which it is intended. 
Thus its value is a ‘basis for a morality of co-operation, compassion, communalism 
and concern for the interests of the collective respect for the dignity of personhood, all 
the time emphasising the virtues of that dignity in social relationships and 
practices’.183 
Metz submits that ‘it is up to those living in contemporary Southern Africa to 
refashion the interpretation of ubuntu so that its characteristic elements are construed 
                                               
179 T Metz ‘Ubuntu as a Moral Theory and Human Rights in South Africa’ (2011) 11 African Human 
Rights Law Journal at 540. 
180 D Tutu No future without forgiveness (1999) at 31.  
181 Kunene (n 175) at 10. 
182 Ubuntu Human Rights International. Available at http://www.ubuntuhri.com (accessed 20 February 
2017). 
183 Mokgoro (n 173) at 3. 
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in light of our best current understandings of what is morally right’. 184 This was 
reiterated by former South African President Thabo Mbeki:  
‘[a]s we know, the African people in this country have, over many centuries evolved 
a value-system of ubuntu. Many of us have been brought up to uphold values based 
on this age-old African adage. Through socialisation many Africans have ensured 
that our families and communities are themselves grounded on the value-system of 
ubuntu’.185 
Collective responsibility and confidentiality accord with the philosophy of 
ubuntu providing a cohesive social basis in African culture.186 Dignity, by embracing 
the ubuntu quality of humanness, is guarded as a comprehensive right of personality 
in indigenous legal systems. Hence, there is a need to harness these qualities with 
care, ingenuity and creativity, so that the intricate traditional African social, historical 
and cultural facets are supported and represented by contemporary legal notions, and 
a legitimate, participative system of law can be advanced for all South Africans.187  
Notwithstanding the intrinsic value of ubuntu, hurdles and objections to its 
implementation do exist. Difficulties include its vagueness, its failure to acknowledge 
the value of individual freedom, and the fact that its application is more appropriate 
for traditional, small-scale culture and pastoral societies and less suited to modern, 
industrial societies with a plurality of cultures.188 These shortcomings should not, 
however, preclude ubuntu from grounding public morality nor of being used as a 
method of resolving contemporary moral dilemmas in South Africa.189  
                                               
184 Metz (n 179) at 532 and 536. 
185 Address of Thabo Mbeki at the Heritage Day Celebrations, North West Province (2005).  
186 A Le Roux-Kemp ‘HIV/AIDS, to disclose or not to disclose: That is the question’ (2013) 16 (1) 
PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad.  
187 Mokgoro (n 173) at 4 and WW Rankin ‘Ubuntu: An African term meaning humaneness, inclusive 
community where all are respected’ (2000) 15 (1) Journal of Pediatric Nursing at 50. See also HN 
Olinger, JJ Britz and MS Olivier ‘Western privacy and/or Ubuntu? Some critical comments on the 
influences in the forthcoming data privacy bill in South Africa’ (2007).  
188 Metz (n 179) at 534. 
189 Ibid. 
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(4)  The myth of harmonisation of privacy into African data privacy policies  
Based on a review of the literature, the sentiment shared by many authors seems to 
suggest that privacy as a value is more clearly and broadly observable and enforceable 
in the western world.190 Makulilo states: ‘[p]rivacy is a value that has its roots in the 
Western world’. He reiterates: ‘[i]n contrast privacy is a value that is less developed 
in the non-Western world’.191 He then questions whether ‘other cultures in the non-
Western sphere can support claims for privacy’.192 He concedes, however, that the 
argument that the significance of privacy is less established in the non-western world, 
where the culture of collectivism outweighs claims for privacy, is ‘rarely supported by 
empirical evidence’.193 Nonetheless, the widely held position is that African moral 
ideas revolve around communal relationships and that themes of communal 
connections are interpreted and conceived as objectively desirable interactions and are 
less concerned with autonomy or individuality.194  
Unfortunately, the failure on the part of the African Charter of Human and 
People’s Rights 1981 to include the right to privacy protection in the Charter does not 
help to endorse its value and it consequently may be construed as testimony to 
Africa’s unwillingness to embrace an expansive, strengthened right of privacy on the 
continent.195  
Nevertheless, of late there has been full endorsement and promotion of the 
existence and development of privacy laws in Africa. The fallacy that Africa is a 
static and unchanging society is being challenged. Privacy as an evolving concept 
within Africa is beginning to be embraced. To advocate a ‘one size fits all’ approach 
                                               
190 Gutwirth (n 100) at 24. See also HN Olinger, JJ Britz and MS Olivier ‘Western privacy and/or 
Ubuntu? Some critical comments on the influences in the forthcoming data privacy bill in South 
Africa’ (2007) International Information and Library Review 31–43; J Burchell ‘The Legal Protection 
of Privacy in South Africa: A Transplantable Hybrid’ (2009) 13 (1) Electronic Journal of Comparative 
Law at 2 and DN Dagbanja ‘Privacy in Context: The right to privacy, and freedom and independence 
of the media under the constitution of Ghana’ (2014) 22 (1) African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law at 40–62. 
191 Makulilo (n 4) at 81, Bygrave (n 10) at 165–200 and Gutwirth (n 100) at 24. 
192Ibid at 81 and JA Cannataci ‘Privacy, Technology Law and Religions across cultures’ (2009) 1 
Journal of Information, Law and Technology 1–22 at 1. 
193 Olinger et al. (n 187) at 37. 
194 Sihlongonyane (n 115). 
195 Gutwirth (n 100) at 24; Bygrave (n 10) at 180 and Olinger et al. (n 187) at 37. 
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towards general privacy protection throughout Africa, however, is dangerous. The 
reasoning behind this is that adoption of such an approach may negate, and potentially 
even damage, the nuanced cultural traditions and subtle sensitivities evident in the 
diverse societies and communities within Africa. Rather, a delicate, thoughtful and 
skilful response to context sensitive data protection is recommended.  
 
VII CONCLUSION 
Harmonisation of national data protection laws in Africa is an increasing 
phenomenon. 196 A nation's eHealth readiness extends beyond the technological 
imperative, and it should be predicated upon the inclusion of a sound legal and 
regulatory framework around privacy. Unfortunately, the reality is that, with the 
proliferation of data protection laws being imposed within Africa and little consensus 
apparent between nations, resulting in differing cross-border rules and procedures to 
abide by, a fragmented and somewhat cumbersome outcome seems inevitable. 197 
Moreover, many African data protection regimes are still in their formative stages, 
and regulations have either not yet been put into practice, or are progressing at a slow 
pace, resulting in dubious and inexact enforcement efforts. Additionally, data 
protection and privacy literature across large sectors of Africa remains incomplete, 
with privacy issues currently either under-researched or not researched at all.198   
Significantly, a most compelling and powerful incentive of the development of 
minimum standards of privacy law among developing nations is the desire to engage 
in, and be included in, and thereby benefiting from global e-commerce, e-transactions, 
and the exchange and transfer of data freely across jurisdictions.199 Undoubtedly, this 
has been a principal motivation for the adoption of, and adherence to, data privacy 
legislation in Africa.200  
                                               
196 Ibid. 
197 Gwagwa also speaks of ‘fragmentation’ in Africa’s attempts to control cyberspace. See Gwagwa 
(n 6).  
198 Makulilo (n 4) at 163.  
199 Ibid at 81. 
200 Ibid. 
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However, all is not lost. With the momentum of data protection and the sheer 
inertia provided by the more than 100 countries with legislation in place, there is little 
opportunity to turn back, with clear evidence of an upward trajectory. The following 






CHAPTER 5: PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION MEASURES 
WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
The question isn’t ‘What do we want to know about people?’ It’s ‘What do people 






For illustrative purposes, the position of privacy and data protection within 
South Africa is considered in this chapter. South Africa is a useful example of how 
data protection regulation may be implemented on a domestic level. This chapter 
furthermore provides a case study mirroring the issues found within the African 
region as a whole. The position in South Africa is merely used to illustrate the 
domestic implementation of data protection regulation within a health care 
environment and is not an attempt to provide a complete solution. 
In this regard, I consider various provisions of the South African Constitution, 
the common law position, relevant case law, and the legislation and medical 
regulatory guidelines relating to privacy and data protection measures, which have an 
influence on data-related issues emanating from the practice of eHealth in South 
Africa. Given the absence of an eHealth specific privacy or data protection statute 
within South Africa, I have had to take recourse to generic privacy and data protection 
provisions currently prevailing in South African law, together with more recently 
enacted data protection legislation, in an endeavour to extract their relevance to and 
implications for the field of information communications technology and eHealth in 
South Africa.  
 
II THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION 
Privacy may be protected by virtue of the common, or civil, law (usually the law of 
delict), by the protected right to privacy enshrined in the Bill of Rights or the 
Constitution, or by provision in general or specific privacy and/or data protection 
legislation.1 These means of protection often run concurrently within a legal system, 
and rather than existing independently, their convergence and mutual interaction serve 
to strengthen any consequential privacy protection.2 
 
                                               
1 See J Burchell ‘The Legal Protection of Privacy in South Africa: A Transplantable Hybrid’ (2009) 13 
(1) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law at 2. 
2 Ibid at 2, 3 and 4. 
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(1)  South African common law protection of privacy  
Neethling et al. describe the South African private law approach to privacy as ‘an 
individual condition of life characterised by exclusion from publicity. This condition 
includes all those personal facts, which the person himself at the relevant time 
determines to be excluded from the knowledge of outsiders and in respect of which he 
evidences a will for privacy’. They suggest that ‘[p]rivacy can be infringed only by an 
acquaintance with personal facts by outsiders and contrary to the determination and 
will of the person whose right is infringed, and such acquaintance can take place in 
two ways only, namely through intrusion (or acquaintance with private facts) and 
disclosure (or revelation of private facts)’.3 Neethling et al. describes an individual’s 
right to privacy as including the control that individuals have over their personal 
information and the freedom to conduct their personal affairs without unwanted 
intrusions.4  
By definition, privacy is viewed in Neethling et al. as a personality right, this 
being a distinct category of rights distinguishable from three other classes of rights, 
namely real rights, personal rights and immaterial property rights.5 Personality rights 
are worthy of protection in terms of private law by virtue of them falling within the 
individual’s ‘inner sanctum’. 6  The ambit of constitutional privacy protection, as 
contained within the Bill of Rights may suggest that the concept of privacy, quite 
correctly, is extended beyond merely that of the ‘inner sanctum’.7 
Contrary to the position in many other common law countries,8 the protection 
of the right to privacy is an integral part of the South African law of delict.9 Despite 
                                               
3 See J Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality (2005) at 31 fn 334 and 
also J Neethling ‘The Concept of Privacy in South African Law’ (2005) 122 (1) The South African Law 
Journal at 18 and National Media Ltd ao v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A) 271–2.  
4 Ibid where it was held ‘[a]bsent a will to keep a fact private, absent an interest (or a right) that can be 
protected. The boundary of a right or its infringement remains an objective question. As a general 
proposition, the general sense of justice does not require the protection of a fact that the interested party 
has no wish to keep private’. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 See IM Rautenbach ‘The conduct and interests protected by the right to privacy in section 14 of the 
Constitution’ (2001) Journal of South African Law at 115. 
8 While English common law has, for centuries, placed value on the related interests of dignity and 
privacy, ironically, it has been reluctant to protect or recognise the right to privacy as a separate cause 
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various legal remedies at one’s disposal in instances of privacy violations, ultimately, 
the source of legal protection of privacy lies in the law of delict, that is, a modern 
application of the Roman actio iniuriarum.10 This is particularly relevant in countries, 
like South Africa, where an immediate remedy is found in the Roman Dutch common 
law of delict.11 This provides protection of dignity, under the actio iniuriarum, which 
not only protects individuals’ dignity and reputation, but also their physical 
integrity.12  
Thus, the protection of an individual’s private information already forms part 
of the law of delict in South African law. It is, according to Chaskalson P, the 
obligation of the courts within South Africa ‘to develop a constitutional 
jurisprudence’ constructed on principle and then to adjudicate cases based on such 
established principles.13 Moreover, ‘where principles have not yet been established’, 
Chaskalson P held that ‘courts may draw on the burgeoning international 
jurisprudence on constitutional rights’.14 
Despite the reliance on common law as a remedy, cognisance should be taken 
of the judgment in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association. The court held that it 
‘cannot accept this contention, which treats the common law as a body of law separate 
and distinct from the Constitution’15, and that ‘[t]here is, however, only one system of 
law and within that system the Constitution is the supreme law with which all other 
law must comply.’16 Moreover, the court in the case of Fose v Minister of Safety and 
                                                                                                                                      
of action in tort. See C Okpaluba ‘Constitutional protection of the right to privacy: Evaluating the 
contributions of Chief Justice Langa to the law of search and seizure’ Acta Juridica (2015) at 407. 
9 D McQuoid-Mason ‘Privacy’ in Woolman et al. (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2 ed) vol 3 
at 38. 
10 Burchell (n 1) at 2 and 6. See A Roos ‘Core principles of data protection law’ (2006) 39 CILSA at 
102; A Roos ‘Personal data protection in New Zealand: Lessons for South Africa?’ (2008) 4 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal at 65 and J Neethling ‘Features of the Protection of Personal 
Information Bill, 2009 and the law of Delict’ (2012) 75 THRHR at 245. 
11 Ibid at 3. 
12 Ibid at 3 and 5. 
13 Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa at para 3. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa ao: In re Ex parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT31/99) [2000] ZACC 1; 2000 (2) SA 674; 2000 (3) BCLR 
241 (25 February 2000) at para 44. 
16 Ibid. 
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Security held that the remedy granted under the actio iniuriarum was appropriate in 
this instance ‘for the preservation of personality rights’.17  
Instances, where an action for invasion of privacy at common law has been 
recognised as worthy of protection by the South African courts and protected under 
the general principles of the actio injuriarum 18 , are well documented. 19  The 
recognition of the separate personality right of privacy is manifested in the following 
two instances:20 Firstly, it is relevant in instances of acquaintance or intrusion, that is, 
when a person becomes acquainted with another person or his personal affairs, which 
the person elects to be kept private. 21  These may include entry into private 
residence;22 obtaining facts about one’s health;23 secretly watching a person;24 reading 
private documents;25 listening in on private conversations;26  following a person;27 
taking an unauthorised blood test;28 disclosing the HIV-positive status of a patient by 
a medical practitioner29 and the improper interrogation of a person by the police.30 
                                               
17 At para 40. 
18 O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd and Another at 248; D McQuoid-Mason The Law 
of Privacy in South Africa (1978) at 86; D McQuoid-Mason ‘Invasion of Privacy: Common Law v 
Constitutional Delict – Does it make a Difference?’ (2000) Acta Juridica at 227.  
19 See Roos (n 10) at 30. In the recognition of a right to privacy in South African law, the court in the 
1954 case of O’Keeffe (n 18) held that the actio iniuriarum could be used as protection against the 
unauthorised publication of a person’s name and likeness in an advertisement. Also the cases of 
Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk; National Media Ltd v Jooste; Financial 
Mail (Pty) Ltd vs Sage Holdings Ltd and Janit v Motor Industry Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd. Also S 
v A and Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger.  
20 J Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Law of Delict (2010) at 347. 
21 Neething (n 3) at 222–226 and Neethling (n 10) at 243. 
22 Pretoria Portland Cement Co Ltd v Competition Commission at 71, where the court held with regard 
to the validity of a search and seizure operation conducted in terms of a warrant, ‘I must emphasize that 
the facts which I have set out, even the undisputed facts, involve a gross violation to the appellants’ 
rights to privacy under the Constitution.’ 
23  Tshabalala-Msimang v Makhanya; Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger and NM v Smith (Freedom of 
Expression Institute as amicus curiae).  
24 MEC for Health, Mpumalanga v M-Net at 718–719 and 721.  
25 Reid-Daly v Hickman.  
26 S v A.  
27 Huey Extreme Club v MacDonald t/a Sport Helicopters at 498–499. 
28 C v Minister of Correctional Services); S v Orrie at 589–590 and 591. 
29 Hoffmann v South African Airways and Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger at paras 11 to 14, and 38. 
30 Gosschalk v Rossouw at 492. 
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Secondly, instances of disclosure or intrusion, that is, where a person 
acquaints third parties with another person, or his personal affairs, which, although 
known, remain private.31  These instances include the disclosure of personal facts 
acquired by a wrongful act of intrusion;32 the disclosure of personal facts contrary to 
the existence of a confidential relationship33 and the publication of private facts by the 
media.34 
Data processing thus has the potential to infringe on an individual’s 
personality in two ways: in instances where correct and accurate personal information 
is processed, a person’s privacy may be infringed, and, secondly, where false or 
misleading information is processed, the individual’s identity may be infringed.35 
Both instances may be protected in the law of delict by the actio iniuriarum.36 Any 
patrimonial loss emanating from the wrongful, negligent infringement of the 
personality may also be claimed with the institution of the actio legis Aquiliae.37 
Moreover, an interdict is available at common law to avert an impending interference 
with one’s right to privacy or identity, or to prevent the continuation of a wrongful 
infringement.38  
As each person determines the destiny of their private information and 
consequently the scope of their interest in privacy, the aim of data protection is 
                                               
31 Neethling et al. (n 3) at 226–236. 
32 Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd at 463; Motor Industry Fund Administrations (Pty) Ltd 
v Janit at 303 and MEC for Health, Mpumalanga v M-Net. 
33 Swanepoel v Minister en Sekuriteit. 
34 NM v Smith and MEC for Health, Mpumalanga v M-Net. 
35 Roos (n 10) at 89. 
36 The actio iniuriarum protects a person’s corpus, fama and dignitas, whereas the term ‘dignitas’ is a 
collective term embracing a number of personality rights, including dignity, privacy and identity, at 
Neethling et al. (n 3) at 229, and C Gowar and CJ Visser ‘Distinguishing between Dignity, Identity and 
Privacy: Is it Really Necessary? Kumalo V Cycle Lab (Pty) Ltd (31871/2008) [2011] ZAGPJHC 56’ 
(2012) 75 Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law at 154. 
37 See J Neethling and J Potgieter ‘Defamation of a Corporation: Aquilian Action for Patrimonial 
(Special) Damages and Actio Iniuriarum for Non-Patrimonial (General) Damages: Media 24 Ltd v. SA 
Taxi Securitisation and Amici Curiae 2011 5 SA 329 (SCA)’ (2012) 75 Journal of Contemporary 
Roman-Dutch Law at 304–312 where at 312 the author’s state in their concluding remarks that: ‘[t]here 
seems to be general agreement that the amende honorable or similar remedies are available or can at 
least be developed in our law to substitute the actio iniuriarum’ and also Gowar and Visser ‘(n 36) at 
154–162, for a discussion on the correct actio to be used.  
38 Roos (n 10) at 90.  
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essentially to enable persons to exercise effective control over the processing of their 
personal information, for instance, personal data processed by a bank, an insurance 
company, employer or health care professionals. 39  
Identity, in contrast, is described by Neethling as that uniqueness, which 
identifies a person as a particular individual (or corporation), and consequently 
distinguishes them from others. 40 Identity may be revealed by a person’s life history, 
name, voice, handwriting or physical image and is the characteristics by which an 
individual may be recognised. Infringement of identity is typically through 
misrepresentation, where a characteristic or representation of a person does not 
accurately reflect the person’s true image. Neethling postulates the distinction: 
‘truthfulness is an element of infringement of privacy’, while ‘falsity is an element of 
infringement of identity’. Therefore, privacy is ‘threatened by the processing of true 
personal information’, whereas identity is ‘endangered by the processing of false or 
misleading data’.41  
It must also be considered whether specific legislative data protection 
measures are necessary and should be enacted to counter any threats to the rights to 
privacy and identity, or whether it is sufficient protection for the courts to utilise, 
develop and adapt traditional principles of common law directed at the protection of 
personality rights with regard to the protection of private data.42  
Despite remedies being available in delict, Roos is of the opinion that data 
protection must be strengthened and extended: ‘[s]ince the common law in South 
Africa does not provide adequate protection for personal data, specific data protection 
legislation is also required’. 43  This position was reiterated by Neethling in his 
doctrinal work on the right to privacy, in which he concludes that the introduction of 
data protection legislation in South Africa was ‘urgently necessary’.44 Yet again in 
Van der Merwe et al., this view is repeated where it is written that, given that, at that 
                                               
39 Neethling (n 10) at 244. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid.  
42 This was addressed by the Law Reform Commission in assessing whether legislative adoption was 
necessary to protect personal data in South Africa. See Ibid and SALRC Report 14–42. 
43 Roos (n 10) at 102. 
44 In Neethling (n 10) at 241. See J Neethling Die reg op privaatheid (LLD thesis UNISA 1976) at 406. 
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time of the authors’ writing, no general data protection existed in South Africa, they 
recommend that ‘[a]n omnibus data protection Act is required’.45  
The grounds in favour of separate remedial data protection legislative 
measures are numerous and compelling.46  Perhaps in light of the doctrine of the 
separation of powers, it is regarded by Neethling as ‘improbable’ that the application 
of traditional principles in case law by the courts will occur ‘often or extensively 
enough’ in the immediate future to warrant the reliance on the courts to develop 
sufficient, extensive jurisprudence to protect personal data adequately and 
immediately.47 This is, in reality, a slow jurisprudential process, despite the court’s 
willing compliance with their obligation to develop the common law in accordance 
with the values and principles underpinning the South African Constitution.  
Moreover, effective data protection requires that persons themselves should be 
able to exercise a measure of control over their personal data. This unique 
requirement of exercising specific control, by giving or withholding consent in a 
predetermined manner, not only differentiates it from, but places it beyond the ambit 
of traditional common law privacy protection principles. Accordingly, such 
requirements and measures can be more easily and concisely accommodated for 
through specifically tailored data protection and privacy legislation.  
Lastly, to comply with the stringent data protection requirements stipulated by 
the latest data protection regulation coming out of the Europe Union, which, for 
instance, controls the free cross-border flow of personal information, appropriate and 
compliant data protection legislation is essential. Unfortunately, the law of delict does 
not provide such comprehensive and rapidly enforceable protection. 
While common law and the law of delict provide opportunities that may be 
helpful in addressing matters of privacy violations, they may not provide satisfactory 
recourse in confronting all the issues. Supplementary legislative measures may indeed 
be useful. 
                                               
45 D van der Merwe, A Roos, T Pistorius & S Eiselen ‘Chapter 9 - Data protection’ in Information and 
Communications Technology Law (2008) at 367. 
46 See S Snail and S Papadopoulos ‘Chapter 13 - Privacy and data protection’ in S Papadopoulos & S 
Snail (eds) Cyberlaw@SA III ed (2012) at 295 where it is stated that ‘… it is clear that data protection 
legislation is necessary.’. 
47 Neethling (n 10) at 245. 
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(2)  South African constitutional right to privacy and human dignity 
Uncertainty about the exact nature, content and scope of privacy as a concept and how 
it relates to, and concurs with, other rights, was also confirmed in Bernstein v 
Bester48, where Ackermann J described the concept of privacy as ‘an amorphous and 
elusive one, which has been the subject of much scholarly debate’. Despite its elusive 
quality, Banisar noted that privacy is ‘one of the most important human rights issues 
of the modern age’.49  
The right to privacy is indispensable in achieving the constitutional 
commitment of safeguarding human dignity. 50  Both of these rights, the right to 
privacy and the right to have one's dignity respected and protected, are provided for in 
Sections 14 and 10 of the Constitution. By including privacy and dignity protection in 
the Constitution, the very essence and inherent objective embodying human rights 
protection is achieved, that of shielding those most vulnerable in society.51 Section 14 
of the Constitution provides: 
 ‘[e]veryone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have (a) one’s 
person or home searched, (b) one’s property searched, (c) one’s possessions seized, 
or (d) the privacy of one’s communications infringed’.  
Section 14 thus has two parts: the first guarantees the general right to privacy, 
or substantive privacy rights, and the second, informational privacy rights, are 
contained in paragraphs (a) through (d), and provide protection against specific 
violations, namely, searches and seizures and infringements of the privacy of 
communications. Although certain infringements are specifically named in Section 14 
(a) to (d), the list of privacy violations is not exhaustive. Section 10 of the 
Constitution provides: 
                                               
48 Bernstein v Bester (CCT23/95) [1996] ZACC 2; 1996 (4) BCLR 449; 1996 (2) SA 751 (27 March 
1996) at para 65 and 67. 
49 D Banisar and SG Davies ‘Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An International Survey of Privacy, 
Data Protection, and Surveillance Laws and Developments’ (2012) 18 (1) John Marshall Journal of 




‘[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected’.  
Although not recognised eo nomine in the Constitution as specified rights, 
identity and reputation may well be considered part of the right to human dignity. 
This was confirmed by O’Regan J who articulated in the Khumalo case that ‘[n]o 
sharp lines then can be drawn between reputation, dignitas and privacy in giving 
effect to the value of human dignity in our Constitution’.52 
(3) South African case law  
The Constitution provides a solid motivation for the South African courts to develop 
the law of delict and vindicate human rights. From modest beginnings, the South 
African courts have begun to shape the concept of privacy.53 In Mistry v Interim 
Medical and Dental Council of South Africa54, the Constitutional Court provided a 
general framework regulating data privacy protection.55 Although the facts of the case 
did not turn on the issue of informational privacy and therefore were not dealt with 
extensively by the court, the court contended that the ‘texture and perimeters’ of 
informational privacy are ‘complex and controversial’. The case touched on the 
difficulties inherent in breach of informational privacy actions, which, unlike invasion 
of private communications, is not addressed expressly in Section 13 of the Interim 
Constitution (subsequently replaced by Section 14 of the Constitution). 56  In the 
judgment of Sachs J, the court, quoting the privacy provisions in the Act, afforded 
protection based on the broad provisions of the right to privacy in the section.57 
                                               
52 Khumalo and Others v Holomisa at para 27. 
53 The courts have to date delivered judgments on the right to privacy with regard to the possession of 
indecent or obscene photographs, the scope of privacy in society and searches and seizures. See the 
following cases in this regard: Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 
(CC); Curtis and Another v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC); Bernstein v Bester; 
National Media Ltd and Another v Jooste and Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South 
Africa. 
54 Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa. 
55 Burchell (n 1) at 7. 
56 Ibid at 14. 
57 At paras 47 and 48. 
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The determination in Mistry turned on whether the information was obtained 
in an intrusive manner; whether the nature of the information concerned intimate 
aspects of the individual’s personal life; whether the specified purpose of the 
information was not adhered to and the information was used for an ulterior purpose; 
and, lastly, whether the information was disseminated to the press or general public 
from whom the subject ‘could reasonably expect such information would be 
withheld’.58 
The 1996 Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa in 
National Media Ltd and Another v Jooste recognised that privacy is a condition that 
‘embraces all those personal facts, which the person concerned has determined 
himself to be excluded from the knowledge of outsiders and in respect of which he 
has the will that they be kept private’.59  
Interestingly, Harms JA quoted the words of Warren and Brandeis in the 
introduction to his judgment.60  Exactly where the boundary between the right to 
privacy and the infringement thereof should be drawn remains a question to be 
determined. The court held that ‘a person is entitled to decide when and under what 
circumstances private facts may be made public’ and such disclosure or consent to 
such disclosure may ‘be limited conditionally or unconditionally and irrespective of 
motive’. 
In Tshabalala-Msimang v Makhanya an application was brought before the 
South African High Court, calling upon it to consider the inherent conflict between 
the competing constitutional rights of privacy and that of freedom of expression 
entrenched in Section 16, also positioned as the public’s right to know. 61  The 
application was based on the provisions contained within the Constitution and the 
National Health Act pertaining particularly to one’s right to privacy and to the 
confidentiality of, access to, and protection of medical records. The court confirmed 
that, in terms of ‘the National Health Act, the medical records of a person are private 
                                               
58  Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa at para 47. See additionally, D 
McQuoid-Mason (n 18) at 227. 
59 At para 13 quoting Neethling’s definition of ‘privacy’ in his doctoral thesis, Die Reg op Privaatheid 
(UNISA 1976) at 287. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Tshabalala-Msimang v Makhanya. 
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and confidential’. 62  The court followed: ‘where a person acquires knowledge of 
private facts through a wrongful act of intrusion, any disclosure of such facts by such 
person or by any person, in principle, constitutes an infringement of the right to 
privacy’.63 The court reiterated the importance of keeping the information concerning 
a user, including information relating to his/her health status, treatment or stay in a 
health establishment, as confidential. 64  The reason for this is clear. Confidential 
medical information invariably contains ‘sensitive and personal information about the 
user’, concerning the ‘individual’s health, reflects sensitive decisions and the choices 
that relate to issues pertaining to bodily and psychological integrity as well as 
personal autonomy’. 65 The court emphasised the ‘potential harmful effects’ that may 
result from such disclosure.66 
In Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger the court reiterated the importance of a 
medical practitioner’s duty of maintaining confidentiality regarding information 
acquired in a medical practitioner’s professional capacity. The plaintiff argued that the 
disclosure by the medical practitioner of his HIV status – despite an explicit request 
by the patient to keep the information confidential – to other health practitioners was 
an invasion of his privacy and an injury to his rights of personality. The court 
confirmed that the Hippocratic Oath, which requires a medical practitioner ‘to keep 
silence’ about information acquired in his professional capacity relating to a patient, 
‘counting such things to be as sacred secrets’, is still applicable. The court held that 
the duty of a medical practitioner to respect the confidence of his or her patients is not 
merely an ethical duty but also a legal duty that is well recognised by South African 
common law. The court held that the duty of a medical practitioner to maintain patient 
confidentiality not only serves to protect the privacy of patients, but it is also vital in 
securing public health.  
The reaffirmation of the importance of the patient’s right to privacy and the 
non-disclosure of medical information by medical practitioners was restated in the 
case of NM v Smith. The applicants in this case contended that, because of the 
                                               
62 Ibid at para 26. 
63 Ibid. 




disclosure of their names and HIV status to the public, their rights of personality, 
more particularly their right to privacy, dignity and psychological integrity, had been 
violated.67 The constitutional court was called upon to address the effect of the South 
African Constitution on the common law right of privacy and to pronounce on the 
scope and content of this right.68 On hearing the case, the constitutional court justices 
were unanimous in agreement regarding the private nature of information concerning 
a person’s medical condition, in general, and the fact that they were HIV positive, in 
particular. However, the dissenting justices did offer a different approach from that of 
the majority with respect to both the interpretation of the facts of the case and to the 
legal interpretation of the right to privacy.69 
Madala J held that: 
‘[p]rivate and confidential medical information contains highly sensitive and 
personal information about individuals. The personal and intimate nature of an 
individual’s health information, unlike other forms of documentation, reflects 
delicate decisions and choices  relating to issues pertaining to bodily and 
psychological integrity and personal autonomy’.70  
Consequently, the lack of respect for medical information and its unauthorised 
disclosure might result in ‘fear, jeopardising an individual’s right to make certain 
fundamental choices that he/she has a right to make’.71 The protection of medical 
information was furthermore extended, rather than being limited only to the health 
care personnel.72 The court in NM v Smith continued:  
‘[a]s a result, it is imperative and necessary that all private and confidential medical 
information should receive protection against unauthorised disclosure. The involved 
parties should weigh the need for access against the privacy interest in every instance 
                                               
67 NM v Smith at para 35. 
68  T Gidron ‘Publication of private information: An examination of the right to privacy from a 
comparative perspective (part 2)’ (2010) 2 Tydskryf vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg at 271–287. 
69 Ibid. 
70 NM v Smith at para 40. 
71 At para 41. 
72 A Le Roux-Kemp ‘HIV/AIDS, to disclose or not to disclose: That is the question’ (2013) 16 (1) 
PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad.  
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and not only when there is an implication of another fundamental right, in this case 
the right to freedom of expression’.73 
Regardless of the fact that the applicants had given their consent to participate 
in the clinical trial and in the consequential enquiry, the court held that they 
unquestionably had not given express informed consent for highly personal and 
confidential material to be published in a book, which was to be widely circulated 
throughout South Africa.74 Earlier consent given by the applicants was for a specific 
limited purpose, and it precludes the information from being published for an 
alternative purpose. The consent was ‘limited to medical records and if any other 
publication was envisaged the requisite consent had to be obtained for that particular 
publication’.75 Thus, an individual’s direct interest in controlling information about 
himself and keeping it confidential remains intact. It was made clear by the court that 
it is fundamentally flawed to assume that others have the right to access private 
medical information once it has left the hands of authorised medical personnel 
involved in their medical treatment.76 The courts verified one of the cornerstones of 
health care and a fundamental characteristic of the practice of medicine, viz. that of 
confidentiality.77  
Section 14, in creating a new constitutional right to privacy, may influence the 
development of the common law action for privacy infringement. Inversely, courts, in 
providing content and recognition to the substantive right to privacy, will be guided 
by common law precedents.  
It is argued by McQuoid-Mason that the distinctions between a ‘private law 
delict’ under common law and ‘public law delict’ arising from a breach of a 
fundamental right are ‘more apparent than real’. The investigation, he suggests, 
should rather consider whether or not the common law of delict vis-à-vis personality 
rights ‘should be incrementally developed to accommodate the relevant constitutional 
                                               
73 NM v Smith at para 43. 
74 Ibid at para 80. 
75 Ibid.  
76 Ibid at para 44. 
77 Le Roux-Kemp (n 72).  
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imperatives’, thereby evolving into a new, and different, form of constitutional delict, 
and, if so, what such version of invasion of privacy should look like.78 
Currently, the courts seem likely to continue advancing the common law by 
‘infusing it with the spirit of the Constitution’.79 Consequently, a ‘hybrid action based 
on a mixture of the common law and constitutional imperatives’ may emerge in 
time.80  Clearly, though, broad protection is afforded to the right to privacy by the 
South African legal system, which is the favourable rhetoric of the courts. 
Undeniably, privacy protection in South Africa, particularly within a health care 
context, is both well established and understood in the jurisprudence.  
(4)  Limitation of the right to privacy  
The South African constitutional right to privacy, like its common law counterpart, is 
not an absolute right but may be limited. 81  The limitation clause is set out in 
Section 36 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Constitution provides that the rights 
in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of the law of general application to 
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society, based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all 
relevant factors, including (i) the nature of the right; (ii) the importance of the purpose 
of the limitation; (iii) the nature and extent of the limitation; (iv) the relation between 
the limitation and its purpose; and (v) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.82 
Data protection legislation should therefore strike a balance between the 
fundamental right to privacy of the data subject, as contained in Section 14 of the 
Constitution, on the one hand, and the legitimate need of other persons, on the other 
hand, to obtain information about the data subject. 
                                               
78 McQuoid-Mason (n 18) at 227 at 246 and South African Law Reform Commission ‘Privacy and 
Data Protection’ Discussion Paper 109 Project 124 The Commission Pretoria (October 2005) at 18. 
79 McQuoid-Mason (n 18) at 260. 
80 Ibid at 260 and 261. 
81 See in Bernstein v Bester: ‘… In the context of privacy this would mean that it is only the inner 
sanctum of a person, such as his/her family life, sexual preference and home environment, which is 
shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the community.’ 
82 Section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
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The balance is between the right to privacy, and the right of access to 
information and the freedom of speech and expression. These are provided for in 
Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights at Sections 16 and 32.  
Competing interests may be, for instance, the administering of national social 
programmes, the need to maintain law and order, issues of national security and 
protecting the rights, interests and of others, including the economic interests of 
banking, insurance, direct marketing, health care, pharmaceuticals [my emphasis] 
and travel services. Clearly, the task of balancing these opposing interests is a delicate 
one.83 Ackermann J in the Constitutional Court case of Bernstein v Bester cautioned 
against employing common law principles when interpreting fundamental rights and 
their limitations.84  
At common law, the determination of whether an invasion of privacy has 
occurred forms a single enquiry. The court held that ‘[a]s in the case of other iniuriae, 
the presence of a ground of justification excludes the wrongfulness of an invasion of 
privacy’.85 To find delictual liability under the common law for a violation of privacy, 
the conduct in question must be said to be wrongful, that is, when using the criterion 
of reasonableness or the norm of boni mores.86 Thus, in terms of common law, data 
industry practices may constitute a wrongful invasion of privacy, where such violation 
is by way of an unlawful intrusion upon the personal privacy of another, or an 
unlawful disclosure of private facts about a person. The unlawfulness of an 
infringement of privacy is adjudged ‘in the light of contemporary boni mores and the 
general sense of justice of the community as perceived by the Court’.87  
                                               
83  See the summary of preliminary recommendations set out in the South African Law Reform 
Commission report ‘Privacy and Data Protection’ Discussion paper 109 Project 124 October 2005. 
84 Bernstein v Bester at para 71, which held that ‘[c]aution must be exercised when attempting to 
project common law principles onto the interpretation of fundamental rights and their limitation; it is 
important to keep in mind that at common law the determination of whether an invasion of privacy has 
taken place constitutes a single enquiry, including an assessment of its unlawfulness. As in the case of 
other iniuriae the presence of a ground of justification excludes the wrongfulness of an invasion of 
privacy. In constitutional adjudication under the Constitution, by contrast, a two-stage approach must 
be employed in deciding constitutionality of a statute’.  
85 Defences may include inter alia consent, absolute privilege, statutory authority, private defence and 
necessity.  
86 Bernstein v Bester at para 68 and Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd at 462F. 
87 Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd at 462G. 
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The court, however, explained that the position in constitutional adjudication 
differs, in that it requires a two-stage approach.88  In the case of a constitutional 
invasion of privacy, it requires the assertion, firstly, of whether the invasive law or 
conduct infringes on the right to privacy, as contained in the Constitution. To do so, 
the person has to show that he or she has ‘a subjective expectation of privacy’, which 
is ‘objectively reasonable’.89 Unless it is a violation of a person’s ‘inner sanctum’, a 
person’s expectation of privacy should be balanced against ‘the conflicting rights of 
the community’.90 
And if so, secondly, it must be asked whether such an infringement is 
justifiable in terms of the requirements contained in the limitation clause in Section 36 
of the Constitution. For this reason, the Constitutional Court has cautioned against 
simply applying common law principles to the interpretation of fundamental rights 
and their limitations.91  
(5)  South African legislation influencing privacy and data protection in 
health care92  
The Constitution requires that all laws in South Africa be congruent with the 
provisions contained in the Constitution. Section 8 and the related s 39(2) of the 
Constitution mandate the legislature to ensure that all constitutional rights are 
provided substance and content, and that any prevailing conflicting laws be brought 
                                               
88 Bernstein v Bester at para 71.  
89 McQuoid-Mason (n 18) at 247 and see Bernstein v Bester at para 75. 
90 Ackermann J describes a person’s ‘inner sanctum’ as their ‘family life, sexual preference and home 
environment’ in Bernstein v Bester at para 69. 
91 See Bernstein v Bester at para 71 and South African Law Reform Commission ‘(n 84) at 18. Also 
McQuoid-Mason (n 18) at 246. 
92 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the intricacies of all South African data protection 
legislation, for instance, the National Credit Act No. 32 of 2005 and the POPI Act. I have restricted 
myself to only those enactments, which have a direct influence on data protection within the health care 
system primarily for two reasons: firstly, the POPI Act seeks to consolidate many of the disparate 
provisions found in the various acts and, secondly, data protection governance within the health care 
environment is also and more importantly to be found embedded in various health care legislation and 
medical regulatory guidelines.  
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into line, not only with the express provisions of Chapter 2, the Bill of Rights, but also 
with the ‘spirit, purport and objects’ of the Bill of Rights.93  
In South Africa, statutory measures have been introduced to achieve health-
related demands, and to bring about health reform, thereby ensuring that human rights 
are not mere promises but legitimate and enforceable rights.94 This pertains not only 
to the constitutional right to life but also to the right to privacy. Singh et al. assert that 
South Africa is one of the best known examples of how ‘human rights matter to 
health’ and that South Africa is a country ‘in which an explicit codified right to health 
has prompted health reforms’. Despite the country’s ‘failure to ratify the covenant on 
economic, social, and cultural rights’ [specifically article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural rights of December 1966], South Africa 
has shown ‘how respect for, and promotion of human rights can lead to improved 
health outcomes’.95  
 
(i)  The National Health Act No. 61 of 2003 and the National Health Amendment 
Act No. 12 of 201396 
The National Health Act has as its primary purpose to ‘provide a framework for a 
structured uniform health system within the Republic, taking into account the 
obligations imposed by the Constitution and other laws… with regard to health 
services…’.  
In the preamble to the National Health Act, the Act recognises ‘the socio-
economic injustices, imbalances and inequities of health services of the past and the 
need to improve the quality of life of all citizens’, and acknowledges Section 27 (2) of 
the Constitution, which provides that the State must take ‘reasonable legislative and 
                                               
93 Section 39(2) states: ‘[w]hen interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights’ and sections 8(3)(a) and (b) which provides: ‘[w]hen applying a provision of the Bill of Rights 
to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection (2), a court – (a) in order to give effect to a right in 
the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not 
give effect to that right; and (b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that 
the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1)’. 
94 JA Singh, M Govender and EJ Mills ‘Do human rights matter to health?’ (2007) 370 Lancet at 521.  
95 Ibid.  
96 A Gray and Y Vawda ‘Health Policy and Legislation’ in South African Health Review 2013/2014 
(2014) Health Systems Trust.  
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other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of 
the right of the people of South Africa to have access to health care services’.  
Regarding the position of eHealth and privacy protection in South Africa, 
Chapter 2 of the National Health Act has particular relevance. Confidentiality-related 
provisions are set out in Section 14, and Sections 15 through 1797 provide for access 
to health records and their protection. These sections effectively strengthen the ethical 
principles of confidentiality into a statutory requirement.98 Section 14 of the National 
Health Act defines confidentiality as follows:  
 
‘(1) All information concerning a user, including information relating to his or 
her health  status, treatment or stay in a health establishment, is confidential. 
(2) Subject to section 15, no person may disclose any information 
contemplated in subsection  
 (1) unless – 
  (a) the user consents to that disclosure in writing; 
  (b) a court order or any law requires that disclosure; or 
(c) non-disclosure of the information represents a serious 
threat to public health’.  
 
‘Protection of health records’ is contained in Section 17, which provides for 
privacy related issues. 99  Particular references in Sections 6, 7 and 8 are made 
regarding informed consent.  
 
                                               
97 Section 15 provides: a health care professional ‘... may disclose such personal information to any 
other person, health care provider or health establishment as is necessary for any legitimate purpose 
within the ordinary course and scope of his or her duties where such access or disclosure is in the 
interests of the user…’.  
98 H Oosthuizen and T Verschoor ‘Ethical principles becoming statutory requirements’ (2008) 50 (5) 
SA Family Practice 36 at 38 and A Gray, Y Vawda and C Jack ‘Health policy and legislation: 
legislation and financing’ (2012/2013) South African Health Review at 10 and 11. 
99 C Jack and M Mars ‘Telemedicine: A need for ethical and legal guidelines in South Africa’ (2008) 
50 (2) South African Family Practice at 60c. 
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(ii)  The Health Professions Council of South Africa’s guidelines 
The Health Professions Council of South Africa 100  is a statutory body, created 
pursuant to powers granted in terms of the Health Professions Act. The Council, 
which is mandated by the South African government to provide regulations, guides 
health care professions in South Africa in aspects pertaining to the ethical behaviour 
and conduct of health professionals and in ‘fostering compliance with health care 
standards’.101 The HPCSA has developed a series of ethical rules and guidelines, 
which have been set out in booklets regulating, for instance, the good ethical practice 
relating to, for instance, confidentiality and the protection of information.102  The 
regulatory mandate of the HPCSA affects health care practitioners in both state and 
privately owned health care institutions and its primary purpose is to protect patients 
against abuse or maltreatment by health care practitioners, while affording guidance 
to medical professions on what constitutes good medical practice and appropriate and 
acceptable conduct.103 With regard to the regulation of eHealth and telemedicine, the 
HPCSA has recently published draft guidelines governing the ethical practice of 
telemedicine in South Africa.104 
The existing guidelines contained in Booklet 11 in respect of confidentiality 
seek to inform medical professionals dealing with patients’ personal information and 
to provide direction concerning the storage, confidentiality and protection of such 
patient information. 105  These guidelines state that a practitioner may divulge 
information regarding a patient only if this is done: ‘in terms of a statutory provision, 
at the instruction of a court, in the public interest, with the express consent of the 
patient, with the written consent of a parent or guardian of a minor under the age of 12 
                                               
100 Referred to as the ‘HPCSA’. 
101 As described on the HPCSA’s website. Available at http://www.hpcsa.co.za/ (accessed 20 February 
2017). 
102 HPCSA Confidentiality: Protecting and providing information (2nd ed) Booklet 11 (2007). 
103 HPCSA General Ethical Guidelines for good practice in Telemedicine Booklet 17.  
104 Ibid. 
105 Although still regarded as primary sources of guidance, the promulgation of recent legislation has 
amended and extended this considerably. See Oosthuizen and Verschoor (n 98) at 37–40. 
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years, or in the case of a deceased patient with the written consent of the next of kin 
or the executor of the deceased’s estate’.106 
Likewise, the draft ‘General Ethical Guidelines for good practice in 
Telemedicine Booklet 17’ states at 4.5.3 that ‘[h]ealthcare practitioners should not 
give medical advice or provide treatment using telemedicine without obtaining proper 
informed consent from the patient for both the treatment to be given and the use of 
telemedicine technology’. 107  The draft guidelines continue at 4.6.2 ‘[i]nformed 
consent for the use of telemedicine technologies must be obtained in writing.’ 
Additionally, a lengthy and onerous list of documentation is required in the provision 
of informed consent’.108 
The guidelines provide that a patient should be informed as to who will have 
access to their information where telemedicine is practiced. Additionally, a copy of 
the consent form should be kept with the patient’s records and a duplicate given to the 
patient.109  
Certainly, one should exercise caution in distinguishing between eHealth 
medical professionals per se and other health care professionals, as defined by the 
Health Professions Act. Perhaps it is prudent rather to talk of health care practitioners 
who provide the same services, treatment and care, but who merely use eHealth 
platforms to do so and who must nevertheless adhere to the same laws and regulations 
as those providing traditional health practices. Surely, eHealth medical practitioners 
have the same core ethical values, responsibilities and duties as their non-eHealth 
counterparts in respect of the same health care services, as required by virtue of their 
being qualified and registered in terms of their respective professions.110  
It is worth noting that the principles established by the HPCSA do not bind 
every member of the health care sector, but only those registered in terms of the 
Health Professions Act. Unfortunately, this results in an entire sector of the health 
care industry being without guidelines: this includes allied health practitioners, 
                                               
106 HPCSA (n 102) at 2–3. 
107 HPCSA (n 103) at 8. 
108 Ibid at 9 and 4.6.5 at 10. 
109 Ibid at 10. 
110 See M Kekana, P Noe and B Mkhize ‘The practice of telemedicine and challenges to the regulatory 
authorities’ (2010) 3 S Afr J Bioethics Law at 34. 
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African traditional practitioners and health establishments, ranging from clinics and 
hospitals to service providers assisting with the storage of stem cells and sperm banks. 
 The guidelines do not bind other eHealth industry players either, such as 
software developers and those controlling and transferring personal health data 
outside of the medical profession, where the potential for data mismanagement is rife. 
Likewise, in light of the jurisdictional limitations inherent in the application of the 
guidelines, together with the borderless unrestricted flow of eHealth data and advisory 
resources, draft guideline 4.1.3 stipulates that, where telemedicine crosses country 
borders, medical practitioners assisting or treating South African patients should be 
registered not only with the regulating bodies in their country of origin but also with 
the HPCSA.111 
A further challenge posed by the implementation of eHealth is the 
involvement of non-health care participants, for instance, information technology 
specialists. There is no requirement for these IT specialists, operators and data 
managers to register with any regulatory authority. Moreover, they fall outside of any 
provisions determined by the HPCSA and are thus not governed by them. Although 
certain protection may be afforded by compliance in terms of the POPI Act, a clear 
risk to the privacy and safety of patient information cannot be excluded. 
With regard to the security of patient information, the following is provided: 
‘(a) Patient information should only be transmitted from one site to the other and 
stored, with the full knowledge and approval of the patient, in line with the informed 
consent guidelines’.112 
The informed written consent required by the guidelines, along with the 
extensive written documentation required surrounding such consent, and the onerous 
stipulation that written records be held at both the sending and receiving location 
where eHealth activities are practiced, are not only impractical but excessively 
burdensome on a health care system, which is already understaffed and in crisis.  
Additionally, the position regarding how, if at all, informed consent may be 
obtained electronically by, for instance, the use of cellular telephones, remains 
unresolved. Whether consent obtained in this way can be construed as ‘written’ 
                                               
111 HPCSA (n 103) at 6.  
112 Ibid at 14.  
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consent, consistent with the provisions of the ECT Act, is also unclear. eHealth 
activities can be conducted partially or wholly electronically in an online 
environment. The ECT Act (as does the UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce113) 
adopts the principles of non-discrimination, technological neutrality and functional 
equivalence. 114  The principle of non-discrimination stipulates that any document 
should not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability by virtue solely because it 
is in an electronic format.115 The principle of technological neutrality enforces the 
provision that various technologies used are all of neutral value, while functional 
equivalence establishes criteria under which electronic documents may be considered 
equivalent to paper-based documents. 116  Despite the formality for consent to be 
‘written’, the extent to which the ECT Act may provide relief to eHealth practitioners, 
where data messages are recognised as the functional equivalence of written 
messages, and electronically provided consent has the equivalent legal value as that 
written on paper, is uncertain. The imposition of written informed consent by policy 
makers in those countries with low literacy levels and significant language variances 
is suggestive of an impediment to telemedicine and eHealth usage rather than an 
enabling one. It was found in research conducted by Jack and Mars that ‘[w]ritten 
informed consent is not routinely obtained from patients during clinical examination 
or when using ICT for the transfer of patient information’ despite a statutory 
requirement for this to be undertaken.117 This suggests that, where a requirement in 
law is impractical or unrealistically achievable, it may simply not be implemented or 
                                               
113 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce: Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 
[on the report of the Sixth Committee (A/51/628)] 51/162 Model Law on Electronic Commerce 
adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, see particularly Chapter III 
article 5, which holds ‘[i]nformation shall not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on 
the grounds that it is in the form of a data message.’.  
114 See ECT Act Chapter III Part I s 11(1) to (3), s 12, s 14(1) and (2), s 15(1) to (4), s 16 (1) and (2), 
and s 17(1) and (2). 
115 Section 11 of the ECT Act provides ‘(1) Information is not without legal force and effect merely on 
the grounds that it is wholly or partly in the form of a data message’. 
116 Section 12 of the ECT Act provides ‘[a] requirement in law that a document or information must be 
in writing is met if the document or information is - (a) in the form of a data message; and (b) 
accessible in a manner usable for subsequent reference.’ 
117 As set out in the National Health Act. For more, see CL Jack and M Mars ‘Informed consent for 
telemedicine in South Africa: A survey of consent practices among health care professionals in Durban, 
KwaZulu-Natal’ (2013) 6 (2) South African Journal of Bioethics and Law at 55–59. 
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enforced. Nevertheless, the narrative is clear: eHealth issues and the governance 
thereof require thoughtful and insightful direction and remain an ongoing challenge to 
policy regulators in South Africa.118  
 
(iii)  The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (ECT Act) 
Sections 50 and 51 of the ECT Act apply to personal information that has been 
obtained through electronic transactions. The ECT Act sets out the accepted data 
protection principles, describing how personal data, as defined in the ECT Act, may 
be collected and utilised.119 The definition contained in the ECT Act for ‘personal 
information’ includes specifically ‘physical or mental health, well-being and 
disability’. Section 51 compels ‘data controllers’ to have the ‘express written 
permission of the data subject for the collection, processing or disclosure of any 
personal information on that data subject’.120 Moreover, sub-section 4 provides that 
‘[t]he data controller may not use the personal information for any other purpose than 
the disclosed purpose without the express written permission of the data subject, 
unless he or she is permitted or required to do so by law.’  
Additionally, a data controller may not disclose any personal information to a 
third party unless required by law or expressly permitted by the data subject to do so, 
should ‘delete or destroy all personal information which has become obsolete’, and 
may use personal information to compile profiles for statistical purposes and may 
freely trade with such profiles and statistical data, only so ‘long as the profiles or 
statistical data cannot be linked to any specific data subject by a third party’.121 
Integral to the success of eHealth delivery systems is the sharing and exchange 
of sensitive or personal data, which infers the transmission of data between parties 
and locations. Data security methods, such as cryptography, digital watermarking and 
                                               
118 Kekana et al. (n 110) at 33. 
119 See Snail and Papadopoulos (n 46) at 292–293 for the ways in which personal data may be collected 
including viruses, ‘trojan horses’, hacking, and ‘spoofing’. 
120 A ‘data controller’ means ‘any person who electronically requests, collects, collates, processes or 
stores personal information from or in respect of a data subject’. 
121 Sections 51(6) and 80. 
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steganography have been proposed as possible measures to safeguard data.122 The 
onus of non-disclosure of information to third parties rests on the data controller. 
 However, the ECT Act is silent on the extent of security, if any, required – but 
merely unreservedly prohibits disclosure to a third party without consent. One can 
only deduce what constitutes the expected adequate or plausible level of security 
under the circumstances, as this is not explicitly stipulated in the ECT Act, but 
presumably, it is whatever is reasonably necessary to avert disclosure to third parties. 
Given that the POPI Act provides protection for the processing of personal 
information in an electronic format, it will probably supersede the comparable 
provisions in the ECT Act.123 
 
(iv) The Protection of Personal Information ACT 4 of 2013 (POPI)  
The introduction of the POPI Act in South Africa will necessitate amendments to 
existing South African legislation. Most notably, it will affect certain provisions in the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000, the ECT Act and the National 
Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014.124 
 
a.  The background to the POPI Act 
In 2013, the much-anticipated POPI Act was assented to by the President of the 
Republic of South Africa and promulgated in Government Gazette No. 37067. Its 
commencement date is to be determined on a date in accordance with s 115(1) of the 
Act by proclamation in the Gazette. Section 114 allows parties who process personal 
information, a period of one year from the date of commencement of the provisions of 
the POPI Act to conform therewith. 
Privacy and data protection issues were initially approved for inclusion in an 
enquiry conducted by the South African Law Reform Commission as early as 
2000.The SALRC’s report noted the significant impact that global trends have on 
                                               
122 AO Adesina, KK Agbele, K Kehinde, R Februarie, AP Abidoye and HO Nyongesa ‘Ensuring the 
security and privacy of information in mobile health-care communication systems’ (2011) 107 (9–10) 
South African Journal of Science at 1.  
123 Van der Merwe et al. (n 45) at 368. 
124 SALRC (n 83) at 9 fn 49.  
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international trade and the unrestricted exchange of data across borders, and records 
that information privacy cannot ‘simply be regarded as a domestic policy problem’. It 
recognised that personal information can be effortlessly transferred outside the 
borders of the country of origin, resulting in the necessity of strengthened 
international harmonisation efforts, and a concomitant endeavour to regulate and 
standardise transborder data flows between nations. 125  Moreover, the report 
recommended that South Africa’s information privacy and data protection framework 
should align itself more closely with transnational data protection instruments, thus 
ensuring that the ‘adequate’ protection demanded by certain international regulations 
is complied with, and that future participation in global information markets is 
encouraged.  
 
b.  The purpose of the POPI Act  
The POPI Act has as its primary purpose the promotion and protection of personal 
information processed by private and public bodies, thereby giving effect and 
substance to the right of privacy contained in Section 14 of the Constitution. In so 
doing, it endeavours to achieve a delicate balance of this right to privacy against other 
rights contained in the Constitution, particularly the right of access to information.126 
 The legislation seeks to find a sustainable and equitable balance between the 
interests of opposing rights, that of an open, transparent and accountable society, on 
the one hand, and the right to be left alone, on the other.127 The right to privacy, as 
embodied in the POPI Act, is delicately balanced against the interests contained in its 
legislative ‘competitor’, the Promotion of Access to Information Act.  
The POPI Act has committed to the objective of regulating ‘the manner in 
which personal information may be processed, by establishing conditions, in harmony 
with international standards, that prescribe the minimum threshold requirements for 
the lawful processing of personal information’ and to protect ‘important interests, 
                                               
125 Ibid at v.  
126 Neethling (n 10) at 245.  
127 SALRC (n 83) at 4 and C Piller ‘Privacy in peril’ (1993) 10 (7) Macworld at 124–130. 
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including the free flow of information within the Republic and across international 
borders’.128  
The POPI Act provides for the safeguarding of personal information, as 
defined. Exceptions include the processing of personal information by the Cabinet and 
the courts, as well as for purposes of purely personal or household activities, national 
security or defence, criminal investigation and prosecution, and journalism. Such 
exemptions and exceptions are granted to data processors where the risk of privacy 
violation is relatively low, or where private or the public interests exceed those of the 
right to privacy.129 
The POPI Act, in seeking to regulate the way in which personal information is 
processed, includes the processing of so-called ‘special information’, and provides 
recourse by means of remedies to those whose rights have been infringed.130 A degree 
of flexibility is envisaged, in that data processing industries are permitted to develop 
their own codes of conduct, in accordance with the data protection principles set out 
in the Act, which will be overseen by a regulatory authority.131  
Section 107(a) of the POPI Act grants individuals protection measures with 
regard to their rights, and remedies and penalties for non-infringement or violation are 
severe.132 Section 39 provides for the establishment of an Information Regulator, thus 
ensuring the enforcement and fulfilment of the rights protected in terms of Act. 
 
c.  Conditions for the processing of personal information  
Section 4 of the POPI Act provides for the lawful processing, as defined, of personal 
information. The POPI Act seeks to protect the eight core data-protection principles in 
respect of the processing of personal information embodied within the Act. 
Accordingly, Section 4 (1) sets out the conditions for the lawful processing of 
personal information by a responsible party under the following headings: 
                                               
128 Chapter 1 Section 2 (a) ii and 2 (b) of the POPI Act. See a commentary on the bill before it was 
enacted in Snail and S Papadopoulos (n 46) at 299.  
129A Roos ‘Core principles of data protection law’ (2006) 39 CILSA 102 at 127. 
130 Chapter 3, Part A and Part B of the POPI Act, and chapters 10 and 11.  
131 Chapter 7 of the POPI Act and see Neethling (n 10) at 246.  
132 Penalties for non-compliance amount to fines not exceeding 10 million ZAR or imprisonment of up 
to 10 years. 
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(a) ‘accountability’,  
(b) ‘processing limitation’, 
(c) ‘purpose specification’,  
(d) ‘further processing limitation’, 
(e)  ‘information quality’,  
(f) ‘openness’,  
(g) ‘security safeguards’, and  
(h) ‘data subject participation’ 
 
It is a requirement that personal information be processed ‘lawfully’ and in a 
‘reasonable manner that does not infringe the privacy’ of the person. The Act further 
provides that ‘personal information may only be processed if, given the purpose for 
which it is processed, it is adequate, relevant and not excessive’. The person from 
whom data is collected must consent to the processing and be made aware clearly and 
precisely of the purpose for which the information is to be processed. The information 
must be collected directly from the person and for a specified, explicit, and legitimate 
purpose. Additionally, personal information may not be retained for longer than is 
necessary for the specified purpose, and such information should not be used for any 
other purpose than that for which it was collected. Moreover, the POPI Act prescribes 
that the ‘responsible party’, as defined, has an obligation in terms of the Act to take 
reasonable steps to ensure that information is complete, accurate, not misleading and 
is updated where necessary.133  
Further, it is incumbent upon the responsible party to put security measures in 
place to ensure that personal information is safeguarded against loss, damage to and 
unlawful access to or processing of personal information.134  
 
d.  Sections 19 through 21 – Security measures 
Of relevance to the health care environment are the provisions contained in 
Sections 19 through to 21 regarding the security measures that protect the integrity of 
                                               
133 Sections 8 to 18.  
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133 
personal information. As safeguarding security and the maintenance of data integrity 
are integral to the provision of privacy, this is of utmost importance to emerging 
eHealth processes.  
Section 19 of the POPI Act provides that a responsible party ‘must secure the 
integrity and confidentiality of personal information in its possession or under its 
control by taking action to prevent (a) loss of, damage to or unauthorised destruction 
of personal information; and (b) unlawful access to or processing of personal 
information’.  
The POPI Act provides in Section 19(2) that the responsible party is obliged to 
take ‘reasonable measures to (a) identify all reasonably foreseeable internal and 
external risks to personal information in its possession or under its control; (b) 
establish and maintain appropriate safeguards against the risks identified; (c) regularly 
verify that the safeguards are effectively implemented; and (d) ensure that the 
safeguards are continually updated in response to new risks or deficiencies in 
previously implemented safeguards’.  
It is further incumbent upon the responsible party to have ‘due regard to 
generally accepted information security practices and procedures’, which may be 
required in terms of professional rules and regulations in respect of their profession or 
industry.  
Section 20 provides that an operator or any person acting under the authority 
or on behalf of a responsible party must process information only with the knowledge 
or authorisation of the responsible party and should ‘treat personal information which 
comes to their knowledge as confidential and must not disclose it unless required by 
law or in the course of the proper performance of their duties’. This is of particular 
importance to hospital staff and health care administrators or any person authorised by 
the health care practitioner to process personal information on their behalf.  
Section 21 provides that ‘[a] responsible party must, in terms of a written 
contract between the responsible party and the operator, ensure that the operator 
which processes personal information for the responsible party establishes and 
maintains the security measures referred to in Section 19.’ Further, it is the 
responsibility of the operator ‘to notify the responsible party immediately’ where 
personal information has been accessed or acquired by any unauthorised person. 
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e.  Sections 26 and 32 – Authorisation of a data subject’s health data  
Special provision is made for the protection of so-called ‘sensitive personal 
information’ relating to children, religion or philosophy of life, race, trade-union 
membership, political persuasion, health and sexual life, and criminal behaviour in 
Chapter 3 of the POPI Act.135  Section 26 provides: ‘[a] responsible party may, subject 
to section 27, not process personal information concerning—(a) the religious or 
philosophical beliefs, race or ethnic origin, trade union membership, political 
persuasion, health or sex life or biometric information of a data subject’.  
However, the prohibition contained in Section 26 does not apply to the 
processing of information by certain categories of persons and institutions, including, 
but not limited to, ‘medical professionals, health care institutions or facilities or social 
services, if such processing is necessary for the proper treatment and care of the data 
subject, or for the administration of the institution or professional practice 
concerned’.136 This is qualified under Section 32(2) as information processed only by 
responsible parties subject to an obligation of confidentiality by virtue of office, 
employment, profession or legal provision, or established by a written agreement 
between the responsible party and the data subject. The prohibition does not apply 
where it is necessary to supplement the processing of personal information concerning 
a person’s health with a view to the proper treatment or care of the person. 
Information regarding the person’s health and sex life, as well as biometric 
information, may only be processed by responsible parties ‘subject to an obligation of 
confidentiality by virtue of their office, employment, profession or legal provision’ or 
if ‘established by a written agreement’ between the responsible party and person.  
With regard to eHealth applications, any personal information that is 
processed by a health practitioner for the purposes of his professional activity, 
including online activities, will be required to comply with the conditions imposed by 
the POPI Act. 
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f.  The significance of the POPI Act in eHealth in South Africa  
South Africa is in the favourable position of realising privacy protection through 
several legal sources, namely, by virtue of the law of delict, under the right to privacy 
contained in the South African Constitution and in terms of recent provisions 
contained in omnibus data protection legislation. 137  The mutually advantageous 
interaction between these three sources of protection within the South African legal 
system renders individuals’ rights in cases of violation not only protected in terms of 
law, but it also provides the infringed party with clearly actionable and enforceable 
remedies.  
South Africa has recently adopted statutory protection in the form of the POPI 
Act. In the preamble to this enactment, the right to privacy contained in Section 14 of 
the Constitution is recognised. The POPI Act seeks to satisfy the obligation placed on 
the state to respect, protect, promote and realise this fundamental right, while taking 
cognisance of the reality that, within the framework of an information society, the 
‘removal of unnecessary impediments to the free flow of information, including 
personal information’ is required.138 The POPI Act aims to regulate, in harmony with 
international standards, the processing of personal information, which gives effect to 
the right to privacy, subject to justifiable limitations.139 Additionally, the POPI Act 
seeks to add a degree of administrative control by means of an ‘information 
regulator’, which allows the aggrieved party the option of seeking redress through an 
alternative means, without needing to resort to litigation. 140 
Pre-emptive caution is required in allowing unfettered access to personal and 
sensitive data, and the POPI Act is an attempt to achieve this. To facilitate optimal 
eHealth care, practitioners require more clearly defined access parameters within 
which to work, as the access to and transferability of a patient’s medical records, such 
as the history of their condition, previous diagnoses and treatments, are imperative in 
                                               
137 Certain situations cannot be accommodated at common law, with remedies only available under the 
Constitution, for instance, where the court is required to invalidate a statute.  
138 Preamble to the POPI Act.  
139  Exemption from the conditions for the processing of personal information is provided for in 
Chapter 4 of the POPI Act, while exclusions are found in Sections 6 (1) (a) through (e), 6 (2) and 7(1).  
140 Chapter 5. See D van der Merwe ‘A comparative overview of the (sometimes uneasy) relationship 
between digital information and certain legal fields in South Africa and Uganda (2014) 17 (1) PER at 
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providing quality treatment. 141  Certainly, markedly defined strictures are desired, 
which balance freer access to personal medical data with sensitive patient care.  
Also significant is the manner in which personal information is processed, as 
well as the type of information that is protected. These have been extended by the 
POPI Act, and they include the processing of ‘special personal information’, as 
defined. 142  The POPI Act provides that ‘appropriate, reasonable technical and 
organisational measures’ be taken to prevent ‘loss of, damage to or unauthorised 
destruction’ or ‘unlawful access’ to personal information. It is not clear, however, 
what these ‘appropriate and reasonable measures’ would be and what would be 
considered sufficient security in an eHealth environment. Whether it would be 
considered reasonable and appropriate security, for instance, to use e-mail encryption 
software available in commercial packages, such as Microsoft Outlook®, which 
requires little more than the ‘unlocking’ of an email message by the recipient by 
means of an encryption key, remains to be seen.  
Likewise, the level of security that is considered sufficient for the hard drives 
of personal computers of health care practitioners where patients’ health records are 
stored, or for practitioners who participate in ‘store and forward’ e-mail based 
telemedicine, as well as for those who participate in online eHealth discussion or 
advice forums, is vague and yet to be determined.143  It may well be left to the 
judiciary to establish the precise meaning and extent of these concepts, as greater 
clarity in this respect will certainly be needed in the future.  
 
III  CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, the position of privacy and data protection within South Africa was 
considered. South Africa was discussed as an example of how data protection 
regulation may be implemented on a national level. This chapter provides the position 
of South Africa as a case study, mirroring the issues found within the African region 
as a whole, and considers recently implemented South African data protection 
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142 Defined in Chapter 1, Section 1 of the POPI Act.  
143 Jack and Mars (n 99) at 60 and see Kekana et al. (n 110) at 33.  
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legislation. The following chapter will consider various influencers that have affected 






CHAPTER 6: DRIVERS OF EHEALTH PRIVACY REGULATION  
 








After analysing the substance of eHealth services and the nature of privacy and data 
protection in Chapters 2 and 3, data protection regulatory measures pertaining to the 
African continent and to South Africa were ascertained in Chapters 4 and 5 
respectively. This chapter sets out certain recent influencers within the digital 
environment, which may inform or direct the eHealth privacy and data protection 
regimes of the future.  
Various interrelated themes central to the argument regarding privacy 
protection in an online health environment are considered. Technological realities, 
such as big data and cloud computing, and the steady introduction of novel health care 
platforms and initiatives, such as the establishment of centres of excellence within 
Africa, as well as the emergence of global health care, directly affect data and the 
need to safeguard it. Recent medical developments, such as the changing nature of the 
doctor-patient relationship and the principle of confidentiality, are reviewed. 
Additionally, the chapter considers the following questions: whether any 
boundaries in cyberspace exist; whether privacy is of concern to online users, and 
particularly, to users in developing countries; and whether data protection is a luxury 
that we can ill afford in the developing world. 
 
II TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Certain technical drivers or influencers have emerged recently, which have an impact 
on privacy regulation. Questions posed are: are there boundaries in cyberspace? Is 
privacy a concern to online users generally, and then also specifically, to those found 
in developing countries? And, lastly, is privacy protection regulation an ill-afforded 
luxury in countries with more urgent health care needs?  The development of cloud 
computing and big data and its significance to eHealth initiatives is described.  
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(1)  Are there any boundaries in cyberspace?  
Considerations of cyberspace governance 1  have been the subject of much recent 
attention.2 Attempts at applying traditional privacy and disclosure legal rhetoric to an 
online, digital environment are problematic. Reservations arise from the nature of the 
Internet where limitations of distance and location become increasing irrelevant; 
connections between users are no longer determined by location-dependent processes; 
and the differentiation between private and public margins of social interaction 
become obfuscated.3 
In accessing the cyber environment, a user may unwittingly be subjected to a 
haphazard and inconsistent quagmire of regulation. Whereas the jurisdictional extent 
of a country is determined geographically, such notions of physical constraint are 
meaningless constructs in cyberspace. Nevertheless, this has not hindered geographic 
sovereigns from enacting regulations, with varying degrees of success, in an attempt 
to control online behaviour.4  
For many online transactions, including those involving an eHealth 
component, multiple sovereigns may have jurisdiction, based on the nature of the 
activity within their borders.5 Consequently, questions of how choice of law rules will 
operate have implications for online activity. It is possible to conduct one’s affairs so 
that key elements of the transaction occur in different countries. Constructing and 
manipulating elements of online transactions in order to maximise the benefit of 
‘regulatory havens’ is achievable. Thus, users have had the opportunity to ‘forum 
shop’, or to select the jurisdiction that is most advantageous to their purposes.  
                                               
1 J Kang ‘Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions’ (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review at 1195 
describes cyberspace as ‘the web of consumer electronics, computers, and communication networks 
that interconnects the world’. 
2  DG Post and DR Johnson ‘Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent: Towards a new Theory of 
Decentralized Decision-making in Complex Systems’ (1998) 73 (4) Chicago-Kent Law Review at 
1055. 
3 Ibid and S Papadopoulos ‘Revisiting the Public Disclosure of Private facts in a Cyberworld’ (2009) 
30 (1) Obiter at 31. 
4 PP Swire ‘Of Elephants, Mice, And Privacy: International Choice of Law and the Internet’ (1998) 32 
(4) The International Lawyer at 991. 
5 M Kekana, P Noe and B Mkhize ‘The practice of telemedicine and challenges to the regulatory 
authorities’ (2010) 3 S Afr J Bioethics Law at 34.  
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Moreover, the Internet has effectively enabled ‘supra-jurisdictionality’, where 
acts are not subject to any jurisdiction or specific authority.6 The Internet allows 
transactions ‘in indefinable or undiscoverable geographic space, such that no courts 
(even of a powerful and bold country) could convincingly claim jurisdiction’.7 The 
Internet circumvents traditional barriers of distance and borders, which effectively 
places it beyond the regulatory reach of any one national state’s direct 
influence. Internet users, ‘as long as they share a common language and a reasonably 
rapid connection’, may be generally ‘indifferent to the physical location of those with 
whom they communicate’, affording them the opportunity to engage in what 
Froomkin describes as ‘regulatory arbitrage’.8 
The a-geographical nature of cyberspace, as reported in the Leveson Report, 
noted that the online social media world remains ‘beyond regulation’. It describes the 
insurgence of social media as ‘little short of phenomenal’. The report acknowledged 
that websites are ‘entirely unregulated’ and that this situation was ‘unlikely to 
change’. It concluded that ‘[d]espite the efforts made to comply with national law, it 
is clear that the enforcement of law and regulation online is problematic’.9  
Sir Tim Berners-Lee, credited as the inventor of the World Wide Web for his 
pioneering work conducted at CERN in 1989,10 in a discussion on the future of the 
Internet said: ‘there have always been forces to try to control the Internet. When you 
are the government of a country it is very tempting to want to govern the Internet 
within your country… the trouble is it doesn’t work because the Internet is not a thing 
of countries’.11  
                                               
6 See R Clarke ‘Internet privacy concerns confirm the case for intervention’ (1999) 42 (2) 
Communication of the ACM at 62 for greater clarification of these terms. 
7 Ibid. 
8 AM Froomkin ‘The Internet as a source of Regulatory Arbitrage’ in Borders in Cyberspace B Kahin 
& C Nesson (eds) (1997) at 129 and 142–155. 
9  ‘Leveson Inquiry on Twitter and Facebook: Social media World remains “beyond regulation”’ 
Huffington Post UK 29 November 2012 and the Leveson Inquiry ‘Culture, practices and the ethics of 
the press’.  
10 CERN is the European Laboratory for Particle Physics. Available at http://home.cern/topics/birth-
web (accessed 18 July 2016). 
11  See Sir Tim Berners-Lee speaking at a conference sponsored by The Duke Law Center for 
Innovation Policy on October 17, 2014 to discuss the future of Internet regulation. Available online at 
https://law.duke.edu/video/internet-regulation-2020-tim-berners-lee-kc-claffy-henning-schulzrinne-
daniel-weitzner/ (accessed on 20 February 2017). 
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Moreover, controlling Internet activities cannot be achieved by simply 
applying the laws relevant to other forms of telecommunication.12 This is because 
information on the Internet can be accessed immediately and distributed globally, and 
because the Internet differs in nature and scope to other telecommunication 
channels. 13  The Internet is uncontrolled, unlimited by boundaries and accessible 
worldwide.14 The conclusion drawn is that, while most Internet providers indicated 
‘that the Internet needs regulating’, the degree of regulation required remains 
unclear.15 As the Internet is a global network operated by countries under their own 
sets of laws, regulating the Internet on an international level ‘may be impossible’.16  
This is confirmed in Higgins and Azhar, who stated that ‘[c]yberlaw is, by 
nature, global’.17 The Internet is a dynamic ubiquitous information system, with ill-
defined boundaries.18  It is thus impossible to regulate it in any meaningful way. 
Westphal and Towell indicate that ‘… the cultural diversity in the world will make it 
difficult to govern the Internet’.19 Despite this, when asked who should regulate the 
Internet, the overwhelming response was ‘… according to an individual country’s 
legal system’.20 
Moreover, the Internet is ‘forever’, in the sense that, which is disclosed and 
documented online, will potentially have lasting and uncontrollable consequence.21 
Thus, data protection represents a challenge, as acknowledged by policymakers in 
                                               






17  A Higgins and A Azhar ‘China begins to erect second Great Wall in Cyberspace’ (1996) The 
Guardian.  
18  A Seppälä, P Nykänen and P Ruotsalainen ‘Privacy-related context information for ubiquitous 
health’ (2014) 2 (1) JMIR Mhealth and Uhealth. See also D van der Merwe ‘A comparative overview 
of the (sometimes uneasy) relationship between digital information and certain legal fields in South 
Africa and Uganda’ (2014) 17 (1) PER at 298. 
19 Westphal and Towell (n 12) at 26–31. 
20 Ibid. 
21 S Tobak ‘You have no privacy – get over it’ (2013) FOXBusiness.  
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their attempts to safeguard user rights.22  A study conducted in respect of Israeli 
websites and their compliance with information privacy regulation highlighted these 
challenges. The research observed the information privacy procedures of 1360 active 
websites in Israel. They sought to determine the extent to which these websites 
actually complied with applicable legal requirements with regard to information 
privacy. Information procedures were investigated on three levels: firstly, they 
conducted a legal analysis and examined the legal requirements applicable to 
information practice under the Israeli law of the time; secondly, they investigated the 
declared privacy policies that were accessible to users on each website; and thirdly, 
they studied the actual information procedures practiced by each website23. 
The research concluded that data protection regulators have difficulties 
constructing a single legal measure that is comprehensive enough to regulate the 
entire Internet. Rather, it was suggested that regulating online behaviour requires 
tailored regulatory measures.   
The discourse amongst European and American regulators has centred on the 
appropriate limitations to be imposed, and the degree of control required, in regulating 
online privacy. This remains the subject of rigorous debate. What the Israeli study 
revealed was that a significant disparity exists between the legal privacy requirements 
and the actual practice of information privacy. 24  A high level of deviation in 
compliance with legal rules was observed. The conclusion was overwhelmingly that 
the law with regard to the protection of personal information is very relevant. In fact, 
the legal regime should facilitate and promote an open infrastructure and foster an 
environment of personal ‘self-help’.25  
The most effective form of control of cyberspace is by ‘government intrusion’ 
through regulation. This, Greenleaf proposes, is essential in the preservation of 
important values, as digital libertarianism and its claim of promoting the 
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‘independence’ of cyberspace is being manipulated both by private enterprise and by 
state power.26 
The problem is whether certain online behaviour should be ‘encouraged, 
discouraged, ignored, or prohibited’ and whether such prohibition should be by way 
of a legally enforceable measure.27 This gives rise to the following question: ‘How 
does an individual’s performance of certain activities affect the well-being of the 
general population to which that individual belongs?’28 Once society has decided that 
online privacy protection is worthy of protection, the legal challenge is to determine 
the most appropriate method of securing such protection.29  
(2)  Is privacy a concern to online users: The death or decline of privacy? 
In advancing arguments with regard to the decline of privacy, certain writers, notably 
David Brin, are of the opinion that society should accept a concession in personal data 
protection in favour of the weightier social values of increased transparency and 
openness. Brin proposes that the powerful (in society) will always possess ‘privacy-
invasive technologies’. He argues that such privacy protection mechanisms are 
inherently ‘futile’, ‘impossible’ and ‘an aberrant notion’. He calls rather for a culture 
of widespread transparency. 30  Everyone, he believes, should have ‘access’ to 
information and the freedom to acquire information, thus promoting freedom and 
dispelling secrecy. His thinking is that ‘if transparency is the norm, the powerful will 
not be able to hide their own secrets’ and that ‘[s]ociety as a whole is healthier when 
based on mutual accountability rather than mutual secrecy’. 31  Brin advances the 
argument that a society of ‘glass houses’ is sounder than one of ‘shields’. 32  By 
allowing all to be ‘watched’ freely, the premise is that the watchers (or those in 
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control) will not be able to hide or to preclude others from watching them.33 Thus, 
‘the powerful will only be as successful in avoiding observation as they already are in 
resisting privacy laws that offend their own interests’.34 Echoing the thinking of Brin, 
Bernal also suggests that we ‘give up on privacy’35 and accept ‘emerging realities’.36 
On closer inspection, however, this transparency approach is not as beneficial 
as Brin’s initial proposition suggests. His proposition is predicated on the 
understanding that most, if not all, personal data is to be freely and publically 
available.37 Brin’s perspective, although intriguing, certainly fails to deliver either 
immediate or lasting results, as privacy remains, in general, a highly valued and 
sought after construct in modern society. Criticisms suggest that Brin’s view is neither 
realistically achievable, nor does it advance the core issues relevant to the privacy 
debate. Froomkin argues that Brin’s pessimism about the efficacy of privacy 
regulations is ‘unfounded’ or, at least, ‘premature’.38  
Although criticised at the time, the former Sun Microsystems chief executive, 
Scott McNealy, said nearly 15 years ago, ‘you have zero privacy anyway, so get over 
it’.39 At the time, McNealy was seeking to denounce government regulation of online 
consumer privacy in favour of industry self-regulation.  
This view was reiterated by Mark Zuckerberg, CEO and co-founder of 
Facebook, who claimed that, with particular reference to young adults, privacy is 
‘dead’. Privacy, he suggests is ‘no longer a social norm’ as ‘[p]eople have really 
gotten [sic] comfortable not only sharing more information [of] different kinds, but 
more openly and with more people’.40  
Regardless of these sentiments, these views are strikingly incompatible with 
the attitudes of many individuals who still value privacy highly. As research suggests, 
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these views are not indicative of the opinion of the vast populace of online users.41 As 
noted by Berendt et al., certain users are ‘privacy fundamentalists’, while others are 
only ‘marginally concerned’.42  Importantly though, the study revealed that, while 
many users have ‘strong opinions’ on privacy, and although they may state specific 
privacy preferences, they do not necessarily act accordingly.43 Once engaging online, 
they ‘often do not monitor and control their actions sufficiently’ and ‘privacy 
statements seem to have no impact on behaviour’. Users thus place increasing reliance 
on formalised legal protection.44 
The move towards rejecting privacy outright is observed by Edwards as an 
incomplete account of the position. Although acknowledging that conceptions of 
privacy are changing, the requirement for privacy protection has in no way 
diminished completely.45 That people have an expectation of privacy and a definite 
disquiet about its misuse is also reflected in recent empirical studies.46 Reflecting 
critically on the privacy-position, privacy is not generally considered by users as 
expendable. In fact, Burchell states that, if the law fails to recognise individual 
privacy protection adequately as a ‘hallowed right’, a resultant ‘governmental knee-
jerk reaction’ to potential threats and ‘individual exploitation’ is inevitable. This 
would lead to a loss of what modest privacy we have had.47 
Further evidence of the importance of privacy protection is found in a survey 
conducted by TRUSTe online. According to this report, mistrust is high, with 89% of 
British Internet users admitting to being concerned about online privacy.48 More than 
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a third of respondents recorded ‘frequently’ or ‘always’ being worried about their 
online privacy. It was recorded that the sharing of personal information with third 
parties (60%) and tracking online behaviour (54%) were the two largest causes of 
online privacy concerns.49 Further, 27% of respondents were concerned about the 
privacy policies of Facebook and other social media networks, while 21% were 
apprehensive about the privacy policies of Google and other search engines. A 
staggering 91% of respondents admitted avoiding conducting business online where 
they did not believe their online privacy was being protected.50 
With regard to online health care applications and privacy concerns, a US 
study reported that 58% of respondents cited the eHealth feature they were most 
likely to use was to ‘communicate with medical practitioners via email, text message 
of the social media’, with 44% of respondents using online access or mobile phones to 
manage personal electronic health records.51 Of the respondents interviewed, 49% 
thought that consumer wariness about privacy violations would deter the adoption of 
eHealth, while 51% of respondents stated that ‘data privacy risks are their biggest 
concern’.52  
Likewise, Tachakra et al., in a survey examining the topic of ethical issues and 
patient confidentiality relating to the use of eHealth, found that patients’ concerns 
regarding telemedicine in their treatment primarily centred on their fears concerning 
the privacy of transmitted medical records and any data that could potentially identify 
them.53 Users are keenly aware and concerned about the threats to their medical data 
by unwanted disclosure to third parties, such as their employers or insurers, for 
instance. Indeed, users frequently describe themselves as being ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ 
concerned about the unwanted use of their data when using mobile devices for 
medical-related activities.54 
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Attempts have been made to describe the tenuous relationship between users, 
their digital environment, and their privacy. The position in the US is described by 
Barnes as a ‘privacy paradox’.55 The concept of a ‘privacy paradox’ was confirmed in 
research conducted by Lafky and Horan, who reveal that, while consumers express 
great concern about their privacy online, very few effectively engage in any form of 
privacy-protecting activities or behaviour.56 This disconnectedness and inconsistency 
in users’ attitudes and behaviour is ‘frustrating’ for privacy-focused search engines.57  
The relationship between an individual’s social network and privacy is ‘multi-
faceted’.58 Research published revealed that participants experienced high levels of 
social privacy and psychological privacy because of their ‘privacy-protective 
behavior’.59 Users are notoriously fickle when it comes to sharing information about 
themselves. In some instances, they are more willing to reveal personal information 
than in others, resulting in patterns of personal information revelation being variable 
across age groups, contexts and different web-site types.60  
Regardless, the disclosure by users of their personal information should not 
negate the requirement to safeguard their privacy and protect their data. To infer that 
privacy is of no concern merely because there is greater user disclosure is to adopt a 
precarious approach.61 In fact, increased revelation by a user, and in particular the 
purpose for which the information was intended, should strengthen, rather than lessen, 
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the need for stringent safeguarding of privacy. Consenting to publication does not 
signal an abandonment of the right not to consent. 
Nevertheless, while acknowledging that conceptions of privacy are shifting, it 
would appear that the requirement for privacy protection has not diminished at all.  
(3)  Is privacy a concern to eHealth users in developing countries? 
Claims for privacy have long been regarded by certain authors as values that are 
exclusively the domain of the modern world, with privacy thought to be absent from 
the social fabric of past and present ‘primitive’ societies.62 This unfortunate way of 
thinking is refuted by various anthropological and sociological studies that 
conclusively reveal that the need for privacy for individuals and groups is present in 
virtually every society63 and that privacy is evidenced in ‘primitive’ communities.64 
Privacy norms are present at an individual level, a family level and at the level of the 
community as a whole.65 
Given that a need for privacy in the vast majority of societies is well 
established, cultural variants of the concept of ‘privacy’ do exist. Although privacy is 
of universal importance, the subject matter of what is regarded as worthy of protection 
is variable. Differences in interpretation are apparent between various regions with 
differing societies presenting divergent ideas of what is deemed tolerable, aberrant or 
abhorrent within a particular society, for instance.  
Following Westin’s informational control definition of privacy, that is, ‘the 
claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how 
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others’,66 the term 
‘privacy’ includes aspects of a person’s life, which are ‘intimate’ and/or ‘sensitive’.67 
A violation of privacy occurs in the event of sensitive and/or intimate personal data 
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being disclosed.68 This is true of personal health data, which, though factually or 
contextually accurate, may be of such a sensitive and/or personal nature, that it could 
cause potential harm, embarrassment or ostracism, when disclosed to a third party 
without the prerequisite data subject’s knowledge and/or consent.69  
The disclosure of medical diagnoses of, for instance, mental health conditions, 
infectious diseases and diabetes may result in adverse repercussions directed towards 
persons in developing countries, yet such diagnoses would not necessarily be a cause 
of sensitivity or shame to persons in developed countries. Particularly problematic are 
health care issues involving reproductive rights, including sensitivities around sexual 
activity, sexual orientation and abortion.  
An Amnesty International report confirms that: ‘[m]any Indonesian women 
and girls, especially those from poor and marginalised communities, struggle to 
achieve reproductive health in the face of discriminatory laws, policies and 
practices’.70 The legal regime in Indonesia requires consent by a woman’s husband 
for various medical treatments.71 
Similarly, McGirk reports discrimination against those infected with 
HIV/AIDS, as is widely prevalent throughout Northern Africa and the Middle East.72 
Those infected with HIV/AIDS are often the target of severe prejudice and intolerance 
and may be subjected to rejection, isolation and even violence from their 
community.73 The stigma causes those who are infected to hide their condition and is 
hampering the effective treatment and prevention of the disease.74 Social taboo and 
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homophobia are also widespread, with shame, fear, humiliation and being shunned 
realistic concerns where privacy is not safeguarded.75  
In the South African case of NM v Smith, the Constitutional Court was invited 
to address the effect of the South African Constitution on the common law right of 
privacy and to pronounce on the scope and content of this right.76 On hearing the case, 
the Constitutional Court justices were unanimously in agreement regarding the private 
nature of information regarding a person’s medical condition, in general, and the fact 
that they were HIV positive, in particular. 77 Madala J held: ‘[t]he disclosure of an 
individual’s HIV status, particularly within the South African context, deserves 
protection against indiscriminate disclosure due to the nature and negative social 
context the disease has as well as the potential intolerance and discrimination that 
result from its disclosure’. He continued in describing the consequences that such a 
revelation might bring about: ‘such a person stands to be isolated and even rejected by 
others’.78  
For good reason, sexual orientation is often concealed in certain African 
communities. Provisions in, for instance, Zimbabwe,79 Kenya,80 and southern Sudan81 
criminalise acts of homosexuality with punishment by incarceration in prison, 
confinement in an insane asylum, fines, and flogging, and, most horrifically in 
Mauritania82 and Sudan83, with homosexuality even being punishable on conviction 
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by death.84 Only on 17 May 2016 did the Seychelles parliament pass a bill to amend 
their Penal Code to decriminalise sodomy. The only African country that 
affirmatively permits same-sex marriages is South Africa.85 
The Guardian newspaper reported in 2010 that ‘human rights activists have 
warned that the lives of gay people in Uganda are in danger, after a newspaper 
published a story featuring the names and in some cases photographs of 100 
homosexuals under the headline “Hang Them”’.86 Homosexuality has long been a 
taboo subject in Uganda, and it is considered by many to be an affront to both 
Ugandan culture and religion. In fact, the Ugandan parliament has been considering 
an Anti-Homosexuality Bill, which ‘calls for the death penalty for those convicted of 
repeated same-sex relations, and life imprisonment for others’.87 The point is that 
disclosure of certain information in African countries may elicit detrimental 
consequences not ordinarily experienced in developed countries.  
Moreover, the model of personal ownership of a mobile phone that is 
prevalent in the first world may not be applicable in the developing world, where 
shared mobile telephone use is common.88 This is particularly a risk when dealing 
with sensitive patient related information, for instance, where SMS messages are sent 
to users, providing them with test results, specific treatment advice, and medication or 
appointment reminders.89 The revelation of such content may have dire consequences 
in communities where mobile phones are shared amongst family members who may 
inadvertently intercept these messages. It is reported in Aker and Mbiti that a 
significant number of African mobile phone users have access to mobile phones only 
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through sharing them with others.90 Sharing mobile phones may be challenging to 
health care interventions, however the exact magnitude of the problem is 
undetermined.91 According to a survey conducted by Nokia in 2008 on consumers in 
emerging markets, mobile phone sharing is on the rise. More than 50% of those 
surveyed in India and Pakistan and nearly 30% in Vietnam noted that they were 
currently sharing or would share their mobile phone with family or friends.92  
The inference is thus three-fold: firstly, what is considered sensitive, personal 
information in developing countries may differ from that, which is considered private 
or shameful in developed countries; secondly, disclosure in developing countries may 
take unusual or different forms to those found in developed countries; and lastly, the 
implications of such disclosures may have far more severe consequences for users in 
developing countries than for users in developed countries.  
(4)  Are data protection and high privacy standards a luxury that the 
developing world can ill afford, where countries have limited resources 
and more immediate health care needs?  
Clarke states that the slow adoption of e-commerce initiatives in developing countries 
can be attributed to a lack of trust and confidence by consumers in corporations and 
governments to safeguard their personal data.93  
The South African Constitution seeks to act as a bulwark against an oppressive 
state by supporting the people it serves, while fulfilling an expression of a wider call 
for social, economic and political progress. As explained by Justice Pius Langa, an 
understanding of transformative constitutionalism includes ‘the pursuit of some form 
of economic transformation and a change in legal culture’. 94 It seeks to ‘heal the 
wounds of the past’ and ‘guide us to a better future’.95 As part of guiding one to a 
                                               
90 JC Aker and IM Mbiti ‘Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa’ (2010) 24 (3) Journal 
of Economic Perspectives at 212. 
91 WA Kaplan ‘Can the ubiquitous power of mobile phones be used to improve health outcomes in 
developing countries?’ (2006) 2 (9) Globalization and Health.  
92 ‘Nokia unveils two handsets that offer a range of useful features and colours aimed at consumers in 
emerging markets’ (2008).  
93 Clarke (n 6) at 62. 
94 P Langa ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’ (2006) 17 (3) Stell Law Review 351–360 at 353. 
95 Ibid at 352. 
154 
better future and, at the very least, attaining the material conditions for a dignified 
life, one could argue that eHealth can provide substance to the socio-economic right 
to health care. 
The promise of new technologies to revolutionise and drive health care and 
communications across Africa is well-traversed terrain. eHealth, by enhancing 
connectivity and facilitating the flow of health information and health care services 
and delivery, can empower isolated and disenfranchised communities. In light of the 
weakened health care position experienced in most developing countries, and the need 
to attain even the most basic right to health care, the question to be asked is whether it 
is imperative that eHealth be adopted, to the extent that it is possible, and whether 
there is a place for the adoption of less stringent data protection measures, rather than 
the ever increasing push for stronger and more robust protection, as experienced by 
developed countries. 
Certainly, data protection measures and policies require a high degree of 
policymaking innovation and strengthening. 96  Without meaningful regulatory 
oversight, unregulated data processing poses a threat to individual liberties. 
Governments can respond to technological developments and provide protection in a 
variety of ways.97 By strengthening the privacy rights of individuals – particularly in 
terms of consent and the right to be informed – the current imbalance can be altered. 
This shift in power is transformative in its ability to instil user confidence and trust.  
Despite one of the most notable features of eHealth being the realisation of 
significant health care savings (mostly in developed nations) and the provision of 
health care, treatment and care (to many people in developing countries), the 
widespread deployment of eHealth initiatives is still remarkably limited, as eHealth 
service providers are confronted with legal uncertainty with regard to their potential 
liability regarding personal and sensitive data infringements in the health sector.  
The failure of developing countries to adopt data protection measures 
timeously may reinforce an underlying message and suspicion already prevalent 
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amongst first world economic operators, including eHealth developers and investors, 
who perceive an inadequacy in legislative and judicial measures in large parts of the 
African region.98  
Developing countries may resist elevated data protection standards by 
claiming that unrealistically high standards of data protection, as found in developed 
states, may be obtained at the expense of and impeded eHealth development. 
Developed countries, in contrast, argue that, by implementing more stringent and 
higher data protection measures, with fewer flexibilities, international eHealth 
initiatives and cross-border data transfers may be better promoted, as international 
organisations can be assured of an adequate privacy and data protection framework. 
This in turn encourages more technological growth and innovation and, of course, the 
desirable eHealth services and delivery. 
As stated by Ariel Pablos-Méndez: ‘[f]or a given e-health solution to achieve 
scale and sustainability, it must be effective and efficient in its own right and it must 
be seamlessly integrated into the health system’.99 Potential for abuse, especially with 
regard to privacy and data protection, cannot be overstated, particularly in societies 
with traditions of ethnic conflict and unrest.  
Apart from theoretical perspectives, the opinion of the user is also powerful 
and should not be underestimated. If the user demands privacy protection, and deems 
it important, it is conceivable that they will expect to receive it. Seemingly, the choice 
to transact and thus to inform the direction of privacy protection criteria may well vest 
in them.100 This is also true of users in developing countries.  
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(5)  Cloud Computing and the role of Big Data in health care  
(i)  Cloud Computing  
The term ‘cloud computing’ describes a range of services offered over the Internet.101 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology, an agency of the US Department 
of Commerce, defines it as: ‘a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand 
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, 
servers, storage, applications and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and 
released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.’102  
Cloud computing comprises online applications and services, and the 
hardware and software systems supporting such applications, which are held in 
various data centres.103 The data centre hardware and software are termed a ‘cloud’.104 
It refers to the storing, processing and use of data on ‘remotely located computers 
accessed over the Internet’105 and enables services to be carried out, on behalf of 
users, on hardware that is neither owned, managed nor controlled by the user.106 
Typically, the user uploads input data107 to the cloud provider’s server.108 The cloud 
provider then supplies access to the data at the user’s request.109 Consequently, a 
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user’s data is stored and controlled, in an unencrypted format, remotely on a hardware 
device. This may pose a threat to a user’s data privacy.110  
Cloud computing enables the cross-border transfer of data, as personal 
information is hosted and ‘transferred’ to a foreign jurisdiction or site. With regard to 
the health care sector, medical data is thus transferred across national or state borders 
where limited consensus exists, regarding which authorities have jurisdiction over the 
data.111 Privacy regulations also vary across jurisdictions, with the resultant possibility 
of uncertain legal constraints on the management of data by cloud computing 
providers in the geographical location of the machine.112 Although cloud computing 
offers many benefits to the health care sector, including, for instance, electronic health 
records, telemedicine, ePrescriptions and digital imaging, the difficulty arises where 
highly sensitive medical data is managed remotely by cloud providers ‘who may have 
operations spanning many different countries or even continents’.113 Armbrust et al. 
cite security violations as a frequent objection to cloud computing.114  
As cloud technology evolves, the pace of regulation in the area of data 
privacy, security and data transference is failing to develop rapidly enough.115 While 
Japan,116 the US117 and Europe118 are making significant inroads into the regulation of 
cloud computing,119 specific challenges identified are assurances concerning users’ 
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privacy and the security of their data.120 Users of cloud technology confront potential 
breaches in security from both outside and within the cloud.121 
Berry and Reisman suggest that the best method of addressing these issues is 
through the development of a regulatory framework of domestic policy, international 
bilateral and multilateral agreements, and international co-operative forums, and 
industry arrangements.122 A systematic review of regulation and compliance of data 
protection and data flows is required. 
 
(ii)  Big Data 
The concept of ‘big data’ is defined as ‘high-volume, high-velocity and high-variety 
information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information 
processing for enhanced insight and decision making’.123 Related to this is the term 
‘data fusion’, which describes not merely the collection of individual data elements, 
but the fusing together of multiple data sets. It is recorded in a paper published by 
Stanford University’s School of Medicine that 2.5 exabytes of data are generated from 
computers, mobile devices and sensors every day. While the Internet comprised a 
mere 100 terabytes124 in 1993, it is now estimated to comprise four zettabytes125 of 
data.126 
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As the quantity of data being digitally collected and stored is growing rapidly, 
the science of data management and analysis is also advancing, thereby giving 
organisations the ability to convert this data into information and knowledge that 
assist in achieving their objectives.127 This powers the effectiveness of big data.128 
Analysing big data aids in the development of clinically beneficial predictive 
models,129 devising strategic health care planning,130 establishing short-term trends in 
illness transmission, 131  the long-term remote monitoring of personal health 
conditions,132 and advancing the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of diseases.133 
By leveraging off of big data analytics within the field of health care, it becomes 
practicable to improve the quality and efficiency of health care delivery and to 
examine connections across a vast range of data sets for a variety of medical research 
purposes.134 
Murdoch and Detsky cite the following ways in which big data may advance 
health care delivery: 135  Firstly, big data may be instrumental in generating new 
knowledge. Patient, or user, data is stored in large and complex, albeit unstructured, 
data sets, which may then be analysed computationally to reveal patterns, trends and 
associations. Big data facilitates the linking of data, and potentially extracts valuable 
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information from unstructured data in an automated and cost-effective way.136 Such 
data compilations, for instance, of measurements, medical images and symptom 
descriptions can be stored in large databases and, with the aid of data-mining 
algorithms, can enhance health care research, innovation and provide opportunities 
with regard to diagnosis, treatment monitoring, surveillance of disease and disease 
control.137  
With the proliferation and increasing sophistication of technological 
platforms, such as mobile phones, it is estimated that personal sensor data will 
increase from 10% of all stored data in 2009 to an enormous 90% within the next 
decade. 138  Analysing unstructured data contained within, for example, Electronic 
Health Records, using computational techniques, permits automated data 
refinement.139 Big data offers the capacity to create a large observational evidence 
data set for quantifiable research, which might otherwise be impossible. Such vast 
amounts of data are a vital element of epidemiological research, as researchers 
establish patterns or trends on a larger scale and draw conclusions, thereby improving 
treatment.140 This is helpful in issues of clinical generalisability.141  
Secondly, big data aids the dissemination of knowledge. The digitisation of 
medical literature improves access to the most recent evidence guiding clinical 
practice.142 This approach differs from conventional medical decision support tools, in 
that suggestions are derived from real-time patient data analysis, rather than solely 
using rule-based decision trees.  
Thirdly, big data allows for the transformation of health care by delivering 
information directly to patients, thus empowering them to play a more active role in 
their health care decision-making and treatment options.143 Big data also offers the 
opportunity to integrate the traditional health care model, that is, where patients’ 
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primarily paper-based records are stored with health care professionals, with the 
social basis of directing health care towards a patient-centric fashion. It is envisaged 
that medical records reside with the patient themselves.144 Understandably, this will 
give rise to privacy concerns, which will require ostensibly more extensive data 
protection solutions, as the fundamental right to personal data protection applies 
equally in the context of big data.145  
Such is the importance and growth of the big data driven economy that the 
European Commission committed, on 13 October 2014, in a public-private 
partnership with the Big Data Value Association, to make available an investment of 
€2.5 billion to ‘put Europe at the forefront of the global data race’ by supporting 
research and innovation in big data technologies and infrastructures. Such 
development indicates that the European Union intends to strengthen privacy 
protections for European users, while acknowledging and capitalising on the huge 
market advantage inherent in big data. 
A 2016 WHO report noted that only six EU member states have a national 
policy or strategy regulating the use of big data in the health sector. Only 9% of EU 
member states have a national policy or strategy regulating the use of big data by 
private companies.146 The survey questioned EU member states on barriers to the 
adoption of big data in health care, and found that the three most critical barriers 
(rated as very or extremely important) are, firstly, ‘a lack of data privacy and security 
laws’, ‘limited integration between different health services and other systems 
collecting data’ and, lastly, ‘a lack of support for new analytical methods’.147 These 
barriers reflect a lack of adequate data governance.148 
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III MEDICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The changing nature of the doctor-patient relationship, the emergence of a globalised 
health regime, and the establishment of centres of excellence are medical 
developments, which drive the development of privacy regulation within health care. 
These are discussed in turn. 
(1)  The nature of the doctor-patient relationship and the principle of 
confidentiality 
(i)  The changing nature of the doctor-patient relationship 
In the 1950s, sociologist Talcott Parsons described the concept of the ‘sick role’; he 
found that the doctor’s role in the health care encounter was based on a high degree of 
specialisation, professionalism and the application of expert medical knowledge and 
technical competence. 149  Doctors maintained a ‘dominant autonomous authority’, 
while patients occupied a ‘more passive, submissive role’. This entrenched power 
imbalance continued well into the late 1970s.150  
Discussions of trust and confidentiality were frequent topics in medical ethical 
forums prior to the 1970s.151 Medical ethics focused on questions of professionalism 
and the role that ethics played in the formation of trust between a doctor and patient. 
Trust presupposes the belief that a person will render continued and absolute integrity, 
justice, and confidentiality. Ethics is a ‘branch of philosophy dealing with what is 
morally right or wrong'. 152  Many professions, including medical professionals, 
lawyers and priests, have embraced strong confidentiality principles in their ethical 
codes.153 The principle of confidentiality has as its basis competence, respect, and 
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confidence.154 Medical trust and confidentiality have value because of the personal, 
sensitive and emotional content. 155  This arises from the deep vulnerability 
experienced during illness, which consequently necessitates a considerable degree of 
confidentiality. 156  As a medical ethical construct, the doctor-patient relationship 
ultimately had a corrosive effect on patient health privacy in a broader sense.157 
The conventional doctor-patient relationship has been essentially contractual 
in its metaphor and paternalistic in policy.158 During the 1980s, a fundamental shift 
occurred, away from the passive acceptance of doctor’s advice and unquestioning 
admiration and acceptance of the medical practitioner’s authority, together with a 
degree of disillusionment with the traditional health care structures. With extensive 
and more vocal consumer protection in the 1980s, the sick abandoned the role of the 
‘child’ in accepting medicine from a paternalistic doctor and began to assume the role 
of ‘adults’, capable of independent thought and informed decision-making. This trend 
of people taking greater responsibility for their health, increased information seeking 
and involvement in decision-making, along with the need for self-determination and 
autonomy, coupled with a willingness to challenge the power that doctors exercised 
over them, altered the dynamic between doctor and patient. Thus, the doctor-patient 
relationship and the notion of trust and confidentiality has transformed in 
contemporary western society.159  
Interactions between doctors and patients do not exist in a vacuum; they are 
influenced by the socio-cultural context within which they occur.160 Although patients 
have become more consumerist and the balance has shifted towards greater patient 
autonomy, it is argued ‘that the medical profession remains firmly in control of key 
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decisions concerning treatment and that patients continue to expect this to be the 
case’.161  
Clearly, though, health care interactions today are unlikely to take the form of 
the ‘medical dominance’ of health care professionals over patients, as was the case in 
the past.162 Interactions are anticipated to be far more complex in the future, with 
relationships based primarily on that of ‘health partnerships’, with an ‘active or expert 
patient’ being seen as the way forward.163 As Coulter has suggested, paternalism, 
though widespread and as well intentioned as it may be, creates an unhealthy 
dependency on health professionals that is ‘out of step’ with other trends in society. 
Patients are maturing and professionals are required to accommodate this.164 
A relationship based on partnership would thus be one where patients are more 
empowered, sharing in the decision making processes, promoting self-management of 
their conditions and, more importantly, having access to and control of their personal 
medical information. 
 
(ii)  Confidentiality  
Given the altered nature of the patient-doctor relationship and the inherent 
weaknesses in the disclosure-centric confidentiality model, a transformative approach 
to eHealth privacy protection is needed from that of mere ‘soft’ ethical guidelines to 
protection that comprises reinforcement that is more expansive.165  
The traditional role of confidentiality progresses as follows: patients disclose 
information to doctors in the belief that it will aid their diagnosis and treatment, while 
doctors respect such confidences, to encourage patients to reveal personal and medical 
information that will make diagnosis and treatment easier and more effective. The 
difficulty is that this notion of confidentiality becomes unstable when it exists outside 
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of the doctor-patient paradigm. This is the case when it is applied in, for instance, 
institutional or industrial models of care or in eHealth contexts. As the context 
changes, the simple and innocuous traditional approach becomes increasingly 
utilitarian and complex.166 eHealth poses a threat to privacy that cannot be resolved 
through traditional confidentiality models alone. 
A 2011 World Health Organization report identified ‘health information 
security’ and ‘patient confidentiality’ as pertinent policy challenges to overcome for 
eHealth promotion and validation.167 The security of data ‘is a particularly important 
issue to address within the area of policy’ with data security and privacy key areas 
requiring ‘legal and policy attention’ thus ensuring that users’ data are not 
compromised.168  
While the development of eHealth holds promise, difficulties persist that are 
impeding its adoption. A concern identified is ‘the privacy and security of data 
transmitted and accessed’ both online and via electronic devices. 169  eHealth 
technologies have the ability to collect, store, disseminate and use vast quantities of 
personal and medical data. Such technologies have a potentially deleterious influence 
on patients’ data privacy rights.170 
eHealth policy frameworks necessitate an appropriate balance between the 
promoting of entrepreneurship and the maintaining of patients’ and users’ data 
security. 171  Reiterated in Mechael et al. is that a significant barrier to eHealth 
development is data security and confidentiality.172 As quoted by Ronald Plesser: 
‘[m]edical records are a top priority “due to the sensitivity of the data …”.’173  
Moreover, difficulties arise in determining liability for breaches of 
confidentiality for medical practitioners involved in eHealth consultations. In eHealth 
and telemedicine consultations more than one doctor is frequently involved, the 
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referring doctor, usually at the same location as the patient, together with the doctor 
consulting via telemedicine. The patient is still ostensibly under the care of the 
referring doctor. This differs from traditional referrals, where a doctor refers the 
patient to a specialist, who then takes over the responsibility for diagnosis and 
continued treatment of the patient. Patient information then flows freely between 
locations using various technological platforms and is transferable and accessible by 
various parties, with no guarantee or legal obligation to ensure its protection or 
safekeeping. 
Crucially, while the ethical notion of confidentiality would suffice in the 
simplistic delivery paradigm of the traditional doctor-patient relationship, the myriad 
of new relationships and structures brought about by the evolution of eHealth services 
and the industrialision of medical practice, the traditional professional confidentiality 
model has been relegated to primarily an operational concept with a dearth in patient 
data protection.174 The resultant metamorphosis in health care delivery systems and 
industrial providers encounters few of the traditional ethical or legal constraints, and 
both systems and providers are positioned to exploit patient data for utilitarian or 
commercial purposes.175 Consequently, the conventional, traditional approach to data 
protection within the patient-doctor relationship and the responsibility to ensure 
confidentiality does not necessarily sit comfortably with the advancement of eHealth. 
Social media can ‘dramatically blur the line between public and private spaces’.176 
The permanent nature of postings online means ‘that the control over information 
dissemination, once posted, differs significantly from a fleeting and local interaction 
within a hospital or outpatient office’. 177  
Confidentiality, synonymous with a simpler model, in the context of an 
ongoing relationship of care and treatment, remains an essential element in the ethical 
professional practice between doctors and their patients and this is likely to remain 
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unchanged.178 The concept of privacy-confidentiality protection inherent in a single 
physician-patient relationship is likely to fail, however, when the doctor-patient 
relationship is extended and replaced by fragmented care, or where various physicians 
administer care at differing stages of the treatment process.179 As ‘continuity of care’ 
diminishes, denoting a relationship of impermanence, for instance, in the prescribing 
relationship that a patient would have with a doctor prescribing medicine over the 
Internet, arguably so do the levels of accountability compared to those found in more 
traditional delivery channels.180  
In traditional medical practice, the ethical, legal, and operational domains 
were largely synchronised. Contextually, the parallelism between legal, ethical, and 
operational domains was not particularly harmful. 181  However, the nature of the 
doctor-patient relationship, while formerly an ethical and moral dilemma, which could 
be easily regulated using principles of confidence, has now evolved into a far more 
complex relationship within the context of eHealth delivery, with sensitive medical 
data transmitted over a variety of technological communication channels, and 
involving many more participants, both medical and non-medical.  
Non-traditional health care providers such as, for instance, those engaged in 
eHealth services, may not provide shelter by disclosure-centric confidentiality 
principles. The danger in relying on confidentiality provisions contained in medical 
ethical guidelines or codes of conduct in the practice of eHealth is that medical and 
personal data is often managed and processed by people other than medical 
practitioners. While medical practitioners may be governed by confidentiality 
guidelines, other third parties are not necessarily bound by such duties. 
A further difficulty in relying solely on the medical ethical principle of 
confidentiality is that, as the advancement of patient-centred health care increases, the 
core value of preserving trust and confidence is replaced with a heightened awareness 
by patients of doctors’, perceived or otherwise, lack of or diminished 
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trustworthiness.182 Ethicist Mark Hall states that the modern theoretical approach to 
privacy and confidentiality in respect of health law principles has changed 
considerably and that it is predicated on, and supported by, a healthy scepticism of 
trust and understandable caution by patients. 183  With the steady demise of the 
traditional, long-standing and personal relationship between doctor and patient, the 
rules around confidentiality and privacy have had to be transformed too. The 
deterioration of the traditional doctor-patient relationship, and the consequential shift 
from a relationship between intimates to one based on medical encounters between 
strangers, is noted.184 Childress and Siegler confirm this: 
‘Whether medicine is now only a series of encounters between strangers rather than 
intimates, medicine is increasingly regarded by patients and doctors, and by analysts 
of the profession – such as philosophers, lawyers, and sociologists as a practice that 
is best understood and regulated as if it were a practice among strangers rather than 
among intimates’.185 
While a supportive legal regime is achievable where its foremost benefit is in 
its regard for confidentiality and trust as virtues worthy of protection in a traditional 
doctor-patient relationship, as the relationship becomes more multifaceted a greater 
threat to breach in confidentiality follows.186 Terry states:  
‘[a] concept of privacy-confidentiality protection that is bound to an outdated 
conception of the confidence inherent in a single physician-patient relationship was 
bound to fail when the physician-patient relationship was replaced by fragmented 
care’.187 
The legal protection of patient data, previously achieved primarily by virtue of 
the nature of the doctor-patient relationship and the disclosure-centric principle, 
expressed as breach of confidence and actionable through implied contract or delict, is 
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a paradigm now affording inadequate protection, as it is overwhelmed by the realities 
of modern medical and personal data complexities. Patient data in eHealth systems is 
‘comprehensive, portable, and manipulatable’ and the resultant potential for privacy 
abuse is enormous.188 
(2)  The emergence of a globalised health regime 
A defining factor of the 21st century is the increasingly rapid integration of economic, 
social, medical and political activity worldwide.189 Additionally, a steady transference 
from the individual to the global has been noticed.190 ‘Global health’ refers to the 
point at which ‘... determinants of health or health outcomes circumvent, undermine 
or are oblivious to the territorial boundaries of the state and this beyond the capacity 
of individual countries alone to address through domestic institutions’.191 To facilitate 
a new global approach to health care, Benatar et al. advise that a ‘common set of 
principles to deal with global health threats’ should be agreed upon. 192  These 
principles form the corpus of what is understood as ‘global health ethics’. ‘Global 
health ethics’ are an attempt to conceptualise the ‘process of applying moral value to 
health issues that are typically characterised by a global level effect or require action 
coordinated at a global level’.193 
Globalisation is vital for cultural uniformity and restructuring and seeks, 
innocuously perhaps, to eradicate cultural diversity in the world.194 In the opinion of 
Yankuzo the cultural variations between ethnic divisions in Africa have been 
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weakened by forces of globalisation and at particular risk are African traditional 
cultural values as they are being replaced by ‘global cultural values’.195 
Nevertheless, various authors have contradictory perspectives on the benefits 
of globalisation and much has been written on its impact on the world both positively 
and negatively. Whichever approach is adopted, the reality is that globalisation is a 
multi-dimensional process, the impact of which is that cultural, economic and 
political relations are being dramatically transformed on a global basis. Yankuzo 
likens it to ‘... an uncontrollable wildfire … it has started and nobody knows where it 
is taking us’. Moreover, Yankuzo reflects on how ‘the world is being compressed into 
a single space now referred to as a global village’.196 He states ‘[g]lobalization is a 
reality for all of us because; we are forced with no other option but to live in a global 
village.’ 197  
The trend suggests a movement from that of a ‘tribal village’ to a ‘global 
village’.198 Countries at differing stages of development are being forced to impose an 
ever-expanding interconnection of socio-cultural related issues and policies in the 
management of their national affairs. Consequently, states are losing their governing 
capacity and sovereignty in a world that is gradually becoming borderless, and they 
are being coerced into assuming universal global cultures and policies. Ip suggests 
that global processes are stretching and transforming national law significantly, 
causing the lines demarcating global and national law to become increasingly 
blurred.199 
The value of globalisation lies in its ability to inform essential information 
policy issues. In leveraging off of lessons learned elsewhere in the world, growth can 
be facilitated, as expansion is accelerated into Africa. The application of international 
law has been intentionally directed away from the national and domestic concerns of 
sovereign states, as it is regarded as their exclusive preoccupation and dominion.200 
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Although the scope of electronic transactions and the newly forged perception of 
‘global health’ is clearly international in nature, where substantial overlap will 
inevitably occur, the onus still remains on the national legislation enacted by the 
sovereign state to provide the bulk of legal and regulatory reform, control and 
management.  
Despite the best efforts of the realms of international and national law to 
remain detached from each other, the absolute juridical sovereignty of a state’s 
autonomy in creating its own national law is slowly being eroded. 201 A steady but 
progressive transnationalisation of international law is gaining momentum. 202 
Globalisation has had an enormous impact on the sovereign state and is the greatest 
perceived threat. Khrebtukova states:  
‘[i]n a globally integrated world, national borders no longer confine the diverse views 
that prioritize subjects of international law… it is imperative that these regimes 
themselves be made to take account of one another, to understand one another, and to 
go about their respective decision-making processes in a way that places them within 
the scheme of one cohesive international legal system.’203 
A global regulatory approach prevents the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage, 
which enables individuals to arrange and structure their communications and 
transactions so as to evade more restrictive national regulations in favour of the 
advantages offered by less stringent foreign regulatory regimes.204  
The dynamic between national, international, transnational and global 
institutions is ‘complicated and interwoven’.205 International law has evolved over 
time into a framework to accommodate the emergence of global governance. 
Transnational processes have created a new legal model, that of ‘global law’. 206 
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Rather than the fragmentation prevalent in international law,207 global law is not a 
formalised legal system but represents a ‘multi-cultural, multi-national, and multi-
disciplinary’ system.208  
(3)  The introduction of centres of excellence  
A centre of excellence can be described as a network of participating countries, which 
target local or regional health challenges. The expectation is that participating 
countries within a regional network will provide specialised medical services in one 
particular discipline. Each centre of excellence is committed to referring patients for 
treatment to the various partner countries, and to share experiences, protocols and 
management policies with one another. 209  The intention is to engage in regional 
cooperation in various areas of medical specialties, thereby strengthening health care 
systems at a national and regional level. The regional networks of excellence have as 
their primary objective the efficient and rapid response to regional diseases and 
threats through synergy, co-operation and multi-disciplinary collaboration.210  
The Republic of Rwanda, reputed to be the technology hub in East Africa, has 
recently been appointed as the region’s centre of excellence in eHealth, biomedical 
engineering and immunisation procurement, supply and maintenance. Within the East 
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and P Kaleebu ‘EDCTP regional networks of excellence: Initial merits for planned clinical trials in 
Africa’ (2013) 13 BMC Public Health at 258. Further examples of networks are the EACCR, 
comprising 34 East African regional institutions including Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan and 
Ethiopia. The TESA network, which includes 10 institutions across 6 Southern African countries 
including Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The West African 
network of excellence WANETAM for research into Tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and Malaria located in 
Senegal and CANTAM the Central African Network for Tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and Malaria, in 
Brazzaville, Republic of Congo. Each network has a governance structure and is multi-disciplinary, 
and multi-disease-oriented for the furtherance of research coordination and resource sharing across 
Anglophone, Lusophone and Francophone countries in Africa. See too S Nwaka et al. ‘Analysis of 
pan-African centres of excellence in health innovation highlights opportunities and challenges for local 
innovation and financing in the continent’ (2012) 12 BMC International Health and Human Rights at 
11.  
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African region, Uganda has been selected as the centre of excellence in treating 
cancer, Kenya with issues of urology, Tanzania with the service of cardiac issues and 
Burundi has been charged with nutritional issues. 
In establishing these centres of excellence, eHealth systems are transcending 
national boundaries and becoming transnational.211 Encouraging patients to utilise 
these facilities requires them to be tracked and treated within and between regions. 
Transnational platforms for collaboration in eHealth systems require continent wide 
and global eHealth debates, defining the challenges in cross-border eHealth and health 
care delivery systems. The argument in favour of the development of an overarching 
legal and regulatory framework addressing eHealth challenges, particularly the 




This chapter considered certain drivers in an online health environment. These 
included the establishment of centres of excellence, the emergence of global health 
care, the changing doctor-patient relationship, and the influence of all of these on 
online eHealth data protection. The chapter examined whether there exist any 
boundaries in cyberspace; whether privacy is of concern to online users; whether 
privacy is of concern to eHealth users in developing countries and whether data 
protection is a luxury that the developing world can ill afford.  
The chapter indicated that states no longer exercise the exclusive domain of 
being the sole legislators and enforcers of laws, and that this duty is now shared 
among states, as transnational law alters international law and its governance, which 
in turn ripples down to affect law at a national level. As the application and 
enforcement of national law cannot extend beyond its borders, a law is required that is 
effective across boundaries and jurisdictions. 212  This is primarily a reactionary 
response to the nature of data and its inherent ability to flow freely across boundaries. 
                                               
211 T Gerber, V Olazabal, K Brown and A Pablos-Mendez ‘An Agenda for Action on Global E-Health’ 
(2010) 29 (2) Health Affairs at 233–236.  
212 Ip (n 199) at 637.  
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Additionally, the chapter described that the decentralised and ubiquitous 
global Internet network, together with the flexibility and mobility of treatment and 
services offered by eHealth initiatives, allows for a seemingly effortless 
transcendence of borders and jurisdictions, all of which require the application of 
regulation at a regional, international or global level.  
The following chapter will consider the solutions to the privacy dilemma 
within electronic health care in the developing world. It will describe data protection 
regulatory measures and the factors that inform them, and it will assess the Malabo 
Convention as an option for solving the predicament faced by data protection eHealth 
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This chapter explores options that may assist in finding a solution to the privacy 
dilemma in the field of electronic health care in the developing world. The purpose of 
this chapter is three-fold: Firstly, it sets out to describe international data protection 
and the questions confronting data protection regulators. Secondly, it introduces and 
assesses alternative protective regulatory methods to those more usually applied to 
information policymaking. These alternative, or extended, models may prove useful 
in informing a comprehensive, albeit layered, approach to a solution. Thirdly, in the 
concluding part of this chapter, I assess the Malabo Convention.1 This convention is 
the obvious choice when seeking assistance in unravelling the dilemma of eHealth 
data protection in Africa, most particularly because it already exists, and has been 
well received by various sectors.2 Moreover, it affords a degree of protection under 
human rights law, which until now has been unprecedented outside of the European 
Union and thus is something of a triumph for the African continent. While 
acknowledging this achievement, I set out certain shortcomings in the Convention. 
 My goal is not to identify all the inconsistencies contained in the Malabo 
Convention. Rather I propose that, although the Convention is a welcome start, for it 
to be useful in providing a solution, review and reform are necessary. The details of 
such amendments I discuss in the following chapter (Chapter 8).  
 
II THE FUTURE OF DATA PROTECTION  
The development of data protection internationally and the questions facing regulators 
are considered in an attempt to drive data protection forward. 
(1) Development of international data protection  
The stated mission of Google, for instance, is to ‘organize the world’s information 
and make it universally accessible and useful’.3 The power to access and manipulate 
                                               
1 The Malabo Convention is discussed in Chapter 4. 
2 G Greenleaf and M Georges ‘The African Union’s data privacy Convention: A major step toward 
global consistency?’ (2014) 131 Privacy Laws and Business International Report at 18. 
3 See ‘About Google’. Available at http://www.google.com/about/ (accessed 20 February 2017). 
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data is enormous. 4  Of late, there has been unprecedented activity around the 
development of data protection regulation worldwide. 5  More recently, scripted 
constitutions, such as the South African and the Hungarian, include explicit rights to 
access and control personal information.6 Where privacy and data protection is not 
specifically recognised by the constitution, such as in the US, Ireland and India, courts 
have found the right to privacy in other provisions and in international agreements, 
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which were adopted into law.7  
In the 1970s, a general movement emerged with the intention of wider privacy 
protection, and with the adoption of comprehensive privacy laws primarily setting the 
framework for protection.8 The genesis of modern data protection laws can be traced 
to those originally enacted in a separate legal instrument in the German federal state 
of Hesse in October 1970.9 This was followed by a wave of regulatory legislation, 
largely based on the models introduced by the OECD and the Council of Europe, 
including legislation found in Sweden,10 Germany11 and France.12 The incidence of 
                                               
4 See B van der Sloot & F J Zuiderveen Borgesius ‘Google and Personal Data Protection’ in A Lopez-
Tarruella (ed) Google and the Law: Empirical Approaches to Legal Aspects of Knowledge-Economy 
Business Models. Series: Information Technology and Law Series vol 22 VIII (2012) 75–111. 
5  See G Greenleaf ‘Sheherezade and the 101 data privacy laws: Origins, significance and global 
trajectories’ (2013) Journal of Law, Information & Science at 1. D Banisar and S Davies 'Global 
Trends in Privacy Protection: An international survey of privacy, data protection, and surveillance laws 
and development' (2012) 18 (1) John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law and D Banisar 
and S Davies 'Privacy and Human Rights: An International Survey of Privacy Laws and Practice' 
Global Internet Liberty Campaign. 
6 Ibid at 3. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz (or The Data Protection Act of Hersse) of 1970. This was the first legal 
instrument bearing the name of ‘Datenschutz’, which was later translated into English as ‘data 
protection’. The etymological origin of ‘data’, observed in the plural form of the Latin word ‘datum’, 
echoes the English interpretation of the word data as being ‘in general any given piece of information’, 
much like the French word ‘donnée(s)’ or the Dutch word ‘gegeven(s)’. This is strictly speaking not 
consistent with the German term ‘Daten’, which is not understood to refer to any data but specifically 
only to data that has been processed by computers. See G González Fuster The Emergence of Personal 
Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU (2014) at 56 and 57, and also FW Hondius 
Emerging Data Protection in Europe (1975) at 84. 
10 (Swedish) Data Act of 1973, subsequently repealed by the Personal Data Act of 1998 and the 
supplementary regulations contained in the Personal Data Ordinance of 1998.  
178 
enactments slowed down in 1981, with the adoption of the Council of Europe’s 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data13 and the OECD’s Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data.14 By early 2014, as reported in Greenleaf, 
101 countries across the world had data protection laws.15  
This has had a profound impact on the way in which global businesses are 
required to approach the collection, dissemination and management of personal 
information, and it has encouraged topical debates around the right of people to be 
forgotten, the right of data to be deleted, and the right to data portability. Moreover, 
new developments in medical research and care, and health data transfers, have 
dramatically increased the level of information generated.16 Consequently, existing 
paradigms of privacy and data protection have shifted and are undergoing scrutiny, 
with a global response aimed at reviewing and redesigning data privacy laws.17  
Specific law reform proposals and recommendations are emerging, or are in 
the process of being implemented, by for instance, the Australian Government, which 
enacted the Privacy Act of 1988 (which seeks to regulate the handling of personal 
information about individuals), the Information Privacy Act of 2014 and the 
Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act of 2012 (which create the 
legislative framework for the Australian Government’s personally controlled 
electronic health record system),18 the EU Regulation 19 and the Consumer Privacy 
                                                                                                                                      
11  The Gesetz gegen missbrauchliche Datennutzung (Act Against the Misuse of Data) adopted in 
January 1974. 
12 Loi no 78–17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative á l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés (Law on 
Computers, Files and Freedoms of 6 January 1978). 
13 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 
ETS no. 108 Strasbourg 1981. 
14 OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data 
Paris (1981).  
15 With the 101st country with data protection legislation that of South Africa. See Greenleaf (n 5) at 28. 
16 Banisar and Davies (n 5) at 4. 
17 G Gunasekara ‘Paddling in unison or just paddling? International trends in reforming information 
privacy law’ (2014) 22 (2) International Journal of Law and Information Technology at 141. 
18 For a critical summary, see N Waters and G Greenleaf ‘Australia’s 2012 Privacy Act revisions: 
Weaker Principles, More Powers’ (2012) 121 Privacy Laws & Business International Report at 12. See 
for an update to the Australian Privacy Principle guidelines issued by the Office of the Australian 
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Bill of Rights proposed in 2012 by the Obama Administration in the US.20 Outside of 
Europe, the 1993 Privacy Act of New Zealand is considered to be one of the most 
comprehensive privacy acts.21 In the Asia Pacific region, Japan, Hong Kong, South 
Korea and Taiwan have also adopted data protection measures, while Singapore,22 
Vietnam and Indonesia have privacy legislation applicable to certain sectors.23 In the 
People’s Republic of China, great strides have been made in the new focus of a 
judicial interpretation issued in The People’s Republic of China’s Supreme People’s 
Court, which became effective on 10 October 2014 with regard to the infringement of 
privacy rights on the Internet.24 As China has no comprehensive data protection law, 
with limited data protection and privacy regulation in terms of sector-specific laws, 
this judicial interpretation is a significant development in data privacy regulation.25 
Generally, the interpretation serves to prohibit Internet users and Internet service 
providers from disclosing or publishing personal information on the Internet (or other 
                                                                                                                                      
Information Commissioner http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-act/other-legislation (accessed 
20 February 2017).  
19 European Commission ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data (General Data Protection Regulation)’ Brussels 25.1.2012 COM (2012) 11 final 
2012/0011 (COD). 
20 The White House ‘Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting 
Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy’ (Washington, February 2012). 
Additionally, the US HIPAA has the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996.  
21 S Avancha, A Baxi and D Kotz ‘Privacy in mobile technology for personal healthcare’ (2012) 45 (1) 
3 ACM Computing Surveys at 3.10. 
22 Health data protection is provided by the Computer Misuse Act, the common law and codes of 
practice.  
23 Avancha et al. (n 21) at 3.10. 
24 The interpretation is entitled ‘Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning 
the Application of the Rules regarding Cases of the Infringement of Personal Rights over Information 
Networks’ and clarifies the December 2012 position of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress on Strengthening Network Protection. See in this regard ‘Chinese Supreme People’s 
Court Issues Interpretations Regarding the Publication of Personal Information on the Internet’ Privacy 
and Information Security Law Blog. Available at 
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2014/10/articles/chinese-supreme-peoples-court-issues-
interpretations-regarding-publication-personal-information-Internet/ (accessed 20 February 2017).  
25 Banisar and Davies (n 5) at 31–34. This firewall serves to block certain western news web sites 
including the BBC, New York Times and the Voice of America. 
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information networks). 26  The personal information protected by this prohibition 
includes, personal genetic information, medical records, health examination 
materials, home addresses and information regarding private activities. 
Unfortunately, although they may find general application, few data protection 
laws address eHealth issues directly. Most privacy laws contain broad data protection 
provisions, which may find general application to eHealth issues. Alternatively, 
eHealth privacy protection may be provided for more generally within wider health 
care legislation.27  
The enactment of countries’ own specific data protection laws has been 
influenced by and developed in parallel with collective, multinational instruments.28 
Of interest is that eHealth regulations frequently do not originate in public or private 
international law concerning eHealth but that they rather have their roots in traditional 
international law-making entities, such as non-governmental organisations. In 
developing new technologies, such as eHealth, reliance is increasingly placed on 
general policies and operating procedures developed by participating groups that have 
a firm grasp of the technology.29 Despite these policies and standards being self-
serving, they do provide a basis and assistance to the likes of the WTO and the United 
Nations in crafting legal policies in areas of technology.30 
                                               
26  My emphasis. Disclosure or publication on the Internet (or other information network) may, 
however, be permissible under the following circumstances: where the relevant individual consented in 
writing; the disclosure or publication is in the public interest to a necessary extent; an educational or 
scientific entity makes the disclosure or publication for purposes in the public interest, academic 
research or statistical analysis, the relevant individuals have consented in writing to the publication or 
disclosure and the method of disclosure or publication will not result in the identification of any 
individual; the relevant personal information has already been published by the individual on the 
Internet, or has already become public via other means; or the personal information is obtained through 
legitimate methods. 
27 For instance, the US HIPAA or Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. See too 
Avancha et al. (n 21) at 3.8. 
28 FH Cate ‘The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public Interest’ (1994–95) 
80 Iowa Law Review at 431.  
29 JD Blum ‘The role of law in Global e-health: A tool for development and equity in a digitally 
divided world’ (2002) Saint Louis University Law Journal at 86. 
30 Ibid. For example, the WTO and the United Nations are both working with a private organization, 
the Global Information Infrastructure Commission (GIIC), to facilitate the development of policies 
underpinning telecommunications based commerce. 
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Of all the legal challenges affecting the global eHealth arena, the one inciting 
the most widespread reaction on the part of policymakers worldwide is that of 
privacy.31 Like other areas of eHealth, feasible privacy policies will require universal 
global and regional agreements to develop a common set of international practical and 
workable principles and objectives.32  
(2)  Questions facing regulators 
The five key challenges confronting policymakers are as follows: Can existing laws 
be applied successfully to new activities or are entirely new laws required to address 
data protection developments adequately? Secondly, what are ‘reasonable’ and 
‘proportionate’ responses when legal reformation is necessary to accommodate 
societal objectives in a new context? Thirdly, how do regulators craft new laws that 
are flexible to changing circumstances? Fourthly, how are fundamental human values 
protected in practice, notwithstanding social and technological pressures? And, lastly, 
how is policymaking, on a broader scale, coordinated between nations so that a 
consistent global legal environment is fostered?33  
These questions pose challenges to regulators that require their resolution 
within a given set of circumstances. In an attempt to answer these questions, firstly, 
policymakers must determine whether in fact to regulate at all, and if so, what specific 
kind of regulation is appropriate. If regulation is indeed necessary, then regulators 
have a choice not only between the existing law and the creation of new law, but also 
between ‘multiple existing regulatory forms’.34 In relation to the first three questions, 
Samuelson provides the following insight. She states that, where the creation of new 
law is desirable, the challenge for regulators is to adopt a ‘reasonably proportionate 
response’ to the problem. The proposal by Samuelson is that regulation should be 
‘predictable, minimalist, consistent, and simple’, thus avoiding disproportionate laws 
                                               
31 Ibid at100. 
32 Ibid at 86. 
33 P Samuelson ‘Five Challenges for Regulating the Global Information Society’ at 2. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=234743 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.234743 (accessed 20 
February 2017). And P Samuelson ‘A New Kind of Privacy? Regulating Uses of Personal Data in the 
Global Information Economy’ (1999) 87 Calif Law Review at 751. 
34 Ibid. 
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that create ‘more problems than they can solve’.35 A further reason to enact such 
legislation is that they should be more ‘flexible and adaptable than those that are more 
complex and ambitious’. 36  In an endeavour to cast as broad a net as possible, 
Samuelson suggests that legislation implemented should be as ‘technology-neutral’ as 
possible, that is, it should not endorse any particular technological approach.37  
The fourth challenge facing regulators is to incorporate the claim to the 
universal human right of privacy within data protection laws. How are such values 
integrated into new law? Are human rights instruments too general a method of 
protection to provide an adequate response? Lord Hoffmann argues that ‘human rights 
are universal in abstraction but national in application’. 38  Whereas at a level of 
abstraction, human rights may be considered universal, at the level of application, the 
detail required in addressing concrete human rights difficulties necessitates a national 
approach. The application of human rights, it is suggested by Lord Hoffmann, 
requires ‘trade-offs and compromises, exercises of judgment, which can be made only 
in the context of a given society and its legal system’.39 The fact that a country has 
subscribed to a statement of human rights in the same terms as contained in a human 
rights instrument does not automatically mean that it has agreed to uniformity in the 
application of those abstract rights in its country.40 Although not wishing to minimise 
the importance of aspirational international statements of abstract human rights, such 
as the Universal Declaration, Lord Hoffmann concedes that human rights instruments 
provide a ‘recognised standard against which governments may be criticised and are 
effectively criticised by other governments and international organisations’.41 
Although he applauds the use of human rights instruments as a benchmark for 
compliance with human rights by subscribing countries, he criticises human rights 
judicial bodies. The difficulty, he suggests, is in enabling a foreign court, for instance 




38 L Hoffmann ‘The Universality of Human Rights’ (2009) Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture at 1.  
39 Ibid at para 24. 
40 Ibid. Lord Hoffman states ‘[t]he situation is quite different from that of the European Economic 
Community, in which the Member States agreed that it was in their economic interest to have uniform 
laws on particular matters which were specified as being within European competence’.  
41 Ibid at para 40. 
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the European Court of Human Rights, to ‘intervene in the details and nuances of the 
domestic laws’ of countries.42 With regard to domestic human rights law, caution 
should be exercised in relying merely on rights provisions, as this may ‘blind us when 
envisioning a more balanced picture of the privacy strands at stake’.43 Perritt too notes 
the blurring effect that technology may have on human rights law.44 International 
instruments, including human rights instruments, remain helpful within the data 
protection discourse, and a valuable contribution to attaining a solid basis of domestic 
data protection law.  
 
III ALTERNATIVE OR EXTENDED REGULATORY 
PROTECTION MEASURES 
I shall now consider three extended or additional measures of controlling behaviour 
and protecting data that may run concurrently with more traditional forms of 
information regulation. These approaches may provide a partial solution or, when 
used together with more formalised governance measures, may assist in strengthening 
traditional regulatory models. 
(1)  Global legal pluralism  
‘Legal pluralism’ is the presence of more than one legal order in a social field. It is 
defined in Griffith as ‘…the coexistence of legal orders in the same space, and quite 
independent from … formal recognition by state law’. 45  With the advent of 
globalisation, the opportunity for legal pluralism, or the ‘intermingling of normative 
legal systems with global legal systems’, has become noticeable. The challenges and 
themes imposed by globalisation – the definition of law, the role of the state, the role 
of the community, and that of space – are expanded in the global sphere. Pluralism in 
                                               
42 Ibid at para 44. 
43 V Mayer-Schönberger ‘Strands of Privacy: DNA databases and informational privacy and the OECD 
Guidelines’ in DNA and the Criminal Justice System: The Technology of Justice (2004) at 225–246. 
44 HH Perritt ‘The Internet is Changing International Law’ (1998) 73 Chicago-Kent Law Review at 997. 
45 See J Griffiths ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 
at 1. See R Michaels ‘Global legal pluralism’ Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper No. 259 (2009) 5 Annual Review of Law & Social Science at 3.  
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society radicalises issues of rights and sovereignty. While the concepts of local, 
national, and international are fluid, 46  legal pluralism accepts the concurrent co-
existence of several divergent legal orders within one social space.47  It seeks to 
reconcile a hybrid legal position, where various normative legal systems occupy a 
single social field.48 As such, Cover puts pluralism as being ‘a bridge in normative 
space’ connecting ‘the world that is … with worlds-that-might-be’.49 He continues 
that the law ‘… is the bridge – the committed social behaviour, which constitutes the 
way a group of people will attempt to get from here to there’.50   
For some legal pluralism theorists, global legal pluralism represents more than 
classical pluralism and new legal pluralism.51 An emerging global legal pluralism has 
arisen that transcends traditional legal boundaries. It focuses beyond the individual 
localised state or community toward an international sphere: a paradigm that entails 
inter-legality and a shift from national to regional and/or global legal orders. 52 
Teubner cites the lex mercatoria, or the transactional law of economic transactions, as 
a successful example of an autonomous legal system: a global law without a state.53  
                                               
46 S Benhabib Another Cosmopolitanism (2008) at 74. 
47 E Ip ‘Globalization and the future of the law of the sovereign state’ (2010) 8 (3) Oxford University 
Press and New York University School of Law at 640.  
48 PS Berman ‘The New Legal Pluralism’ (2009) 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Science at 226. 
49  RM Cover ‘The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction’ (1985) Yale Law School Legal 
Scholarship Repository: Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 2706 at 181.  
50 Ibid. 
51  Whereas the classical phase relates to only the interplay of Western and non-Western laws in 
colonial and postcolonial settings, while treating the indigenous non-state law as subordinate to that of 
the law of the colonising state, the new legal pluralism extends the concept to Western societies and the 
interplay between official and unofficial law more generally. See further SE Merry ‘International law 
and socio-legal scholarship: toward a spatial global legal pluralism’ (2008) 41 Studies in Law, Politics 
and Society at 156 and 157; F von Benda-Beckmann ‘Who’s afraid of legal pluralism?’ (2002) 34 (47) 
The Journal of Legal Pluralism and unofficial law 37–82 and Michaels (n 45) at 2 for his clarification 
of the value and limitations of legal pluralism.  
52 See Merry (n 51) at 156 and Berman (n 48) at 226.  
53 See G Teubner ‘Global Bukowina: Legal pluralism in the world society’ in G Teubner (ed) Global 
Law without a State Brookfield: Dartmouth (1997) at 3–28 for a discussion on the lex mercatoria. See 
P Zumbansen ‘Piercing the legal veil: Commercial Arbitration and Transactional Law’ (2002) 8 
European Law Journal at 400 and KP Berger ‘The Law Merchant and the New Market Place: 21st 
Century view of transnational commercial law’ (2000) International Arbitration Law Review at 91 for 
a theoretical discussion on the lex mercatoria. See also GP Calliess ‘Reflexive Transnational Law: The 
privatization of civil law and the Civilisation of private law (2002) 23 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 
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How to define what the law is and the manner in which it is distinguishable 
from other normative systems and modes of governance is not as simplistic as arguing 
that multiple legal forms exist side by side. Questions arise: How do these legal forms 
exercise power and authority? What is their connection to each other? How do they 
express local normative standards and regulate social interactions?54 As described in 
Merry, ‘international regulations, agreements, human rights conventions, and other 
forms of law are increasingly merging with domestic law’. She states that ‘[i]t is no 
longer possible to study domestic law in isolation from these influences’.55 A stable 
system of law coupled only to a particular national law is ‘no longer adequate’. It is 
the fluidity and plurality of law found particularly in international law that provides 
the answer to the ordering and grounding required in regulating a highly mobile and 
fragmented set of social relationships.56 Sloss likewise states that, as nations become 
increasingly interdependent, greater reliance is sought of international instruments to 
regulate matters previously considered domestic in nature, 57  as does the view of 
Berman, who suggests that legal pluralism may provide a valuable alternative 
framework for addressing conflict of laws issues, which are unfolding in areas of, for 
instance, Internet jurisdiction. 58  As inter-systemic law-making has grown more 
complex, the use of legal pluralism as a solution in the global arena becomes 
viable. 59 Jurisdictional overlap, a predictability of the growth of informational 
communications technologies, along with the mobility of data across borders all 
indicate that jurisdictions will now feel the ‘effects of activities around the globe, 
which will inevitably lead to multiple assertions of legal authority over the same act, 
without regard to territorial location’.60  
                                                                                                                                      
at 185, where the nature and subsequent rise of transnational law within the modern territorial state is 
considered in greater detail.  
54 Merry (n 51) at 156.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid. 
57 D Sloss ‘Non-self-executing treaties: Exposing a constitutional fallacy’ (2002) 36 (1) UC Davis Law 
Review at 3. 
58 Berman (n 48) at 225. 
59 Ibid. This is because it has ‘always sought to identify hybrid legal spaces, where multiple normative 
systems occupied the same social field’. 
60Ibid. 
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Legal pluralism is a product of social processes and a context for social 
interaction at a specific point in time and location.61 The proposed shift in law is not 
from one system, the political, to another, the economic, but instead is ‘an expansion 
toward numerous autonomous global functional subsystems of world society, with 
which different legal orders are coupled’.62 Other forms of inchoate global law, which 
reinforce this view have been identified,63 most significantly for this work, the lex 
digitalis (a self-administered law of the Internet). Siegal states that ‘[t]he technical 
advances in communication have underpinned the advance of globalization in all 
spheres of the economy, and health should be no exception’. 64 He proposes that ‘the 
promise of IT-globalization has something to offer all parties involved: patients, 
providers, insurers, national health systems, and the international community’.  
Likewise, Reidenberg argues that a ‘set of rules for information flows imposed 
by technology and communication networks form a “lex informatica” that 
policymakers must understand, consciously recognize and encourage’.65 He continues 
that the establishment of a lex informatica may provide ‘a single, immutable norm for 
information flows on the network or may enable the customization and automation of 
information flow policies for specific circumstances that adopt a rule of flexibility.’66  
He advocates that policymakers should look to the lex informatica as a 
solution and ‘a useful extra-legal instrument that may be used to achieve objectives 
that otherwise challenge conventional laws and attempts by governments to regulate 
across jurisdictional lines.’67 
Although heavily contested in the realm of traditional legal theory as nothing 
more than a ‘quasi-legal phenomenon of soft law’, existing merely in the shadows of 
the national legal regime, a ‘third way’ between market and state should not be 
                                               
61 Von Benda-Beckmann (n 51) at 72. 
62 Ibid. 
63 E.g., the lex sportive (an autonomous law of sport) and the lex constructionis (an autonomous law for 
construction projects). 
64 G Siegal ‘Enabling Globalization of Health Care in the Information Technology Era: Telemedicine 
and the Medical World Wide Web’ (2012) 17 (1) Virginia Journal of law and technology at 1. 
65  JR Reidenberg ‘Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through 
Technology’ (1998) 76 (3) Texas Law Review at 555.  
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid at 556. 
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immediately dismissed, a possible ‘regulated self-regulation’.68  Understandably, in 
developing any legal system, it is to be expected that particular local, social contexts 
and sensitivities may both be considered in a way possible by their national 
counterparts. Thus, sovereign national law will continue to find legitimacy and 
relevance.69 
Certainly, implementation, enforcement measures and sanctions are 
immediately apparent as potential Achilles heels in the establishment of any legal 
system of this sort. 70  Unless political legitimation and effective enforcement are 
furnished by national courts, little prospect of legal traction is envisaged. Informal 
sanctions, as recognised in the lex mercatoria and applied by the market, are often 
insufficient mechanisms for redress. Consequently, the core of its legality risks being 
placed in dispute.  
(2)  Self-regulation 
An alternative method of regulation is that of ‘self-regulation’. In a self-regulatory 
system, the choice to comply with the guidance and direction of a code of conduct or 
set of industry principles, or not, is at the sole discretion of the respective industry 
member with little or no formal enforcement mechanisms beyond that of corporate 
peer pressure. Put concisely, ‘self-regulation only works for those who agree to be 
self-regulated’.71 Nevertheless, Goldman and Hudson view a self-regulatory approach 
as a ‘useful stepping stone’ to the introduction of legislation.72  
Swire uses the interesting, albeit unusual, metaphor of ‘elephants’ and ‘mice’ 
to describe Internet legal regulation and enforcement. Curiously, ‘elephants’ are 
                                               
68  Or ‘reflexive law’, i.e. ‘an action directed back at itself’, e.g. ‘thinking of thinking’ or 
‘communicating about communication’ or ‘regulating self-regulation’, see Calliess (n 53) at 189 and 
190. Reflexive law is described ‘[l]ike self regulation it is a concept, which potentially fits all kinds of 
policies, from neoconservative subsidiarity, over neo-liberal spontaneous ordering in free markets, to 
neo-socialist or communitarian ideas of democratic self-government in small parts of society’. 
69 Ip (n 47) at 651. 
70  See V Karavas and G Teubner ‘http://www.CompanyNameSucks.com: The horizontal effect of 
fundamental rights on ‘private parties’ within autonomous internet law’ (2003) 4 (12) European & 
International Law at 1356. 
71 ME Boulding ‘Perspective: Self-Regulation: Who Needs It?’ (2000) 19 (6) Health Affairs at 132. 
72 J Goldman and Z Hudson ‘Virtually exposed: Privacy and e-Health’ (2000) 19 (6) Health Affairs at 
144. 
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understood to be large, powerful organisations, which ‘have a thick skin, but are 
impossible to hide’. Without exception, ‘elephants’ are subject to a country’s 
jurisdiction and are, in all likelihood, compliant with any regulations in place. On the 
other hand, ‘mice’ are smaller, more mobile participants, for instance, pornography 
sites or copyright violators, which ‘can reopen immediately after being kicked off of a 
server or can move offshore’. Mice, he goes on to suggest, ‘breed annoyingly quickly 
– new sites can open at any time’. As traditional law enforcement over the Internet is 
difficult, Swire suggests that alternative legal enforcement agents be sought. These 
include ‘the individual users, Internet service providers, the financial intermediaries 
that transfer money to the mice, and the offshore countries that provide the mice a 
cozy nest’. 73  Moreover, it fosters a more robust, participatory society, while a 
‘watched society is a conformist society’.74 Likewise, Boulding asserts: ‘[w]hile self-
regulatory systems may help policymakers to understand complex new areas or take 
on some of the government’s burden of enforcing agreed standards of conduct, they 
cannot replace laws’.75  
Certainly, an industry effort to self-regulate in the area of eHealth and privacy 
may convey a positive and powerful message to the user. It is a tacit acknowledgment 
that it is a problem worthy of addressing. It also illustrates and reinforces a 
willingness on the part of industry to act ethically and justly, and adopt a thoughtful 
approach to the given situation, despite a lack of legal enforcement or obligation to do 
so.76 
Despite these benefits, the concern expressed by Clarke, is a valid one. He 
states that industry self-regulation ‘has continually demonstrated itself to be 
inadequate, and only of value if it is instituted within a context’.77 Although the 
influence of online users has gained momentum in the recent past, it is suggested by 
Clarke that it is ‘premature to anticipate the present imbalance of power between 
                                               
73 PP Swire ‘Of Elephants, Mice, And Privacy: International Choice of Law and the Internet’ (1998) 32 
(4) The International Lawyer at 993. 
74 See J Goldman “Health at the Heart of Files?” Brandeis Lecture delivered at the Massachusetts 
Health Data Consortium’s Annual Meeting in September 2001.  
75 Boulding (n 71) at132.  
76 Goldman and Hudson (n 72) at 144. 
77 See R Clarke ‘Internet privacy concerns confirm the case for intervention’ (1999) 42 (2) 
Communication of the ACM at 64. 
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organizations and individuals will be overturned soon’. Therefore, some form of 
government intervention and regulation is still realistically necessary for adequate 
data protection.78 Understandably, a concern may be that relying on a model of self-
regulation is effectively to ‘allow the fox to guard the henhouse’. Thus, a self-
regulatory system should not prevent the development of new legislation but, in fact, 
should assist policymakers in creating a well-reasoned and practical one.79  
Relying on a system of self-regulation, in an era of hyper-connectivity and 
distributed networks, although this may play a useful role in the short term, is deemed 
in the opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor and as expressed in the 
EU-US Privacy Shield, an insufficient method to safeguard the rights and interests of 
individuals in the long term, or to wholly ‘satisfy the needs of a globalised digital 
world where many countries are now equipped with data protection rules’. 80 
Transformation of privacy regulation is more important than trying to create a 
faultless system.81  
(3)  Technological model  
The ‘technological model’ uses private technological systems to provide data 
protection to the user. The approach is merely a tool empowering government and 
individuals to control the use and distribution of their data.  
The European Commission, on evaluating various technologies in an online 
environment, stated that technological tools and technical platforms should not in 
themselves act as sufficient replacements to protect privacy. 82  For any tangible 
protection to be provided, technological tools should be applied within the context of 
a formalised legal framework of enforceable data protection rules, providing a 
minimum and non-negotiable level of privacy protection.83 Failing such minimum 
levels of privacy protection, the position reverts to one of self-regulation. Legislation 
                                               
78 Ibid. 
79 Boulding (n 71) at 137. 
80 European Data Protection Supervisor Opinion on the EU-US Privacy Shield draft adequacy decision 
(May 2016) at 2.  
81 Ibid. 
82 See Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
83Opinion 1/98: Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) and the Open Profiling Standard (OPS).  
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should obligate health software vendors to provide base level security mechanisms 
and precautions for safeguarding user information.  
Realistically, users are unlikely to alter pre-configured privacy settings on 
their online technological platforms, and the ‘default’ position set by the software 
developers regarding the user’s preferences will usually reflect the overall level of 
online privacy protection. These settings may not necessarily reflect a high level of 
privacy protection, even if they are subject to user modification. Internet software 
developers could implement technological tools that enhance rather than reduce levels 
of privacy protection.84 Relying on the industry to set appropriate privacy standards 
and then to comply with them creates an obvious risk. While the utilisation of 
technology as an initial safeguard is viable, it does not provide a complete answer to 
privacy protection.85 Given the sensitive nature of medical data, the need exists to 
provide specific and appropriate security safeguards, for instance, the encryption of 
user data and user authentication mechanisms to mitigate breaches in security. 86 
Encryption methods may provide a degree of security and privacy protection for 
users; of itself, however, it is incomplete without a formalised governance 
framework.87 Likewise, the safeguarding of privacy and data protection requires more 
than the implementation of a specific technical algorithm. 
Moreover, where legislation calls for the rather vague requirement to adopt 
‘reasonable security standards’, it is not immediately apparent as to what exactly this 
means or how one is to go about fulfilling such a legal obligation. It may then be 
prudent for industry itself to assist in setting and dictating security levels embedded in 
technology driven models, particularly as the threat imposed on data protection is 
evolving constantly and rapidly.88  
                                               
84 Ibid. 
85 T Sahama, L Simpson and B Lane ‘Security and Privacy in eHealth: Is it possible?’ (2013) e-Health 
Networking, Applications & Services (Healthcom) 247–253. Available at 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6720676&isnumber=6720623 (accessed 5 
January 2017) who ‘hypothesize that the major concerns regarding eHealth security and privacy cannot 
be overcome through the implementation of technology alone’. 
86 European Commission ‘Green Paper on mHealth’ (2014) at 8. 
87 Banisar and Davies (n 5) at 6 and S Pearson, Y Shen and M Mowbray ‘A Privacy Manager for Cloud 
Computing’ in Cloud Computing (2009) at 90–106. 
88 ‘Patient Privacy in a Mobile World: A framework to address privacy law issues in mobile health’ 
(2013) at 11. 
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A legal framework accommodating considerations of legislative constraints, 
together with technologically based protection measures, is valuable in acquiring data 
protection within an eHealth system that is both measurable and accountable. 89 
However, for such initiatives to be productive requires ‘a bold, forward looking 
legislative framework’. 90  Whether individual states can deliver this framework, 
depends largely on their commitment and willingness ‘to listen to the pulse of the 
emerging global digital economy and to recognise the need for strong protection of 
privacy’.91 
 
IV CRITICISMS OF THE MALABO CONVENTION  
Of late, the Pan-African Parliament, the legislative body of the African Union,92 has 
facilitated striking growth in the protection of human rights in Africa. It is an obvious 
choice of institution to initiate data protection reformation measures on the African 
continent. To this end, and in the first instance, the Malabo Convention is an attempt 
by the African Union to provide for the establishment of an appropriate normative 
framework for the protection of personal data, consistent with the African legal, 
cultural, economic and social environment.93 It presents a welcomed human rights 
protection agenda that Greenleaf and Georges regard as ‘potentially [the] most 
important development in Africa’. 94  The Convention positions Africa as the first 
region and continent outside of Europe to adopt a data protection convention as 
international law.95  
                                               
89 Sahama et al. (n 85) at 1. 
90 Banisar and Davies (n 5) at 6.  
91 Ibid. 
92 The Pan-African Parliament is one of the nine organs proposed in the 1991 Treaty Establishing the 
African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty). Its purpose, as set out in Article 17 of the AU 
Constitutive Act, is ‘to ensure the full participation of African peoples in the development and 
economic integration of the continent’. 
93 Preamble to the Malabo Convention at 2. The Malabo Convention is discussed in Chapter 4 of this 
thesis. See also T Maluwa ‘The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-Building in 
Postcolonial Africa’ (2003) 16 (1) Leiden Journal of International Law at 157–170. 
94 Greenleaf and Georges (n 2) at 18. 
95 Ibid. 
192 
The Malabo Convention is not without weaknesses, however. In its current 
form, it fails to address the provision of data protection on the African continent 
adequately. It is not sufficiently comprehensive and requires refinement and 
extension. Essentially, the critical issues are lack of enforcement and governance 
mechanisms, ineffectual data transference provisions, and the insufficiency in 
recognising obstacles pertaining specifically to the African continent, such as cultural 
sensitivities and issues of consent. These criticisms are discussed in turn below. In the 
following chapter, possible solutions to these difficulties are advanced.  
(1)  The Convention’s alignment with sub-regional African frameworks is 
unclear and greater standardisation is necessary  
The extent to which the Malabo Convention is aligned with the provisions contained 
in regional instruments in Africa, particularly those of the ECOWAS Supplementary 
Act and the SADC ‘Data Protection Model Law’ requires further investigation.96 
Greater consistency and harmonisation across the regions is much needed and would 
prevent regulatory fragmentation and discrepancies in development and 
implementation. 
(2)  Lack of an Afro-centric approach: Concepts like ‘consent’ and ‘privacy’ 
are not described with cultural and contextual sensitivity 
The Convention fails to appreciate or integrate the notion of privacy prevalent within 
the rich tradition of indigenous African law and its contextual philosophy. Simply 
transposing and adopting regulatory approaches appropriate elsewhere in the world, 
may be unsuitable and impractical within an African context.97 
As reported in a paper written by Gwagwa on lessons drawn during Conectas 
XIV International Human Rights Colloquium, ‘African countries need to develop 
effective legislative, administrative, judicial and/or other measures to ensure the 
                                               
96 Greenleaf and Georges (n 2) at 18–21. 
97 In Chapter 3 of this thesis, the concept of ‘privacy’ is discussed from an African perspective. 
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protection of human rights in cyberspace’, as the ‘cyber discourse in the Global North 
… [is] often far removed from Africa’s realities’.98  
African legal systems comprise differing strata of laws from a variety of 
sources over time, which have been imposed upon one another, thus creating a 
complex manifestation of legal regimes shaped by strong cultural influences. 99 
Determination of the legal reality within which each country in Africa is found is 
further guided by their Francophone, Anglophone, Hispanophone or Lusophone 
heritage. Difficulties arise when attempts are made to explain or transplant concepts 
and assumptions prevalent within one particular historical culture or system into 
others. 100  Many African countries have ‘hybrid’ legal systems formed by the 
interweaving of a number of distinct legal traditions, derived from their diverse 
origins. Indigenous, or African customary law, to the extent that it is possible to speak 
of a single ‘African customary law’, finds application in many African legal 
systems.101 As described in Lévy-Bruhl, ‘it is impossible that tribes from the savannah 
have the same legal rules of those from the tropical forest, and that those are all bound 
by the same law, which rules the life of people living on fishing or maritime 
commerce’.102 
Mention of ‘African customary law’ is understood with reference to the 
‘different rules, having “legal” value, of different African populations, which are 
                                               
98 My emphasis. See A Gwagwa ‘Internet Governance lessons Africa can learn from Brazil’s success 
story’. Available at http://www.opennetafrica.org/?wpfb_dl=29 (accessed 20 February 2017). See also 
C Eberhard ‘Towards an Intercultural legal theory: The dialogical challenge’ (2001) 10 Social and 
Legal Studies 173 states: ‘[o]n the national levels, the illusions of the realization of the État de Droit or 
Rule of Law all over the world, through a transplantation of the western state model have been 
shattered. Even those who still believe that the western model is the answer acknowledge the need to 
take local traditions into consideration’. 
99 A Mancuso ‘African Law in Action’ (2014) 58 (1) Journal of Africa Law at 1. As identified by 
Mancuso, ‘[t]he ways in which the African state is evolving transform it into an extremely complex 
social (and consequently legal) field in which state and non-state, formal and informal, local and 
transnational relations interact, merge and confront each other in dynamic and even volatile 
combinations, making the legal framework even more complex, and where, in extreme cases, multiple, 
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100 Ibid. 
101 AN Allott ‘What is to be done with African customary law?’ (1984) 28 (1–2) Journal of African 
Law at 57 states ‘... the customary laws could vary greatly as between themselves’. 
102 H Lévy-Bruhl ‘Introduction à l’étude du droit coutumier Africain’ [Introduction to the study of 
African customary law] (1956) 8 (1) Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé 67 at 68 and in Mancuso 
(n 99) at 1. 
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grouped because they share the same characteristics’. 103  These complex legal 
structures often antedate the establishment of colonial or modern states and vary 
between cultures.104 Such traditional laws may be very different to those familiar to 
the western jurist. Mancuso states that ‘social phenomena are undifferentiated, so that 
it is impossible (and probably useless) to separate that which is juridical from what is 
religious, supernatural or economic’. 105  The role played by indigenous law, as 
influenced by religious law (for instance, Shariia law) combined with traditional 
influences, yields African legal systems that are both diverse and distinctive. 106 
Customary laws thus accommodate a case-dependent and selective application of 
rules. These are not predictive and determinative, and are often mutually 
contradictory.107 Mancuso describes that ‘most of the laws copied from the western 
model failed to adapt to African legal culture’, largely because ‘the western approach 
does not embrace the same values of the people in the area to which it has been 
transplanted’.108 A resistance to ‘westernisation’ or ‘modernisation’ and a desire to 
protect cultural values is widespread in African countries.109 Thus, the danger in the 
modernisation of African law, in an attempt to adopt western patterns, is that it may 
not amount to tangible, effective, long-term legal reform, but merely a means to 
                                               
103 Ibid. 
104 Von Benda-Beckmann (n 51) at 39. 
105 Mancuso (n 99) at 1. 
106  AN Allott ‘Towards the unification of laws in Africa’ (1965) 14 (2) The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly at 368 for the types and varieties or differences in African legal systems. 
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107 Ibid at 81–82, 84. 
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present ‘an outward image of a modern country and legal structure’, while the legal 
reality evolves very differently within the country.110  
As stated in a 2010 report prepared by the Policy Engagement Network for the 
International Development Research Centre, ‘[j]ust as security and privacy cannot be 
ignored, we equally cannot transplant security and privacy techniques from abroad 
that may not be adaptable, particularly as legal frameworks may be lacking’.111 Before 
applying ‘modern’ or ‘universal’ standards to ‘privacy’, one should be cognisant of 
and sensitive to the cultural norms, customary values and historical context within the 
divergent groupings.  
The concept of ‘consent’ within an African context is problematic, for 
instance. The Convention fails to address the difficulties of providing consent within 
an African context, and the issue of consent for eHealth data protection thus remains 
largely unresolved.112 Consent is not explored in any detail, save to say it should be 
express, unequivocal, free, specific and informed. Unfortunately, the opportunity to 
develop and extend specific privacy-related concepts in a uniquely technological 
environment is not embraced in the Convention.  
(3) Data mobility and transfer between member states is inadequately 
addressed  
Save for where the data controller has obtained authorisation from the relevant 
national protection authority,113 Article 14 (6)(a) provides that ‘... the data controller 
shall not transfer personal data to a non-Member State of the African Union unless 
such a State ensures an adequate level of protection of the privacy, freedoms and 
fundamental rights of persons whose data are being or are likely to be processed’. 
                                               
110 Mancuso (n 99) at 1. See also WMJ van Binsbergen ‘Dutch anthropology of sub-Saharan African in 
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What exactly constitutes an ‘adequate’ level of protection? The Convention is silent 
on this. The treatment of data export in Article 14 (6) is incomplete and inadequate. 
Co-operative agreements or arrangements between member states are not canvassed, 
thus little is done to encourage the safe and effective free flow of information across 
borders. 
(4)  Enforcement and execution of the Convention  
The relationship between international and domestic law also requires consideration. 
Bradley describes two views of the relationship between international and domestic 
law: firstly the ‘monist’ view, which is that ‘international and domestic law are part of 
the same legal order, ... and international law is supreme over domestic law’. This is 
contrasted with the ‘dualist’ view, which holds that ‘international and domestic law 
are distinct, ... and the status of international law in the domestic system is determined 
by domestic law’.114 A state can be described as having a ‘monist’ legal system in 
instances where the provisions of an international treaty are automatically converted 
into domestic law without the need for an act of parliament implementing such 
legislation. What is required in states with ‘dualist’ legal systems, however, is the 
implementation of legislation to convert obligations within the convention into 
national law. 
A regional instrument, such as the Malabo Convention, resonates with 
international law norms, in that state practice determines what eventually become 
settled as norms, values and rules in international law, while simultaneously 
respecting the sovereign equality of states. In the case of the Malabo Convention, it is 
apparent that the drafters of the Convention did not intend to create a self-executing 
instrument. A ‘self-executing treaty’ is enforced directly into national law without 
enactment by domestic legislation, on the treaty becoming binding on the state in 
terms of the state’s international law obligations. The Convention does not create such 
an agreement; instead, it offers a malleable template or guide for advancing 
legislation, which can be modified by member states to fit their national peculiarities. 
Any intention to create primary domestic law by the Convention drafters would be 
irrelevant, as the individual states’ constitutional rules would determine whether a 
                                               
114  CA Bradley ‘Breard, Our Dualist Constitution and the Internationalist Conception’ (1999) 51 
Stanford Law Review at 529 and 530. 
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particular provision of a ratified treaty creates primary domestic law or not; and treaty 
makers lack the power to alter those constitutional rules.115 
Member states who accede to, and ratify, the Malabo Convention, however, 
commit to ‘establishing a legal framework’ based on its provisions. In terms of 
Article 36, the Convention can only come into force 30 days after the last of fifteen 
ratifications have been received by the Chairperson of the Commission of the AU 
from member states. As member countries are required to accede to and ratify the 
Convention and then provide a national legal framework based on its provisions, the 
Convention, like many international treaties, reflects an aspirational model.  
However, as reported in Greenleaf and Georges, no accessions or ratifications 
appear to have occurred within the first three months of its adoption. 116  As at 
June 2016, the Status List published by the AU for the Malabo Convention, indicates 
that, of a total number of 54 member countries, only eight have signed the Convention 
and no ratifications or accessions have been forthcoming.117 The slow response in 
accession and ratification of the Convention may be indicative of a lack of 
commitment of member states to this process. 
Instruments of this nature and the obligations created therein may provide a 
useful catalyst for the evolution of legal frameworks. This being said, the Malabo 
Convention is not a model law and does not establish an explicit model legal 
framework of standard provisions, which African states can easily adopt in their 
entirety. 118  Thus, room for great disparity exists in the interpretation and 
implementation by the member states of the provisions. Moreover, the adoption and 
ratification of the Malabo Convention by African states may be ineffectual, unless 
individual states establish data protection laws that are sufficiently equivalent and 
consistent, thus facilitating regional standardisation and harmonisation in accordance 
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with the directives contained within the Convention.119 The opportunity exists for 
certain states to enact legislation of a lower standard than others do, thus allowing 
states too much room for policymaking manoeuvres.  
(5)  Failure to create a regional data protection authority 
The Malabo Convention compels member states to establish an authority in charge of 
protecting personal data in the form of a national protection authority. 120  These 
national protection authorities are empowered in terms of the Convention and are 
responsible for the establishment of mechanisms for ‘co-operation with the personal 
data protection authorities of third parties’ and for ‘participating in international 
negotiations on personal data protection’.121  
Of concern is that no provision is made for the co-operation of national 
protection authorities between other member states or for the provision of a 
supervisory authority at a regional level. The absence of establishing a regional 
supervisory authority is also troublesome.  
 
VI CONCLUSION 
While it has been established that the challenges facing privacy protection in eHealth 
in Africa are numerous, many of these obstacles are inter-related. However, when 
taken together, these obstacles create a considerable impediment to the achievement 
of eHealth implementation and are a potential threat to individual rights to privacy. 
Certain shortcomings are apparent within the Malabo Convention. I have 
discussed the following criticisms: the Convention’s lack of synergy with sub-
regional African data protection frameworks; the failure to adopt an Afro-centric 
approach; the failure of concepts, such as ‘consent’ and ‘privacy’ being described 
with cultural and contextual sensitivity; the inadequacy in addressing data mobility 
and data exchange between member states and internationally; the failure to provide 
enforcement mechanisms within the Convention, and lastly the failure to create a 
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120 Article 11(1) of the Malabo Convention. 
121 Article 12 (1), 12 (2) (m) and (n) of the Malabo Convention. 
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regional data protection authority. In the following chapter, I shall recommend how 
such insufficiencies in the Convention be corrected, what such a framework should 





CHAPTER 8: RESOLUTIONS FOR THE REGULATION OF 
DATA PROTECTION IN EHEALTH IN AFRICA 
 





I INTRODUCTION  
The central theme throughout this chapter is to advance a solution to the multitude of 
regulatory complexities arising where privacy legal frameworks lag behind the rapidly 
maturing health care technology initiatives, particularly in the developing world. An 
attempt to bring about a transformative response is made by offering 
recommendations, which assist in the realisation of the human right to privacy within 
eHealth.  
In proposing a solution, there are three considerations: firstly, the privacy 
baseline criteria across various societies and cultures differ enormously; secondly, 
there is a consistent and rapid transformation by technology of the global 
environment, which creates something of a moving target;1 and lastly, without user 
confidence and trust in data protection policies and measures, nascent eHealth 
initiatives can never gain any sort of viable traction or reach their full potential.2 
The proposition contained in this chapter is twofold: firstly, I propose the 
adoption of multiple layers of regulatory measures around data protection, using a 
combination of more formal methods of regulation, together with various extended 
regulatory measures, such as self-regulation and technological approaches. 
Additionally, I propose that the foundation of data protection be a formal regional 
regulatory instrument that is fashioned within an African context. In Chapter 7, I 
question whether the existing Malabo Convention provides assistance in this regard, 
and found it lacking in many respects. Accordingly, my questions now are simply: 
Firstly, how can the Malabo Convention be improved and what should such a revised 
framework address? Secondly, I ask what form should such an instrument take?  
 
II THE PROPOSAL  
The proposed solution is to adopt a multi-layered approach to privacy protection and 
to introduce an amended regional data protection instrument.  
                                               
1 D Banisar and SG Davies ‘Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An International Survey of Privacy, 
Data Protection, and Surveillance Laws and Developments’ (2012) 18 (1) John Marshall Journal of 
Computer & Information Law at 15. 
2 Ibid, where ‘without adequate oversight and enforcement, the mere existence of a law may not 
provide individuals with adequate protection’.  
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(1)  A multi-layered approach 
Despite the proliferation of data protection regulatory measures of differing 
enforceability, the question is whether users are afforded the data privacy, which they 
deserve.3 The indication is that, in reality, providing data protection is not easily 
achievable. Additionally, there is considerable commonality and duplication between 
the different legal disciplines and data protection measures and their implementation.  
To attach significance to one protection model and exclude all others is to 
adopt an incomplete position, given that an online environment system comprises ‘a 
rich and complex cross-coupling of elements’.4 Any proposed system may be ‘caught 
in a web of conflicting constraints’ in which ‘each small part of the system affects 
other parts of the whole system,’ and ‘changing [the state of a single element] ... will 
have effects that ripple throughout the system’.5 The challenge is to address these 
ripples in an insightful way.  
What should be borne in mind is the dual enquiry required in the analysis of 
privacy protection. The first is the ex post examination of existing regulatory methods 
and whether such regulation achieves satisfactory protection. We have established 
that existing regulatory measures offer only partial solutions. The second is the ex 
ante predicting or imagining of an ideal informational privacy framework, which 
balances the need for privacy against the practicalities within which the need for 
privacy protection exists. This is an attempt at using the existing framework and then 
extending it to an envisaged position. Thus, after an evaluation of the various options, 
one is called upon to contemplate what the ideal position would look like. A 
determination is made of which approach, or which combination of approaches, best 
serves data protection within the context. 
Clearly, none of the data protection methods addresses all of the obstacles nor 
do they provide a holistic solution. Moreover, a tension between vagueness and 
practicality remains. Abstract notions of privacy and the human rights contained 
                                               
3 L Edwards ‘Consumer Privacy, On-Line Business and the Internet: Looking for Privacy in all the 
Wrong Places’ (2003) 11 (3) International Journal of Law and Information Technology at 226–250. 
4 L Haynes, D Legge, L London, D McCoy, D Sanders and C Schuftan ‘Will the struggle for health 
equity and social justice be best served by a Framework Convention on Global Health'?’ (2013) 15 (1) 
Health and Human Rights The President and Fellows of Harvard College 111–116.  
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within, for instance, international human rights instruments exist side by side with the 
more practical provisions found in a technological approach, for instance, the 
provisions contained in ‘privacy-by-design’ and ‘privacy-by-default’ measures. 6 
Nevertheless, both perspectives have merit and fulfil a function. Similarly, endorsing 
themes of global consistency and industry self-regulation are helpful and cannot be 
discredited. However, can these approaches be used on their own as the sole means of 
regulating the protection of data? I would suggest not. The solution lies in an attempt 
to bring together the various themes of global consistency, technological expediency 
and self-regulation with a formalised legal framework in a multi-layered approach. 
The solution lies in fusing all approaches together in a meaningful way. Thus, the 
utilisation of the best of the various methods in a coordinated and overlaid practice to 
data protection regulation is recommended. 
Granted, establishing the optimal balance between data protection levels (and 
thus the safeguarding of privacy rights) and the promotion of innovative eHealth 
services (and thus the delivery of health care benefits, particularly to people in 
countries in dire need of health care) is not easily resolved. The range of possible 
incentives for compliance with data protection principles falls along a continuum. At 
the one end is the voluntary code, in which there is limited compulsion to develop, 
adopt or enforce. At the other, is the policy, existing within a comprehensive set of 
statutory obligations and liabilities? It is argued that a combination of legislation and 
self-regulation may provide the optimum solution. This offers the flexibility and low 
compliance of a self-regulatory system with the formalised legislative oversight and 
remedies. The solution is to make provision for comprehensive legislative, and self-
regulatory, sectoral mechanisms that complement one other. 
Moreover, for any regulatory solution to be effective, it has to be ‘flexible, 
dynamic and, responsive and sensitive to changing circumstances’.7 The complex and 
sensitive nature of the many facets of privacy and data protection necessitates a 
                                               
6 ‘Privacy-by-design’ means that data protection measures ought to be built into products and services 
from the time of their very inception, while ‘privacy-by-default’ indicates that any products or services 
should have the strictest privacy settings automatically as their default or norm. 
7 See C Bennett & C Raab The Governance of Privacy: Policy instruments in Global perspective 
(2006) at 184 for the distinction between co-regulation and enforced self-regulation. I Rowlands 
‘Understanding information policy: Concepts, frameworks and research tools’ (1996) 22 (1) Journal of 
Information Science 13–25 at 15.  
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combined approach: the transcendence of legal pluralism and international 
agreements, the purposefulness of self-regulation, and the practicality of the 
technological method. Protection would entail the employment of multiple layers of 
protection of various types, whilst adjusting the strength, scope and suitability of the 
protective coverage and its appropriateness within a given framework. This would 
build on patterns and wider associations that have been previously established and 
tested. An overlaying of such models used in conjunction with the more formalised 
option discussed hereunder is envisaged. 
(2)  A regional data protection instrument  
Greater regional integration within Africa and the establishment of a consolidated 
regional instrument, which forms a baseline standard of legal validity, protecting the 
intrinsic human right of privacy generally and protecting personal data processing 
more specifically, is advocated. Such an instrument should extend to the protection of 
eHealth data applications. The instrument ought to comprise clearly defined, non-
negotiable, yet contextually and culturally sensitive data protection standards and 
principles, relevant specifically to health care delivery in an eHealth environment in 
the developing world, whilst still accepting and incorporating internationally agreed 
upon human rights norms.  
Although the Malabo Convention achieves much as a regional data protection 
instrument, I have illustrated its inadequacies in a previous chapter. I am building on 
the good already attained, and I thus address only its most apparent deficiencies. I 
have selected specific issues that in my view ought to be amended. First, I consider 
what should be included within such a regulatory framework. I then explore the form 
this revised regulatory framework should take.  
 
III WHAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK?  
The regulatory framework requires greater alignment and integration with data 
protection measures within the African region. Additionally, an approach that is Afro-
centric or culturally and contextually sensitive is called for. The notion of ‘consent’ 
requires further clarity and adaptation. Data mobility and its significance in enhancing 
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eHealth also require consideration and inclusion within an amended framework. 
Lastly, issues of enforcement and execution need to be addressed within the 
framework. 
(1)  Alignment with regional data protection measures and greater integration 
Regional integration presupposes the agreement by states to co-operate through 
supranational or inter-governmental institutions for the purpose of improving their 
relationships and obtaining mutual benefit.8 Problematically, the act of integration 
necessitates the willingness on the part of the individual states to relinquish a degree 
of sovereignty.9 Certainly, achieving the harmonisation of laws is a tediously slow 
process. This process can be expedited by way of mutual cooperation. Integration and 
a collaborative approach to the adoption of unified policies on certain international 
issues is advantageous to both the individual states and to the region as a whole.10 To 
this end, African states have expressed their commitment to a more united Africa by 
signing and, with a couple of exceptions, ratifying the Constitutive Act.11 The African 
Union is a response to the challenges presented by globalisation and an attempt at 
regional integration. 12  It is an endeavour to resolve the historic quest for deeper 
African unity. The purpose of the African Union, in facilitating greater African 
integration and strengthening human rights, is predicated on principles that suggest 
novel approaches between the African member states.13 The question is whether the 
African Union represents enough of a plausible effort in the management of 
                                               
8 TW Bennett & J Strug Introduction to International Law (2013) at 248. 
9 Ibid. 
10 In an attempt to pursue a path of greater integration, the AU in July 2016 launched a common 
electronic passport for all its 54 member states with the aim of facilitating free movement of persons, 
goods and services around the continent – ‘in order to foster intra-Africa trade, integration and socio-
economic development’. See the AU press release of July 2016. 
11  The Constitutive Act of the African Union can be found at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Education/Training/Compilation/Pages/8ConstitutiveActoftheAfrican
Union(2000).aspx (accessed 20 February 2017). 
12  T Maluwa ‘The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-Building in Postcolonial 
Africa’ (2003) 16 (1) Leiden Journal of International Law 157–170 at 157. 
13 Ibid. 
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globalisation and regional cooperation, in a manner similar to that reflected by the 
European Union.14 
The harmonisation of national data protection laws in Africa is a recent 
phenomenon.15 Similar efforts at economic and financial integration can be witnessed 
through policy harmonisation within the region. A justification for strengthening and 
standardising legal systems within Africa is to enhance the confidence of technical 
and software applications developers in the regulatory regimes within the region, thus 
encouraging investment and economic growth.16 The unification of African laws is 
cited as a possible solution, and by certain authors as the only and most plausible one, 
to removing the developmental obstacles caused by the juridical differences amongst 
the various African territories.17 Such transformation can give ‘the countries joining 
the process of regional integration the opportunity to assert their interests in a stronger 
and more confident manner within the international arena’.18  
Post and Johnson identify the need for a new fundamental organising of ideas 
around the role of law. They recognise the ‘death of distance’, that is, distance is 
becoming increasingly irrelevant or redundant in transactional arrangements, and 
report that technology initiates a ‘spillover effect’ across national boundaries or 
‘federal lines’.19 Consequently, human interactions are increasingly unrelated to their 
physical constraints. 20  In reality, data protection regulation is among the few, 
relatively new, fields of law, which have been developed largely across national 
                                               
14 Ibid at 158. 
15 AB Makulilo ‘Myth and reality of harmonisation of data privacy policies in Africa’ (2015) 31 
Computer Law & Security Review at 81. See NJ Udombana ‘A Harmony or a Cacophony? The Music 
of Integration in the African Union Treaty and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development’ (2002) 
13 (1) Indiana International & Comparative Law Review at 185.  
16 See PS Mistry ‘Africa’s Record of Regional Co-operation and Integration’ (2000) 99 (397) African 
Affairs at 553 on why regional integration is important in Africa. 
17 S Mancuso ‘The New African Law: Beyond the difference between Common Law and Civil Law’ 
(2008) 14 (1) Annual survey of International & Comparative Law at 40. 
18 Ibid.  
19 See DG Post and DR Johnson ‘Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent: Towards a New Theory of 
Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems’ (1998) 73 Chicago-Kent Law Review at 1055 
and further in AM Froomkin ‘Empire strikes back’ (1997–1998) 73 Chicago-Kent Law Review at 1101. 
20 Ibid.  
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borders.21 This rapid and informal trans-border regulatory development prompted the 
creation of formal international instruments.22 These instruments remain relevant in 
attempting to address the complexities of the contemporary processing environment.23  
The following examples highlight the necessity for greater African integration. 
The introduction of cloud computing and location-based services demonstrates that 
the trans-border personal data flows model, as implemented, is incomplete and 
lacking in its ability to address the complexities arising from the cross-jurisdictional 
nature of the new technology. The need for a regionally coordinated approach is also 
apparent with the emergence of ‘centres of excellence’, where the establishment of 
proposed ‘hubs’ or ‘cores’ of ICT proficiency, or centres of medical expertise, are 
being created. Essentially, these centres of excellence may exist only in a few selected 
sub-regions and not in each individual country, although they are serviced by or 
supporting various countries within their sub-regions. This transference of skills, 
knowledge and procedures illustrates that the need for standardisation and 
harmonisation of trans-border policies and legal standards in privacy policies across 
countries within Africa is essential. 
To reduce weaknesses in privacy protection, a recent solution has been for 
individual states to introduce inter-related integrated privacy provisions and 
instruments. Various means are used to achieve such integration. One method is to 
attenuate differences in national laws through policy harmonisation. Integration 
comprises two strands of thought: the replacement of domestic laws with common 
regional policies, and the coordination of such national policies.24 However, initiating 
the incorporation of provisions into various regulatory instruments without broader 
cooperation creates opportunities for fragmentation, inconsistencies and contradiction 
                                               
21 P de Hert and V Papakonstantinou ‘Three Scenarios for International Governance of Data Privacy: 
Towards an International Data Privacy Organization, Preferably a UN Agency?’ (2013) 9 (2) I/S: A 
Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society at 272. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Udombana (n 15) at 189. For more clarity on these terms, see J Li ‘Privacy policies for health social 
networking sites’ (2013) 20 (4) Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 704–707. 
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between the various documents. Many such instruments already exist at a sub-
regional level within Africa.25  
Moreover, greater regional cooperation and policy integration will remove the 
potential for ‘races to the bottom’, that is, a desire for states to adopt the least 
restrictive laws and encourage the most economic activity, or alternatively, ‘races to 
the top’ where the most stringent rules become a ‘baseline for applying pressure to get 
international adoption by others’.26 Both of these scenarios are undesirable.  
Thus, contemporary personal data processing issues require strengthened 
regional instruments, which can then filter down to effective data protection 
legislation at a national level.27A WHO report cites legal frameworks for eHealth as 
fundamental to the ‘effective use of and patient trust in eHealth’.28 These frameworks 
for data protection and security regarding the collection and use (and reuse) of patient 
data are understood to ‘create legal clarity and certainty’ in the medical relationship.29 
Caution should be exercised, however, as such frameworks ‘must adapt to current 
needs in order to work efficiently and continue to evolve as their use by technology 
and society evolves’.30  
A WHO report suggested that those working in health technologies within a 
specific community ‘would be best positioned to understand specific regional or 
national clinical approaches, legal frameworks, and cultural approaches to health 
services delivery’, while greater collaboration with international institutions31 would 
ensure that ‘innovative ideas and practices brought from outside the local context 
could be introduced and integrated with local support’.32 Thus the benefit of both 
approaches may be harnessed. 
                                               
25 For instance, the ECOWAS Supplementary Act on Personal Data Protection of 2010, the EAC Legal 
Framework for Cyber Laws 2008/2011 and the SADC Data Protection Model-Law 2012.  
26 P Samuelson ‘Five Challenges for Regulating the Global Information Society’ at 13.  
27 Ibid. 
28 WHO ‘From innovation to implementation: eHealth in the WHO European Region’ (2016) at 77. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid. 
31  International agencies, such as mHealth Alliance, are in the process of developing globally 
recognised standards and metrics that are relevant, for instance, in the storage and transmission of 
electronic health records.  
32  WHO ‘mHealth: New horizons for health through mobile technologies’ in the second Global 
Observatory for eHealth Series vol 3 (2011) at 64.  
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(2)  Afro-centric approach: cultural and contextual sensitivity 
Africa’s biggest problem is that there are ‘too many people going around the 
continent with solutions to problems they don’t understand’.33 It is suggested that a 
data protection instrument should reflect the cultural and contextual sensitivities of 
the people it wishes to protect. Principles of health care privacy enshrined in 
international or regional policies should be supported by a ‘local awareness of privacy 
responsibilities’.34 Developing countries ‘have a wide range of social, ethical and 
gender considerations related to medical privacy’. 35  It is essential for eHealth 
practitioners providing eHealth services using personal data in foreign jurisdictions 
not only to be informed about aspects of the domestic law, but also to have a firm 
grasp of the sensitivities, language barriers and culture-specific aspects of the 
particular community in which they practice.36 An understanding of the population’s 
values and sensitivities should be sought. 
An illustration of such a contextual barrier is in the frequent use of shared 
mobile phones. Kaplan explains:  
‘[t]he developed world model of personal ownership of a phone may not be 
appropriate to the developing world in which shared mobile telephone use is 
important. Sharing may be a serious drawback to the use of mobile telephones as a 
healthcare intervention in terms of stigma and privacy’.37 
 To address this, Kaplan adds: 
 
                                               
33 L Timberlake Africa in Crisis: the Causes, the Cures of Environmental Bankruptcy (1985).  
34 Policy Engagement Network for the International Development Research Centre ‘Electronic Health 
Privacy and Security in Developing Countries and Humanitarian Operations’ (2010) LSE at 3.  
35 Ibid.  
36 A Le Roux ‘Telemedicine: A South African legal perspective’ (2008) 1 TSAR 99 at 104 and 105. 
37 My emphasis. WA Kaplan ‘Can the ubiquitous power of mobile phones be used to improve health 
outcomes in developing countries?’ (2006) 2 Globalization and Health at 1. 
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‘[r]egulatory reforms required for proper operation of basic and value-added 
telecommunications services are a priority if mobile telecommunications are to be 
used for healthcare initiatives’.38 
Furthermore, societies have divergent ideas of what is acceptable, aberrant and 
abhorrent. Sensitivities are relative to sociocultural context.39 Social status, status in 
terms of a particular illness, sexuality, mental health, and even diabetes are sensitive 
topics in certain cultures, with potentially adverse ramifications of wrongful 
disclosure. 40  The influence of the extended family, social obligations and values 
cannot be divorced from what is private to an individual in an African society. These 
represent challenges to the understanding of eHealth privacy issues. Cultural values 
also influence the adoption of standardised provisions from one culture to another. A 
report commissioned by the European Commission acknowledges this: 
‘A final difficulty is that of cultural and institutional non-equivalence... Despite the 
growing convergence of international data protection policy, privacy still means 
something very different in various cultural and national traditions, perhaps 
particularly in non-Western jurisdictions but by no means there alone’.41 
An African approach based on a privacy and data protection framework that is 
sensitive to a developing market and shaped by the myriad of compelling health care 
restraints is essential,42 particularly in, for instance, describing notions of ‘privacy’ 
and ‘consent’. To resort simply to transplanting international model laws into African 
data protection legislation is misguided. Regulations should mirror the customary and 
community needs of the people whom they are to benefit. Basu suggests: ‘[t]here can 
                                               
38 Ibid. 
39 WW Lowrance Privacy, Confidentiality and Health Research (2012) at 19. 
40 J McGirk ‘Religious leaders key in the Middle East’s HIV/AIDS fight’ (2008) 372 (9635) The 
Lancet 279–280 and ‘Electronic Health Privacy and Security in Developing Countries and 
Humanitarian Operations’ A report prepared by the Policy Engagement Network for the International 
Development Research Centre (2010) at 15.  
41 CD Raab, CJ Bennett, RM Gellman and N Waters ‘European Commission Tender No XV/97/18/D: 
Application of a Methodology Designed to Assess the Adequacy of the Level of Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data’ (1998) European Commission at 202.  
42 A Seppala, P Nykanen and P Ruotsalainen ‘Privacy-Related Context Information for Ubiquitous 
Health’ (2014) 2 (1) JMIR Mhealth and Uhealth at e12 where ‘[c]ontext-sensitive privacy policies are 
needed to regulate information’. 
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never be a purely legislative solution to privacy, neither can there be a “model” 
legislative framework as socioeconomic issues are unique to countries and have to be 
considered in their own right for alleviating concerns over privacy’.43 
Despite this, the urge exists to adopt readily developed regulatory solutions. 
Much may be learnt from other countries’ experiences, particularly where policies 
developed in one country are emulated by others and then disseminated worldwide. 
Policymakers learn from both the positive and negative experiences of their 
counterparts elsewhere, permitting improved and more efficient decision making and 
thus enabling them to resolve their policy-making dilemmas better.44 This can be 
helpful within an African context so long as the cultural traditions and sensitivities 
particular to the region are accommodated. 
Sir Tim Berners-Lee advocates that principles of privacy, free speech and 
responsible anonymity be explored in a ‘digital bill of rights for the web’, which 
would be aimed at protecting and enshrining the independence of the Internet and the 
rights of its users worldwide. He continues that ‘[w]hile regional regulation and 
cultural sensitivities would vary’, he believes that ‘a shared document of principle 
could provide an international standard for the values of the open web’.45 
Additionally, engagement in collaboration with international data protection 
agencies is a worthwhile endeavour. This offers an opening up of synergy between 
international, regional, and local regulators, health administrators, health 
professionals, academic institutions and communities. By doing so, it is expected that 
eHealth may find its recognised place within the current health care sector. Marsden 
proposes that ‘…co-regulation is becoming the defining feature of Internet regulation 
in Europe. It may prove the most appropriate model to respond to other dynamic 
technologically led and globalized fields of regulatory activity…’.46  
In fact, the development of policy provisions appropriate within the African 
region may potentially inform other international jurisdictions. An example of 
synergy between international and domestic regulatory reform processes is illustrated 
                                               
43 S Basu ‘Policy-Making Technology and Privacy in India’ (2010) 6 The Indian Journal of Law and 
Technology 65–88 at 86. 
44 R Rose ‘What is lesson-drawing’ (1991) 11 Journal of Public Policy 4. 
45 My emphasis. ‘An online Magna Carta: Berners-Lee calls for bill of rights for web’ The Guardian.  
46 CT Marsden ‘Internet Co-Regulation: European Law, Regulatory Governance and Legitimacy in 
Cyberspace’ (2011) at 242. 
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in Brazil, which has recently provided normative input at an international level in 
relation to Internet governance. Its role clearly demonstrates how ‘domestic reforms 
can provide a framework within which human rights in foreign policy can sit and find 
strength’.47 By raising its credibility, it effectively increased its influence in shaping 
global human rights decisions. 48  The Brazilian framework demonstrates the 
importance of determining a strategy that is driven by the desire to establish realisable 
solutions.  
As stated by Bennet:  
‘[i]n the world of privacy protection, no government is an island. Decisions made 
anywhere in the world about system architecture, about standards, about international 
regulatory rules constrain, and will continue to constrain, how governments can and 
cannot process personal information to achieve programmatic goals’. 49 
Inclusion in an emerging and economically beneficial global privacy 
framework and the introduction of international standards, by drawing on lessons 
afforded by existing international protection of eHealth privacy policymaking, is 
significant. 50  The possibility of attaining regulatory alignment may be found in 
‘policy interoperability’. The concept of ‘policy interoperability’ is helpful in 
preserving the uniqueness of a country’s social values within a legal framework. The 
concept presupposes that nations agree on the broad objectives of a policy, while 
acknowledging that different regulatory means may be implemented to achieve these 
goals. The wider purpose of the regulation is accepted rather than the specific details 
of its implementation. The idea is thus to avoid the threat that incompatible regulatory 
regimes may derail the benefit of convergence and globalisation.51  
                                               
47 Brazil’s constitution of the Internet, known as the Marco Civil, establishes principles, rights and 
obligations of the parties to the Internet in Brazil. The Marco Civil was premised by the realisation that 
Brazilian people rejected a criminal framework for Internet governance in favour of a civil one. Of 
significance is that the framework evolved out of the needs of the population, as rooted in a 
contemporary, digital society. See A Gwagwa ‘Internet Governance lessons Africa can learn from 
Brazil’s success story’. 
48 Ibid. 
49 CJ Bennett ‘What Government Should Know about Privacy: A Foundation Paper’ (2001) Paper 
prepared for the Information Technology Executive Leadership Council’s Privacy Conference at 29. 
50 Rose (n 44) at 3. 
51 Samuelson (n 26) at 13. 
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The paradox is that the need for a more global approach emphasises the need 
for a new form of local approach. Common interests at a global level in turn feed into 
the formation of regulations in a ‘glocal’ way, that is, in the creation of eHealth 
privacy policy that is ‘tailored to the specific needs of a given locality and 
population’, albeit with due consideration of global implications and influences. This 
provides the opportunity for the cultural uniqueness of a region to be acknowledged, 
whilst supporting a broader, common purpose. 
Thus, rather than slavishly following the ever increasing push for more robust 
protection endorsed by developed countries, together with the resistance to adopting a 
‘one-size-fits-all approach’ to privacy and data protection, 52  an uniquely African 
approach may be facilitated. For instance, the ‘adequacy requirements’ should be 
incorporated in a way that is both practical and functional in execution, and which 
emulates the essence of its inclusion. It should not merely be a means of appeasing the 
EU and expediting EU accreditation.53 
(3)  Rethinking the notion of ‘consent’ 
An obstacle in the digitalised environment of the developing world is that of obtaining 
consent. It necessitates marrying the developing world (which is often illiterate) with 
the more developed and digitised world (which is highly literate). In determining 
consent in an environment that is both ‘developing’ and ‘digital’, the following 
questions remain unresolved. 
Central to the enquiry regarding consent is, firstly, whether all personal data 
ought to be treated the same, or whether there is any justification in treating certain 
categories of sensitive personal data with greater compliance obligations. If certain 
categories of data require heightened protection, the definitions of such data and the 
concomitant compliance obligations require clarification. The nature of the consent 
and purpose for which consent is being sought require clarity. In what form should 
such consent be expressed? Should consent then be ‘specific’, ‘informed’ and ‘in 
                                               
52 N Friederici, C Hullin & M Yamamichi ‘Chapter 3: mHealth’ in T Kelly (ed) Information and 
Communications for Development 2012: Maximizing Mobile (2012) at 53.  
53  See AB Makulilo ‘Data Protection Regimes in Africa: Too far from the European “adequacy” 
standard?’ (2013) 3 (1) International Data Privacy Law at 42–50. 
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writing’? However, can ‘consent’ be obtained a range of valid consent models, which 
exist on a continuum from the very stringent to the more lenient? 
Secondly, in communities with significant rates of illiteracy, what alternatives 
can be found to guarantee effective consent? Can valid consent be obtained while 
avoiding unnecessary barriers to eHealth provision?  
Lastly, how are the practical difficulties that hinder the effectiveness of 
consent as a mechanism for safeguarding online data protection rights to be 
addressed? How can consent be obtained through electronic processes, and are data 
messages, e-consent and electronic transactions valid methods of obtaining consent? 
 
(i)  ‘Consent’ in the Convention 
The notion of ‘consent’ is problematic. ‘Consent by a data subject’ is defined in 
Article 1 of the Convention as ‘any manifestation of express, unequivocal, free, 
specific and informed will by which the data subject or his/her legal, judicial or treaty 
representative accepts that his/her personal data be subjected to manual or electronic 
processing’. Article 14 (2)(b) requires ‘written consent, by any means’, which 
includes the requirement for consent to be in writing where sensitive data is 
processed. What is meant by ‘by any means’ is unclear. The inclusion of the words 
‘by any means’ in the Convention alludes to the validity of the written equivalence in 
electronic form, as contemplated in Section II Article 6.54 While this suggests that 
consent is sufficiently granted when manifested in any form, that is, verbally, on 
paper or electronically, the specific requirement of ‘written consent’ in respect of 
Article 14 indicates that a more onerous and strengthened indication of consent is 
required in cases of ’sensitive data’ processing. For consent to be valid, therefore, it 
must satisfy the cumulative criteria of being specific, informed, freely given, and 
unambiguous. In certain instances, consent must also be in writing. 
EU law attaches weight to user consent.55 The European approach to consent 
is worthy of consideration, as EU data protection reforms have consciously sought to 
                                               
54 Writing in electronic form and functional equivalence is discussed hereunder.  
55 E Carolan ‘The continuing problems with online consent under the EU’s emerging data protection 
principles’ (2013) 32 Computer Law & Security Review 462–473 at 462.  
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deal with the issue of online consent.56 EU jurisprudence identifies three models of 
user consent: presumed consent; informed consent; and active consent.57 The active 
consent model is an attempt to address the empirical realities associated with the 
presumed and informed consent models.58 The introduction of newer forms of consent 
is an effort to cast consent as a ‘reliable proxy for user privacy preferences online’.59  
In comparison to the definition of ‘consent’ that is envisaged by the EU 
Regulation, however, the Convention falls short. While the Recitals to the EU 
Regulation include that consent is not freely given in instances where the data subject 
has no genuine and free choice, or where they are unable to withdraw or refuse 
consent without detriment, no such provision is included in the Convention. The 
Convention also fails to address the difficulties of providing consent in a developing 
world context, and the issue of consent specifically for eHealth data protection 
remains unresolved.60 Consent is not explored in any detail in the Convention, save to 
say it should be ‘express, unequivocal, free, specific and informed’. A significant 
failure of the Convention is the adoption of a consent-based approach constructed on 
the traditional doctrine, which takes no account of the changing context of online 
interactions, particularly those in the developing world. 61  Unfortunately, the 
opportunity to enhance the efficacy of the consent requirement in a uniquely 
technological environment is not fully developed in the Convention.  
 
                                               
56 Ibid at 463.  
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. Proposed by the Article 29 Working Party and favoured in the EU Regulation.  
59  Ibid at 463. Consent under the EU Regulation is ‘any freely given, specific, informed and 
unambiguous indication of his or her wishes by which the data subject, either by a statement or by a 
clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to personal data relating to them being processed.’ See P 
de Hert and V Papakonstantinou ‘The new General Data Protection Regulation: Still a sound system 
for the protection of individuals?’ (2016) 32 Computer Law & Security Review 179–194 at 187.  
60 See CL Jack and M Mars ‘Informed consent for telemedicine in South Africa: A survey of consent 
practices among healthcare professionals in Durban, KwaZulu-Natal’ (2013) 6 (2) South African 
Journal of Bioethics and Law 55–59.  
61 Carolan (n 55) at 463, where a similar criticism is made of the EU Regulation. 
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(ii)  Nature of consent 
In modern forms of political democracy, those governed have the ‘right to consent’. 
The core of democracy is the engineering of consent. Informed consent is a widely 
accepted legal, ethical, and regulatory requirement for most health care transactions.62 
Additionally, consent is a requirement for the lawful processing of a person’s data. 
Consent underpins the ethical principles of respect for persons and individual 
autonomy.63 Respect for autonomy and self-determination diminishes in instances of 
limited consent.64 Besides autonomy, Otlowski lists ‘respect and protection as the 
primary ethical principles underpinning consent’.65 Consent can cause the imposition 
of new obligations, or the release from existing obligations. 66  Consent is the 
justification for allowing certain behaviour or action. With the necessary consent, 
certain previously unauthorised action is sanctioned. In the UK case of Chester v 
Afshar, Lord Steyn underlined the reason, from a legal perspective, why informed 
consent matters: ‘in the context of attributing legal responsibility, it is necessary to 
identify precisely the protected legal interests at stake’. 67  Consent, thus, is a 
distinctive method of communicative transaction, which is used to waive ethical and 
legal requirements in specific ways. 68  It demonstrates a specific and uninhibited 
approval, acceptance and/or affirmation to engage in or waive prohibitions on actions, 
which may otherwise be intrusive.69 
                                               
62  N Chomsky Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order (2011) at 43. See C Grady 
‘Enduring and Emerging Challenges of Informed Consent’ (2015) 372 New Engl J Med 855–862. 
63 OECD ‘Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder of Personal Data’ (1980). 
64 K Sørensen, B Schuh, G Stapleton and P Schröder-Bäck ‘Exploring the ethical scope of: a critical 
literature review’ (2013) 2 Albanian Med Journal 71–83. 
65 MFA Otlowski ‘Tackling legal challenges posed by population biobanks: Reconceptualising consent 
requirements’ (2012) 20 Med Law Rev 191–226. 
66 SD Pattinson ‘Consent and informational responsibility’ (2009) 35 J Med Ethics 176–179. 
67 Ibid. 
68 NC Manson & O O’Neill ‘Chapter 5: Informational privacy and data protection’ in Rethinking 
Informed Consent in Bioethics (2007) 97–129. 
69 Ibid and see too L Curren and J Kaye ‘Revoking consent: A blind spot in data protection law?’ 
(2010) 26 Computer Law & Security Review 273–283 at 274. 
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Applying a traditional legal approach to consent in an online environment is 
challenging, however.70 Pachter et al. advocate the introduction of the practice of 
health care that respects ethnic and cultural values. The question worth asking is 
whether, in a pluralistic society like, for instance, South Africa, and considering the 
impact of language and culture on eHealth initiatives together with the use of complex 
technological terminology, the notion of informed consent is adequately addressed.71  
 
(iii)  Feasibility of obtaining consent in developing countries 
The feasibility of obtaining informed, written consent within developing countries is 
controversial. 72  Can the stringent concept of consent currently advocated in the 
Convention achieve the objective of attaining legitimate consent? Various authors 
question the appropriateness of obtaining individual informed consent in non-Western 
cultures.73 The application of standardised consent models to various and differing 
cultural and social settings is certainly a challenge.74  
Broadly speaking, the appropriateness of informed consent in developing 
countries turns on two arguments. The first is that individually based consent is 
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73  See MP Preziosi, A Yam, M Ndiaye, A Simaga, F Simondon and SGF Wassilak ‘Practical 
experiences in obtaining informed consent for a vaccine trial in rural Africa’ (1997) 336.5 The New 
England Journal of Medicine 370–373. See also CB IJsselmuiden and RR Faden ‘Research and 
Informed Consent in Africa: Another Look’ (1992) 326 The New England Journal of Medicine 830–
834; M Barry ‘Ethical considerations of human investigation in developing countries: The AIDS 
dilemma’ (1988) 319 The New England Journal of Medicine 1083–1086 and EO Ekunwe and R Kessel 
‘Informed consent in the developing world’ (1984) 14 (3) Hastings Cent Rep 22–24. 
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‘culturally or anthropologically inappropriate’. 75  As elucidated in research on a 
HIV/Aids trial drug in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire)76, the 
Western principle of informed consent, as set out in the Belmont report, is ‘predicated 
upon the notions of respect for persons as individuals and as autonomous agents’.77 
This is at variance with the notion of personhood understood in African societies, 
which emphasises the embeddedness and integration of the individual within their 
community, where individuals define themselves largely in relation to others. 
Viewing oneself as a part of a greater whole thus effectively transfers the consent 
process from the individual to the family or to the larger community.78 The findings 
suggest that many community members consent solely on the grounds of established 
trust and because of the associated benefits, which accrue to individuals and 
community members. A complete comprehension of the disclosed information is not 
their immediate priority. Community members who feel that a project’s risk/benefit 
ratio is unacceptable, will usually refuse verbally, while others may adopt strategies of 
avoidance, like passive non-compliance, which are more creative.79 
The second argument against the appropriateness of informed consent in 
developing countries is the inability of subjects to appreciate fully that to which they 
are consenting. 80  This is brought about largely by the complications in 
communication. Lack of understanding of technical or medical processes can 
compromise valid consent.81 Moreover, language barriers and the poor literary levels 
of users may hinder the attainment of a desired specific outcome. Consent requiring 
the signing of informed consent documents containing medical, legal or technical 
                                               
75 Ibid, where it is stated that ‘it is argued that insistence on first-person informed consent in group-
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76 NA Christakis ‘The ethical design of and AIDS vaccine trial in Africa’ (1988) The Hastings Center 
Report at 31. 
77 Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences and the WHO Proposed International 
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (1982) at 32.  
78 JM Janzen The Quest for Therapy in Lower Zaire (1978) at 169 and 189. 
79 Ibid. 
80 See G Joubert, H Steinberg, E van der Ryst and P Chikobvu ‘Consent for Participation in the 
Bloemfontein Vitamin A Trial: How Informed and Voluntary?’ (2003) 93 (4) American Journal of 
Public Health at 582–584. 
81 C Jack, Y Singh, B Hlombe and M Mars ‘Language, cultural brokerage and informed consent – will 
technological terms impede telemedicine use?’ (2014) 7 (1) South African J BL at 16. 
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terminology risks being misunderstood in illiterate or semi-literate populations. 82 
Obtaining valid informed consent is thus unlikely.83 A Ghanaian study concluded that 
research and discussion on improved consent procedures were urgently needed, 
particularly in communities where subjects had little education.84 The study found that 
education is one of the factors most consistently associated with an understanding of 
what the trial entailed and that consent appeared to be inadequate for ensuring 
comprehension amongst those less well educated.85  
Further research concluded in Kenya illustrated a range of inter-related issues 
worthy of reflection. These issues included conceptual and linguistic barriers to 
communicating effectively about research, the critical and complex role of 
communicators (fieldworkers and nurses) in consent procedures, features of research 
unit-community relations that affect these processes, and the special sensitivity of 
certain issues such as blood sampling.86  
Likewise, the inadequacy of users’ health knowledge or technological literacy 
presents an obstacle in acquiring the requisite consent. 87  Users are often poor, 
illiterate, unfamiliar with the conduct of medical research or specific treatment, and 
have various opinions on disease causality.88 These difficulties undermine the consent 
required for the processing of their data. Where consent is focused only on the choice 
rather than on the circumstances under which the choice was made, it presents 
obvious flaws as a determination of individual autonomy.89 Clearly, how to reconcile 
the appropriateness of consent within these contexts requires rethinking.90  
                                               
82 Christakis (n 76) at 31. 
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85 Ibid at 52. 
86 My emphasis. See CS Molyneux, N Pershu and K Marsh ‘Understanding of informed consent in a 
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(iv)  Rethinking consent  
A tension exists between the theoretical prerequisite for consent and the practicality in 
securing it. Debates with regard to the manner of obtaining valid consent follow a 
range of possible outcomes. The dichotomy between the very stringent consent 
methods, on the one hand, which require particular stipulation as to what the nature of 
the consent should look like, and the more lenient approach, which is a loosely 
defined notion of obtaining consent, on the other, together with the numerous 
permutations along a spectrum combining the two approaches is evident. 
Additionally, a tiered approach may be implemented, which ranges from the use of 
specific, stricter consent in certain circumstances, to the use of a broader, extended 
consent model in other contexts.  
In rethinking the concept of consent and its application, certain questions 
arise. Should high expectations of obtaining consent be reduced and should we 
approve of a ‘different’ standard for developing countries? If so, what would that 
mean for the notion of consent and the validity thereof? How do we go about meeting 
expectations securely? Accordingly, in seeking and providing limited forms of 
consent, can they of themselves afford sufficient ethical justification? Could consent 
requirements vary according to a particular country or region, or across different 
communities within a country? Do all African jurisdictions have to adhere to the same 
consent rules? And finally, can consent given electronically be valid?  
Since consent functions by waiving normative values in a particular way and 
with regard to a particular purpose, it should be understood against a broader 
background of norms and standards, both ethical and otherwise. Ethical issues 
embracing the concept of informed consent frequently present in subtle forms.91  
‘Consent’ talks to us in various ways and takes a myriad of forms. Consent as 
a means of legitimation in the traditional sense gives rise to a formalistic system of 
privacy regulation. No perfect solution is clear, with distortions and special 
accommodations pointing in different directions. Are we to despair or can the 
situation be rescued? The range of possibilities extends from a basic acceptance, 
offering less protection, to a comprehensive consent model that offers more 
protection. Within these two extremes, a variety of standards of consent options is 
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found, some of which are more appropriate to a given situation than others. 
Aspirations and realities do not always easily meet the proposition of high standards 
of consent. ‘Pragmatic’ considerations should influence the implementation of 
standards of consent, bearing in mind that consent is the pivotal issue around which 
the justification for the infringement of the individual’s rights hinges.  
On the one hand, the danger in accepting a more limited version of consent is 
the inherent risk in offering justifications that ‘are less than convincing’, and pegging 
standards that ‘are less than feasible’.92 On the other hand, however, insisting on the 
implementation of unobtainably high standards, in the full knowledge that practice 
and standards diverge, is to acknowledge that proper consent is not being validly or 
sufficiently obtained in any event.93 Although high expectations are needed, what is 
required practically is a way of reliably acceding to that bar. Ultimately, rules, 
techniques and methods regarding consent should describe a process of explanations 
and achievements, presenting an awareness of a reality reflecting imperfections and 
incompatibilities. A traditional consent-based approach, when applied to an online 
environment within the context of a developing country, is flawed. A consent model 
that addresses contextual and empirical issues is thus sought, where it is understood 
that consent givers are subject to a variety of specific situational influences that 
intuitively impel the giving of consent.94  
Unfortunately, few practical guidelines on how best to inform users are 
available, particularly in less developed countries.95 Practically, consent functions as a 
‘weak and poorly-correlated proxy for individual autonomy’.96 Consent cannot always 
be obtained in a format that adheres to the very strict parameters set down for its 
attainment.97 Thus, often consent is either not given at all, or where it is given, it fails 
on procedural and legal grounds and, in any event, is invalid. This is confirmed in a 
research study conducted in South Africa in 2005, which concluded that informed 
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consent in disadvantaged communities may often be ‘inadequate’; the study 
advocated that new ways to ‘improve understanding’ should be explored. 98 
Confirmation of this is also to be found in research by Jack and Mars, who conclude 
in a survey of consent practices in South Africa that written informed consent is ‘not 
routinely obtained from patients during clinical examination or when using ICT for 
the transfer of patient information’.99  
Failures are exacerbated rather than remedied by imposing increasingly higher 
and supposedly better standards of consent. 100  South African law, for instance, 
represents the strictest point on the spectrum of consent models. The excessive 
pursuance of driving impractical conceptions of consent, such as ‘informed, written 
consent’, ‘fully explicit’ or ‘fully specific’ consent, particularly within 
technologically, developing countries, is troublesome. As suggested in Manson and 
O’Neill, ‘invoking implausible or underground conceptions of individual autonomy or 
of informational privacy’ cannot ease difficulties. 101  The evidence gathered from 
research conducted by Whitley and Kanellopoulou indicates that informed consent 
rarely operates satisfactorily in online interactions, as it is unlikely to be ‘truly 
informed and freely given’.102   
Critically, ethical and legal thinking with regard to the integration of informed 
consent within emerging health information technologies predominantly concerns 
privacy and security.103 Informed consent is intrinsically linked to confidentiality.104 
A move to an implied consent model, as proposed by Mars and Jack,105 may be of 
some benefit, especially in the practice of synchronous telemedicine; this, however, is 
not canvassed in the Malabo Convention. Of interest is the case made internationally 
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for the incorporation of ‘dynamic consent’, which combines both technical and policy 
flexibility.106  
Mars and Jack suggest that the imposition of written informed consent by 
regulators in countries with low literacy levels will be unduly ‘onerous’ and that it 
will have the undesirable effect of hampering telemedicine and eHealth usage, rather 
than enabling it. In an age where data is shared digitally on a worldwide scale, 
traditional systems of informed consent are static, paper-based and largely organised 
around national borders and domestic legal frameworks.  
Finally, four points emerge: firstly, obtaining consent from an individual 
cannot always be regarded as an accurate articulation of the individual’s choice; 
secondly, a consent-based approach is, at best, incomplete; thirdly, a specific 
difficulty exists when applying consent in an online environment; and lastly, there is 
an additional difficulty with the obtaining of consent in developing countries.107 From 
this, the obvious question arises in conclusion: what might be an alternative approach 
to obtaining consent in an online eHealth environment in developing countries?  
The following is clear: in practice, neither information nor greater action 
reliably signify the presence of true and valid consent. Moreover, insisting on 
increasingly rigorous evidential markers and standards of attaining consent proves 
insufficient in an online health care environment in the developing world. 
Consequently, the law should avoid any reliance on measures that assume all users are 
comparable rational optimisers of their online privacy. Instead, a more flexible 
approach, which is situationally and contextually appropriate, is warranted to obtain 
optimal and worthy consent. These mechanisms could take the form of the strategic 
use of default privacy settings and various ‘choice architectures’, thus encouraging 
users to engage in various understandable decision making. For individuals to make 
choices, one should consider the social contexts, the relations that inform the volume 
and nature of the information disclosed, as well as the timing, manner and impact of 
the decisions made.108 Where it is to be said that an individual has granted ‘implicit 
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consent’ to disclosure, the safety mechanism should place the onus on the responsible 
party to prove that the individual has made a positive decision in the circumstances. 
Lastly, the implementation of a culture- and behaviour-centric approach to consent, 
which is sensitive to the context within which it is granted, requires, as a prerequisite, 
greater clarification of the position and boundaries relating to online privacy than has 
previously existed.  
 
(vi)  The validity of eConsent and electronic transactions 
Obtaining valid consent by using electronic processes should be established. Are data 
messages, e-consent and electronic transactions valid? ‘Consent of a data subject’ is 
defined in the Malabo Convention as meaning ‘…any manifestation of express, 
unequivocal, free, specific and free will…’109  
The EU Regulation defines consent as ‘any freely given, specific, informed 
and unambiguous indication of his or her wishes by which the data subject, either by a 
statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to personal data 
relating to them being processed’.110 In terms of the EU Regulation, consent can thus 
be an oral or written statement, and may take electronic form. Recital 25, however, 
provides that pre-ticked boxes on a website, silence or inactivity on the part of the 
user do not constitute valid consent. 
A defining characteristic of eHealth applications is that they are carried out at 
a distance, where the provider and the user are for the most part in different locations. 
Noticeably, then, a contractual relationship in eHealth may be conducted partially or 
wholly electronically in an online environment. Consequently, difficulties that do not 
arise in traditional paper-based contractual arrangements or where services are 
provided personally may well develop. Issues pertaining to, for instance, the validity 
and enforceability of electronic transactions, contracting online and providing consent 
electronically as well as the admissibility of, for instance, consent documents, may 
become problematic. 
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The UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce adopts the principles of non-
discrimination, technological neutrality and functional equivalence. The principle of 
non-discrimination provides that any document would not be denied legal effect, 
validity or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form. The principle of 
technological neutrality enforces provisions that are neutral with regard to the 
technology used, and functional equivalence establishes the criteria under which 
electronic documents may be considered equivalent to paper-based documents. The 
UNCITRAL Model Law on E-Commerce has been largely influential in the drafting 
of the provisions of many of the e-legislations found in Africa.111  
Where there is a requirement that consent be ‘in writing’, it is expected that 
Article 6 of the Malabo Convention may provide some relief to eHealth practitioners, 
where data messages are recognised as the functional equivalence of written ones and 
as having the same legal value as a message written on paper.112  
(4)  Data mobility and data transfer between states 113 
The elements to be determined are threefold. Firstly, how do African standards 
coincide with international privacy standards, so that exchanges outside of the 
continent may be efficiently expedited? Secondly, how are standards within the 
African continent constructed, so that an equivalent level of protection is available to 
all member states wishing to permit the free flow of data across borders? And thirdly, 
how are these measures to be implemented? 
The debate surrounding the creation of eHealth data regulation transcends 
geographical or organisational boundaries. Issues around inter alia privacy and data 
security across borders are essential components of the very nature of eHealth 
applications and are cited as requiring a transnational approach in order to find 
workable solutions.114 
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eHealth involves the application of law to a borderless technology that moves 
fluidly between countries and across state borders. 115  With the establishment of 
designated ‘centres of excellence’, this becomes even more apparent. Data mobility 
inhibits the ability of any solitary nation to enforce its data protection laws effectively, 
as the application and enforcement of national law cannot extend beyond its borders. 
This is primarily a reactionary response to the nature of data and its inherent ability to 
flow freely across boundaries.  
Additionally, an inherent component of the practice of eHealth applications is 
the vast accumulation of personal data, and therefore the need to manage and store 
this. While considerations of public and private international law, as they relate to 
eHealth, are useful in that they inform privacy law developments, specific unifying 
public and private global eHealth privacy laws governing inter-jurisdictional data 
exchanges do not exist. 116  Instead, principles drawing on a combination of laws 
affecting trade, telecommunications and, to a more limited extent, health care, not all 
of which are appropriate or relevant, are relied upon.117 Adopting standardised data 
exchange and ‘adequacy’ requirements, model contract clauses, and establishing local 
protection authorities may achieve data exchange compliance regulation. 
 
(i) Data havens  
‘Data havens’ are jurisdictions with no or limited data protection laws, to which 
personal data can be transferred, for the purpose of circumventing the national laws of 
the country of origin of the data. The establishment of ‘data havens’ undermines 
national data protection laws by allowing the storage and management of data in a 
manner that may be otherwise unlawful, or subject to restrictions, in countries 
elsewhere.  
The OECD has acknowledged the threat inherent in such ‘data havens’. While 
preventing them from arising, the intention is simultaneously to enable the free and 
secure flow of data across national boundaries.  
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To obviate the creation of ‘data havens’, it is necessary for different countries 
to provide an equivalent level of data protection, thereby ensuring that information 
can be passed between them unrestricted and under the same rules of storage and 
passage. The thinking is that, where a consensual and standardised approach to data 
processing and data exchange is adopted between countries, the benefit of 
‘opportunistic data havens’ will be removed. The cross-border dimension of eHealth 
requires stronger support for ‘regulatory convergence’ in this field and the exchange 
of ‘good practice internationally’.118  
 
(ii)  Adequacy requirements 
In an attempt to persuade other jurisdictions to adopt comparable personal data 
protection measures, certain regimes, such as the EU, have implemented reciprocity-
based rules. The intention is to curtail transnational data flows into and out of nations, 
which the EU considers not to provide ‘adequate’ protection of personal data.119   
Such reciprocity-based measures are a means to achieve harmonisation 
between nations exchanging personal data. With regard to the EU requirements, the 
provisions are contained in Chapter V of the EU Regulation. The Regulation sets out 
the new framework for data transfers and is a significant driver of the emerging global 
data protection regime. The EU Regulation, like its predecessor, the EU Directive, 
provides that the transfer of personal data to third countries, that is, to non-European 
Union member states (which would include African countries) can only occur, where 
such country can guarantee an ‘adequate’ level of data protection. Thus, countries that 
wish to engage in data transactions and exchanges with EU member states are 
required to provide an ‘adequate’ level of data protection.120  
Understandably, this has enormous influence and implications for eHealth 
initiatives in African nations that wish to engage in data transactions with the EU. To 
date, all African countries fall short of these ‘adequacy’ standards. Does this position 
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perhaps illustrate a key example of a failure to exhibit a sensitivity to an African 
context? Is there a need for a lower standard or a ‘different’ set of standards that is 
more accommodating of African countries?  
In circumstances where countries do not comply with the ‘adequacy’ 
requirement, additional enquiries are made into whether legal grounds for transfer 
may apply, such as, whether transfers use the appropriate EU Commission approved 
model transfer terms.121 For the purposes of Article 45 of the EU Regulation, standard 
data contractual clauses (known as model contract clauses) may be adopted by a 
supervisory authority and recognised by the European Commission as offering 
adequate safeguards. The European Commission has developed four sets of approved 
model contracting clauses.122 Use of the model clauses, whether as an independent 
contract or whether incorporated into other contracts, where the wording is altered 
(despite the meaning or effect of the changed clause remaining the same), will 
disqualify the use of the clauses, as authorised by the Information Commissioner, 
from constituting adequate safeguards.123 The use of model contract clauses, given 
that the Commission has determined that such clauses offer adequate safeguards, will 
be safe from challenge regarding the effectiveness of the protection offered. 124 
Additionally, Article 45 describes the conditions under which transfers grounded on 
binding corporate rules, and based on current practices and on the requirements of 
supervisory authorities are permitted.125  
 
(iii)  Safe harbour agreements 
A possible solution to difficulties with data transference lies in the establishment of 
safe harbour agreements between nations. While data export is allowed between 
countries within the European Economic Area, and those approved as adequately 
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compliant, countries could until recently exchange data with the EU in terms of 
principles set out in a ‘safe harbour’ agreement.126 Certain ‘safe harbour’ agreements, 
such as that between the US and the EU, have recently been the subject of attack, 
however.127 In 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union held, in Maximillian 
Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner and Digital Rights Ireland Limited,128 that 
the transfer of data of European subjects, in this case Facebook subscribers, to the 
United States was to be suspended on the grounds that the US did not afford an 
adequate level of protection of personal data within the meaning of Article 25 of the 
Data Protection Directive. Significantly, the Court of Justice declared that the 
Commission Decision 2000/520/EC129 on the EU-US safe harbour framework was 
invalid.130 The Court of Justice moreover affirmed that the threshold for the adequacy 
assessment is ‘essential equivalence’ and demanded a strict assessment against this 
high standard. The outcome of this judgment is that it renounces both EU data 
controllers’ and US recipients’ reliance on the ‘safe harbour’ agreement in an attempt 
to legitimise their data transfers. This places them in an immediately precarious 
position.131  
To introduce safe harbour agreements in this way within Africa would, by all 
accounts, require that such agreements and their provisions be assessed as to whether 
they are indeed the ‘essential equivalence’ of the standards set out in the ‘adequacy 
requirements’. If such provisions do not afford an adequate level of protection, as set 
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out in the African regional instrument, such safe harbour agreements could also risk 
being set aside and data transfer suspended. 
 
(iv)  Privacy Shields 
In response to the EU Court of Justice ruling of 6 October 2015 in Schrems, the 
European jurisprudence on fundamental rights,132 the letter of the Working Party to 
the European Commission on Safe Harbour of 10 April 2014 and the Working Party’s 
Working Document on transfers of personal data to third countries,133 in February 
2016, the European Commission and the US Department of Commerce announced 
that a new framework for transatlantic data flows, the EU-US Privacy Shield, was to 
replace the safe harbour arrangement.134  
The Privacy Shield imposes stronger obligations on US organisations who 
seek to process Europeans’ personal data and requires that monitoring, oversight and 
enforcement mechanisms be established that are more robust. 135  Additionally, it 
tightens the conditions under which data can be transferred onwards to third parties.136  
To this end, and in recognition of the shared goal of the US and the EU of 
enhancing privacy protection and to provide US organisations with a reliable 
mechanism for personal data transfers to the US from the EU, the US Department of 
Commerce issued a list of Privacy Shield Principles, including certain Supplemental 
Principles, it terms of its statutory authority to ‘foster, promote, and develop 
international commerce’.137  
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On 30 May 2016 the European Data Protection Supervisor issued an Opinion 
on the EU-US Privacy Shield, calling for a more sustainable solution.138 In the press 
statement Giovanni Buttarelli, the European Data Protection Supervisor, stated: 
‘I appreciate the efforts made to develop a solution to replace Safe Harbour but the 
Privacy Shield as it stands is not robust enough to withstand future legal scrutiny 
before the Court. Significant improvements are needed should the European 
Commission wish to adopt an adequacy decision, to respect the essence of key data 
protection principles with particular regard to necessity, proportionality and redress 
mechanisms. Moreover, it’s time to develop a longer-term solution in the 
transatlantic dialogue.’139  
While the Statement of the Working Party acknowledges certain 
improvements offered by the Privacy Shield compared to that of the safe harbour 
agreement, it nevertheless expresses various concerns and seeks greater clarifications 
in order to ensure that the draft adequacy decision and the protections offered under 
the Privacy Shield are indeed equivalent to those of the EU, and most particularly 
those offered in the EU Regulation.140 Article 45 of the EU Regulation provides new 
conditions for the transfer of data based on an adequacy decision.  
With the EU Regulation becoming fully implementable across the EU in May 
2018, it should be borne in mind that it finds application to all data protection related 
matters, including those involving the transfers of data. In this regard, a review of the 
literary content and substance of the Privacy Shield can only occur, once the EU 
Regulation has become applicable in law in the course of 2018, in order to ensure that 
the higher levels of data protection offered by the EU Regulation are consistent with 
those provided for in the Privacy Shield. 
Despite the Privacy Shield being seen as useful, it has not been without 
criticism. In its current formulation, the Shield is considered not comprehensive 
enough, nor does it include all appropriate safeguards to protect the rights of EU 
                                               
138 European Data Protection Supervisor Press Release EDPS/2016/11 (2016).  
139 Ibid at 1. 
140 Statement of the Article 29 Working Party on the Opinion on the EU-US Privacy Shield (13 April 
2013). See the European Data Protection Supervisor Opinion on the EU-US Privacy Shield draft 
adequacy decision (May 2016) at 2.  
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individuals to privacy and data protection.141 The Shield is also viewed as feeble in its 
provision of judicial redress and oversight mechanisms.142 It is stated that ‘significant 
improvements are needed should the European Commission wish to adopt an 
adequacy decision’.143 
As the Privacy Shield extends to data use and transfer outside the US, the 
Article 29 working party insists that onward transfers from a Privacy Shield party to 
third party country recipients should only be permissible, where such third party 
countries provide an equivalent level of protection pertaining to all matters contained 
in the Privacy Shield (including those of national security), and that such protection 
measures should in no way lower, circumvent or compromise the high standards 
imposed by the EU data protection principles. This has grave implications for Africa. 
(5)  Enforcement and execution 
A less cumbersome approach for member states would be for the Malabo Convention 
explicitly to establish a model legal data protection framework, which states could 
adopt and ratify into their domestic legislation.144 Thus, states would not have to 
initiate the arduous process of developing new laws, or amending existing ones, but 
could rather have the option of expediting the process by simply adopting the model 
law as is, and then ratifying it into their law.145 In the absence of such model law, it 
may take a considerable length of time before African states have developed and 
harmonised their respective data protection laws to the extent necessary to afford 
effective regional cooperation between the members. Additionally, a model law 
would eradicate inconsistencies in terminology and phraseology. As the position 
stands now, it is unlikely that member states’ interpretation and development of 
national laws will be sufficiently uniform in order to facilitate the necessary effective 
regional harmonisation.146 
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143 Ibid. 
144  UJ Orji ‘Examining Missing Cybersecurity Governance Mechanisms in the African Union 




Enforceability of a regional instrument is also problematic. 147  The most 
obvious tension is between the role of a ‘domestic’ court and that of a ‘regional’ or 
‘international’ court. The first question is what the role of the domestic courts should 
be in assisting in the enforcement of what are primarily national laws, and then in the 
enforcement of the provisions of any incorporated international or regional laws. The 
second question is whether there is any justification in establishing a regional or 
international court to complement national judicial systems to attend to such matters, 
in the event of certain conditions being met. The implication seems to be that 
domestic African courts first attempt to enforce international and regional law, failing 
which enforcement in a regional or international court is required.  
However, the establishment of a coercive means to secure and enforce a 
regional African Union law is difficult. Additionally, how such enforcement 
mechanisms would ‘fit’ within existing African Union institutions requires 
consideration.148 These considerations have resonance with the process of institution 
building in Africa. The question posed is, what is the nature of integration demanded 
in the idea of the African Union, and what is, if anything, its role in policy 
enforcement? Is its role that of a supranational institution or merely one of an 
intergovernmental agency? Moreover, reform of the function of the AU court, and 
possibly even the establishment of a new African regional court, should be 
considered. Perhaps the African Court of Justice and Human Rights149, which has the 
objective of complementing and strengthening the protective mandate of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, may provide benefit. 
Effective enforcement centres on the question regarding the site of the 
enforcing authority. Which tier represents the appropriate location of authority for 
enforcement in a matter involving the breach of data protection provisions? The 
doctrine of subsidiarity is relevant in this regard. This principle seeks to safeguard the 
ability of member states to take decisions and act accordingly. It authorises 
intervention by the regional institution only when the objectives of an action cannot 
                                               
147 C Heyns and F Viljoen ‘An Overview of International Human Rights Protection in Africa’ (1999) 
15 South African Journal on Human Rights at 421–445. 
148 Maluwa (n 12) at 157. 
149 The OAU adopted the protocol to the African Charter establishing the African Court in Burkina 
Faso on 10 June 1998. 
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be sufficiently achieved by the national states themselves, or when they can be better 
achieved at a regional level. This presupposes the making and implementing of 
decisions at the lowest level of the institutional scale as possible.150 The purpose of 
subsidiarity is to sustain a degree of independence for lower authorities in relation to 
higher regulatory bodies. In other words, national government should not take action, 
if provincial government can do so, and provincial government should not take action, 
if municipal government will suffice. This thus favours the allocation of power 
between numerous tiers of authority. Pragmatically, the concept of subsidiarity 
legitimises the extension and constraint of authority by connecting governance to 
particular competencies within a tiered system. Although not explicitly promoted, the 
principle of subsidiarity has been applied in Africa.151 
When applied in the context of enforcement, the principle of subsidiarity 
serves to limit regional intervention, when a matter can best be addressed by states 
themselves at a domestic national level. Only if national states are unable to achieve 
the objectives of a proposed action satisfactorily, or if additional value can be 
provided, where an action is carried out at a regional level, is intervention by the 
regional institutions appropriate. This encourages decisions to be made as far down 
the institutional chain as possible. International courts or tribunals should thus not be 
involved in decisions, where regional courts are competent decision makers and 
enforcers. Likewise, if domestic courts can perform regulatory enforcement 
satisfactorily, this should be promoted. Such reinforcement may prove to be a more 
realistic option. Strengthening regional and sub-regional decision-making and 
enforcement mechanisms may enhance international collaboration in supporting data 
protection actions. While there is evidence of greater regional cooperation, applying 
the principle of subsidiarity would presuppose that affected national governments are 
committed to preventing and protecting data processing, and thus to promote the 
enhancement of African intergovernmental capacities.  
 
                                               
150 Article 5(3) and Protocol No. 2 of the Treaty on European Union, Treaty of Maastricht, 7 February 
1992, Official Journal of the European Communities C 325/5 24 December 2002. See D O’Brien ‘The 
search for subsidiarity: The UN, African regional organizations and humanitarian action’ (2000) 7 (3) 
International Peacekeeping 57–83 at 58. 
151 D Helly ‘Africa, the EU and R2P: Towards Pragmatic International Subsidiarity?’ (2009) Journal 
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IV  WHAT FORM SHOULD THIS TAKE? 
What form should such amendments take? The various possibilities are discussed 
below. They include the amendment of the Malabo Convention, a new sui generis 
regional data protection instrument, and a eHealth specific privacy code of conduct.  
(1)  Amendment of the Malabo Convention by means of additional protocols  
A possible solution may lie in strengthening the Malabo Convention, given that the 
Convention has already been effected. Developing an additional protocol or guidance 
notes may thus provide member states with a model legal framework with regard to 
data protection, which could become the standardised foundation from which the 
individual African member states’ data protection legislations can evolve. 
An attempt to formulate and define key unifying and standardised principles 
will not only circumvent confusion, but also carefully avoid the tortuous, protracted 
process of legal and regulatory development within each individual African nation. It 
is suggested that it would be more intellectually sound and doctrinally satisfying, if 
regulations or guidelines based on data protection principles and tailored specifically 
to the management of sensitive data, were developed and adopted within Africa. The 
regulatory challenges of implementing a privacy framework, in a multifaceted and 
advancing environment, will require careful consideration of the role of consent and 
data exchange.152  
To address matters of extradition, mutual assistance, and enforcement 
measures between AU member states, an additional protocol to the Malabo 
Convention may be necessary.153  
(2)  A new regional sui generis data protection instrument  
The second option may be to redraft the Malabo Convention in its entirety. The 
Malabo Convention comprises three chapters – electronic transactions, data protection 
                                               
152 D McGraw, JX Dempsey, L Harris and J Goldman ‘Privacy As An Enabler, Not An Impediment: 
Building Trust Into Health Information Exchange’ (2009) 28 (2) Health Affairs 416–427. See also J Li 
‘Privacy policies for health social networking sites’ (2013) 20 (4) Journal of the American Medical 
Informatics Association 704–707. 
153 Orji (n 144) at 134. 
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and cybersecurity. The Convention is thus a commercial, human rights and criminal 
law instrument. It is exceptionally broad in its scope. Moreover, it is not specific to 
the data processing of health care related information, or eHealth related services, as 
its provisions are general in application.154  
Difficulties around privacy and data protection in eHealth may be resolved 
through a comprehensive framework that balances the implementation of 
strengthened and clearly defined privacy principles and statutory direction, adopts 
trusted technological mechanisms, includes industry best practice and establishes 
oversight, accountability and enforcement measures. 155  The evolution of clear 
principles would thus translate into a privacy-based action, with a well-defined 
recourse for remedies and legal redress for damages. To engender trust and 
confidence in eHealth activities, policymakers will need to craft policies and 
regulations that encourage enforceable fair-information and privacy practices within 
an emerging and underdeveloped health care environment.156 This could take the form 
of a regional sui generis data protection instrument. 
Finally, as asserted by Mizani and Baykal, the solution in summation is to be 
found in regulations, standards and procedures, inter-organisational efforts and multi-
disciplinary specialised interventions.157 The development of a consolidated African 
instrument specifically for that purpose may well provide such a baseline solution.  
(3)  A code of conduct specifically for eHealth privacy protection 
Regulation may additionally be advanced by the introduction of a code of conduct 
that is aimed at a specific sector of the eHealth industry. Such a code may assist 
eHealth service providers in complying with data protection principles when 
developing eHealth applications, for example, by providing rules on obtaining consent 
for data use, and by providing for and describing the notion of transparency.  
                                               
154 Article 1 Malabo Convention at 5. However, it does contain specific principles for the processing of 
sensitive data in Article 14.  
155 Ibid. 
156 J Goldman and Z Hudson ‘Virtually exposed: Privacy and e-Health’ (2000) 19 (6) Health Affairs at 
145. 
157 MA Mizani and N Baykal ‘Policymaking to preserve privacy in disclosure of public health data: A 
suggested framework’ (2015) 41 J Med Ethics at 263. 
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Although such a code is often industry specific and limited in application, a 
code may raise awareness of the data protection rules in relation to eHealth 
applications, and thus could facilitate and increase compliance with the more general 
regional data protection instrument. Guidance can be targeted at eHealth application 
designers, for instance, individuals, companies or organisations who make available 
(either directly or via application stores) software applications for mobile devices, 
which are intended to process data concerning health.  
Building a governance regime of this sort may seek to ensure effective 
monitoring and enforcement where required and promote standards of good practice 
across the industry. Although useful in providing practical measures of privacy 
implementation, voluntary compliance is required for an instrument of this nature. 
This unfortunately does not always guarantee compliance, however, and it cannot 
provide a complete solution to the eHealth privacy debate.  
A code of conduct for mobile health privacy was submitted to the EU 
Article 29 Working Party on 7 June 2016.158  Issues covered by the EU code of 
conduct, which may be useful in a similar African code, include user’s consent, 
purpose limitation and data minimisation, privacy by design and, by default, data 
subjects’ rights and information requirements, data retention, security measures, 
principles on advertising in eHealth applications, use of personal data for secondary 
purposes, disclosing data to third parties for processing operations, data transfers, 
personal data breach, and data gathered from children.  
A further example is the publication, on 27 September 2016, of a data 
protection code by the Cloud Infrastructure Service Providers in Europe. This code 
takes into account the specific role of European Cloud Infrastructure Service 
Providers. The self-regulatory code lists data protection requirements to be complied 
with by cloud service providers under current and future EU law.159 In terms of the 
EU Regulation, associations and bodies are encouraged to develop codes of conduct, 
the purpose of which is to facilitate the effective application of the EU Regulation.160 
A further example of a code of conduct emerging out of the EU is the code of conduct 
                                               
158 ‘Code of Conduct on privacy for mHealth apps has been finalised’ (2016). 
159 ‘Data Protection Code of Conduct for Cloud Service Providers’ (2015) EU Digital Single Market.  
160 Article 40 of the EU Regulation. 
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for mobile health privacy. This code was finalised and submitted to the EU Article 29 
Working Party on 7 June 2016.161 
The Malabo Convention defines a ‘code of conduct’ in Article 1. However, no 
mention is made of it in the section on data protection. As is found in the EU 
Regulation, industry associations and other bodies should be encouraged to develop 
codes of conduct to facilitate the application of the provisions contained in the 
Malabo Convention. Codes of conduct may thus exist side by side with the 
Convention and act to reinforce the practical, industry specific application of the 
Convention. Codes of conduct are useful, in that they not only reflect existing 
industry approaches, but also set out goals towards which the industry might strive in 
future.  
 
V CONCLUSION  
The contribution of this chapter is twofold: firstly, it recommends the adoption of 
multiple layers of data protection regulatory measures; secondly, it proposes that 
significant strides in data protection can be made by the use of a formal regional 
regulatory legal instrument. I questioned the completeness of the Malabo Convention 
and sought to identify those areas of data protection within the Malabo Convention, 
where the content and substance require amendment. Following this, finally, I 
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CHAPTER 9: POSITION GOING FORWARD 
 
The issue of privacy is not for us simply as a matter of business practice. It’s just 








This thesis presents a constructive perspective, a conceptual understanding and a 
pragmatic critique of the questions that lie at the intersection of the following: an 
individual’s right to privacy and data protection, the cultural disparity when defining 
privacy, the sensitivity of health related data, the individual’s right to health care, 
where lack of resources and accessibility are often commonplace, the introduction of 
networked technologies and development within the health care system as solutions, 
the borderless and largely unregulated nature of the digital environment, and the 
emergence of more stringent data protection norms internationally.  
 
II POSITION GOING FORWARD 
The solution to safeguarding data privacy in eHealth within the African region is 
proposed. It is suggested that there is a need to reaffirm human rights values 
particularly the right to privacy. The future position in South Africa is discussed, as is 
the way forward for Africa.  
(1)  How to resolve the paradox 
Against the backdrop of emerging regulatory policies and practices, I have examined 
the complexity of challenges in the context of eHealth development in Africa, with 
particular attention being paid to the right to privacy and protection of the processing 
of personal data. While eHealth service delivery and the widespread reach of the data 
generated are revolutionary, the concomitant threat to privacy is inevitable. An appeal 
is made for a more systematic and critical review of the regulation of data protection 
and data exchanges, and for a simplification of the regulatory environment by 
unifying the governance of data privacy protection within Africa.  
 In answering the various challenges, I argue that the adoption of an 
accepted social imperative protected by a powerful triumvirate of ethical constraints, 
effective legal provisions and regulations, and operational necessities, is possible. I 
therefore support the adoption of multiple layers of protection and the establishment 
of a consolidated regional instrument, which provides a regulatory baseline 
comprising clearly defined, non-negotiable, yet contextually and culturally sensitive 
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data protection standards and principles that are relevant specifically to health care 
delivery in an eHealth environment in a developing world. Such an instrument should 
still accept and incorporate internationally agreed upon human rights norms and those 
standards and concepts, which are contextually feasible.  
(2)  The need to reaffirm human rights values 
We are at a difficult juncture in the protection of privacy in the digital environment. 
The contribution of this thesis is to embark on a vigorous reaffirmation of privacy in a 
contextually sensitive manner. The challenge is to apply principles that have been 
endorsed internationally and regionally to domestic legislation and practice. 
Human rights exist to protect people. Rights place a limitation on states and 
people, and they impose obligations on how states and people are to act. With the 
increase in technological change, the growing global economy, and steady inequality 
between the developed and developing worlds, a degree of alienation of the values 
underpinning human rights is being witnessed. Protecting rights, including the right to 
privacy, is essential for people to live with dignity. The reaffirmation – and defence – 
of human rights is a moral imperative.1 The full observance of privacy rights should 
be the norm, with limitations being only the exception.2 As new technologies have 
empowered individuals, I argue that rights are now more important than ever. Finally, 
I agree with the Human Rights Watch report of 2017, which argues that how states 
protect human rights in the digital age will determine whether the internet is a force 
that ‘liberates or enchains us’.3  
(3)  The South African position  
Taking into consideration the virtues of their cultural heritage, their social and 
historical legacy and the values inherent in African civilisations, inspiration may be 
drawn from validating African peoples’ particular concept of privacy. The position in 
                                               
1 K Roth ‘The dangerous Rise of Populism’ (2017) Human Rights Watch.  
2 D PoKempner ‘The Internet is Not the Enemy: As Rights Move Online, Human Rights Standards 
Move with Them’ World Report (2017) Human Rights Watch at 44.  
3 Ibid at 39. 
242 
South Africa is thus presented to as an illustration of an approach and its challenges 
that may be mirrored throughout Africa.  
In South Africa, privacy is protected by virtue of the law of delict, by means 
of a protected right of privacy enshrined in the Constitution, and by provisions in 
general or specific privacy and/or data protection legislation. These means of 
protection run concurrently within the legal system and, rather than existing 
independently, their convergence and mutual interaction can serve to strengthen any 
consequential privacy protection. 
Traditional theories of liability based on delict, although well established in 
common law privacy protection, may prove deficient when applied to uses of 
computer technology in eHealth. Reformation and the development of privacy and 
data protection laws by means of statutory protection that is specifically tailored to 
safeguard data generated by eHealth endeavours appears to be the most viable 
solution. Notwithstanding the advancements made by the enactment of the POPI Act, 
specific privacy protection provisions safeguarding eHealth in South Africa are still 
described as incomplete, contentious and inadequate. Little accommodation is made 
with regard to the unique circumstances found in developing countries in drafting 
such provisions. Neither is any discernable contribution or influence attributed to the 
wealth of traditional African laws in South Africa, nor is any obvious attempt made to 
include aspects of African philosophy and ideology. 
As the influence of various international law measures has played a role in the 
drafting of various legislations hinging on human rights, most notably the POPI Act, 
the measures will most likely be evident in the development of future South African 
legislative and jurisprudential efforts. As the role of international law has been 
instrumental in the development of socio-economic jurisprudence since 1994, there 
should be little reason why it should not be present as a factor in the evolution of 
further specific human rights jurisprudence, as contained in the Bill of Rights, for 
instance, with regard to the right to privacy.4  
                                               
4 Confirmation that international law is included among the ‘tools of interpretation’, which the Court 
may consider, is Chaskalson J’s reference in S v Makwanyane at para 35. See further Government of 
South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others, amongst others, which demonstrate that the 
provisions of ‘soft’ international law influenced the guarantees of these rights under the Constitution. 
Also, see Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and others, where the 
relevance of provisions contained in the ICESCR and in General Comment 7 of the United Nations 
CESCR is apparent. 
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The reality is that privacy protection in health care in South Africa is typically 
fragmented, with inconsistencies found in the various legislations, policies and 
guidelines. No comprehensive or cohesive national legislative or regulatory standard 
exists, governing exclusively privacy interests within the eHealth environment or 
issues arising therefrom, for instance, the practice of eHealth across national 
jurisdictions. To comply with the requirements in the POPI Act with regard to trans-
border data exchanges, companies typically conclude a data transfer agreement, which 
stipulate the foreign transferee’s obligations and any data restrictions. 
Organisations, such as the HPCSA, while perfectly positioned to embrace the 
challenges imposed by new health care technology and proactively provide insightful 
solutions in its guidelines, have not done so. Currently, the regulatory position has 
moved from vague, unclearly defined provisions and guidelines, to a bank of drafted 
guidelines with the sole purpose of specifically governing eHealth and telemedicine 
initiative. Sadly, guidelines and codes of conduct cannot provide a complete solution, 
as their authority to regulate and penalise is limited to medical data protection and 
privacy issues within a small and confined eHealth sector.  
Additionally, privacy and data protection, where enacted, is not specific to the 
health care sector, but is rather part of a general omnibus privacy and data protection 
legislative regime.5 Moreover, it is common for a blurring of the boundaries to occur 
between the different regulations and legislative positions that may apply to eHealth 
data protection and privacy within a single country or region. In South Africa, for 
instance, the POPI Act, the National Health Act, the ECT Act and several guidelines 
all have provisions dealing with particular aspects of medical data protection to 
various degrees.  
Despite data protection legislation being enacted or being in the process of 
enactment, not all data protection legislation is comparable. While considerable 
international Human Rights instruments, comprehensive data protection literature and 
authoritative sets of data protection principles are available to which countries can 
refer, regrettably, certain data protection measures may be described as narrow and 
inadequate versions of the full range of data protection principles that are ideally 
                                               
5 S Avancha, A Baxi and D Kotz ‘Privacy in mobile technology for personal healthcare’ (2012) 45 (1) 
3 ACM Computing Surveys at 3.9. 
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required. Nevertheless, attempts to address the issues are positive and encouraging 
and may be an indicator of what is to come.  
(4)  In summation: The way forward for Africa  
There have been considerable research efforts in recent years to create a common 
repository of reusable eHealth system designs, documents, tools and codes focusing 
primarily on the standards related to the technical interoperability of health care 
systems. This has allowed health information systems currently in operation to 
function as a viable whole. Despite this, little has been done to create a common 
cohesive repository of international eHealth best practice, regulatory or ethical 
guidelines, protocols and/or legislations, which could be useful in the governance of 
data protection, particularly within the field of eHealth in developing regions.  
Data protection within eHealth is a challenge that cannot be ignored. The 
undertaking is to demonstrate how we are to protect the interest in privacy and 
personal data, where the following factors are present: the emergence of a constantly 
evolving online and technological environment, the nature of eHealth and its ability to 
span jurisdictions, and the barriers confronted in a developing world.  
The intensification of these factors gives rise to a deeply troubled and 
compromised data protection position. The starting point for a solution is, firstly, the 
use of a multi-layered approach, using the best aspects of the many models of data 
protection already in place. Secondly, a solution is to be found in the adoption of a 
coherent, regional, African cross-jurisdictional instrument that informs the adoption 
of an Afro-centric approach in respect of, particularly, issues of consent, data storage 
and exchange, and regional enforcement. At the centre of such reconstruction, I 
suggest, exists a range of possibilities, and the provision of exclusively one specific 
and limited solution is ambitious.  
What is needed is a sense of confirmation of, and adoption of, the various 
helpful aspects already developed in the legislation, and we need to draw on those 
attractive elements that are of value. Where concepts and measures are inappropriate 
or where a range of choices exists, it is not necessary to tumble all the way down to 
the bottom position but rather to find a comfortable, appropriate position somewhere 
in the middle. Expectations of performance and standards need not be ‘lower’ but may 
just be ‘different’, depending on the context. 
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Finally, for our purposes, it is wise to acknowledge that any attempt at data 
protection integration in Africa will be futile, where there is an unwillingness on the 
part of African member states to translate their commitments in terms of the 
provisions of such regional treaty or agreement into clear substantive amendments to 
their domestic policies, legislation, rules and regulations. Disparities in culture and 
legal traditions may impede consensus on the details of legal international or regional 
provisions. Moreover, the passive adherence to inappropriate and imprecise 
regulations implemented in other parts of the world should not automatically be 
indicated for Africa. Any recommendation ought to be subjected to constant scrutiny, 
debate, evolution and re-evaluation.  
Where substantial investment into eHealth development has been made, the 
indication appears to be that the legal frameworks providing concomitant data 
protection are simultaneously being accelerated. However, this has been largely on a 
fragmented and reactionary basis.6 Noteworthy too, is that where privacy legislation is 
adopted, it is often generic and superficial, with limited provisions addressing the 
more nuanced data protection requirements that are needed to safeguard the user’s 
privacy rights within a health care environment.7 
What is required is for African member states to subordinate any immediate 
national political interests in their commitment to achieve long-term regional data 
protection objectives and thus to cede elements of sovereignty to a regional 
institution, such as the AU. This circumventing of the parliamentary function of states 
in policy creation is not always well received. While initial cooperation may be 
forthcoming, a danger exists that states may leave policies to atrophy. 
Thus, as a general point, multinational international agreements, by their very 
nature, have limitations. International treaty making is constrained, firstly, by what is 
politically possible, secondly, by the value of subsidiarity, and lastly, by the need to 
integrate international laws with diverse domestic legal approaches.  
Accordingly, Africa cannot afford to take an isolationist approach. However, 
the requirements, issues and priorities of the developed world sometimes differ from 
                                               
6 WHO ‘Global Observatory for eHealth’ (2006) at 6. 
7 Ibid. See M Wugmeister, K Retzer and C Rich ‘Code of Conduct for cross-border data transfers: 
making the case for corporate privacy rules’ (2007) 38 Georgetown Journal of International Law at 
449. 
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those pertinent to developing countries. Regulations suitable for the developed world 
may be incompatible with those relevant in the developing world. The problem in 
formulating ‘international best practices’ for the developing world is that it may lead 
to a further deepening of the ‘digital divide’ between the developed and the 
developing world. 
 
III CONCLUSION  
To conclude, there are many things to be hopeful about and Africa has made a very 
promising start in the field of privacy protection in eHealth. In attempting to find a 
solution, my goal is modest. Achieving an optimal balance between too little and too 
much protection of privacy is a complex process. The necessary balance implicit in 
any regulatory framework should take into consideration not only a claim to privacy, 
but also the desire to provide health care delivery on a vast scale to those most in 
need, by encouraging innovative methods of eHealth technological development. 
What this is alerting us to is that eHealth data protection regulation is in a 
fragile state of development and that the basic principles of modern health privacy 
law are not easily determined, nor do they have a particularly strong foundation. 
Nonetheless, the concession is made that the relationship between the transformation 
of the eHealth regulatory landscape in safeguarding privacy and data protection and 
the existing well-established, albeit dated, legal regime is not easily resolved, nor 
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